NUCLEAR WATCHDOG OR IRAN’S LAPDOG? PART ONE
Exclusive: The International Atomic Energy Agency: Nuclear Watchdog or Iran’s Lapdog? (Part One of Two)
Dr. Robin McFee
Author’s note: This is Part One of a series on the IAEA, nuclear threats and Iran.
“The greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East, and to all of humanity, is the encounter between extremist Islam and nuclear weapons.†– Benjamin Netanyahu
And the point of that encounter would be…..Iran.
As Dickens to his readers – Jacob Marley was dead. Without accepting this fact, nothing good can come of this story. Well if you will allow me the same literary theatrics in borrowing Dickens’ technique…..Iran is nuclear – without accepting this fact, nothing good can ensue, including the urgency for strategies to contain a nation with aspirations far greater than being the agent provocateur in the Middle East. Make no mistake about it: Iran has global appetites for worldwide respect or fear, recognition as a dominant international player, vaunted adversary, beloved ally. From its participation/observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to upcoming leadership in the Non Aligned Nations (NAM) to 800 pound gorilla (guerilla) in the Middle East, puppet master to Hamas and Hezbollah, and of course ally of Russia – on some level, Ahmadinejad has illusions of Xerxes and a greater Persia, 21st century style. And he has deftly guided his nation towards this vision very well through savvy use of the media as an accomplished speaker, to employing brutal and ruthless tactics. We are gravely mistaken when we underestimate him, his allies or the resolve of his nation.
Ahmadinejad knows us – the West – better than we know ourselves; what we will readily grasp and buy into, what we fear, and how far we can be cajoled, conned, or distracted. He is crazy as a fox. We would do well not to underestimate him, his eloquence and resolve. He exploits the politics of jealousy and understands how to tap that emotion to build support for his actions against the West. And he has had global leaders and UN representatives, such as now former director of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, as apologists, protectors and purveyors of political cover through plausible deniability.
And what has the West, even the current U.S. administration, pinned its hopes on to protect the world from such nuclear wannabes? None other than the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA has multiple tasks before it and is a multifaceted, complex organization. At the outset let’s separate the components of the IAEA; throughout this article we’ll be talking about the nuclear watchdog/non-proliferation aspect of IAEA. As a scientific body and source of expertise for the peaceful use of atomic power it has distinguished itself and those who have fulfilled that role have done so with professionalism. The following discussion is of the IAEA in terms of watchdog, not their medical or scientific sections.
“All warfare is based upon deception.†–Sun Tzu, The Art of War
And just how are we going to pierce the veil of deception?
At a recent security conference at which I was presenting a talk on bio-disruptive challenges and biological threats, another one of the scheduled lectures was to introduce a “new†strategy that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has taken an interest in, as well as investing in, an approach to identify nations that might not be forthcoming about the true intentions for their nuclear programs – i.e. non-peaceful intent. Sounds good so far, right? Given the threat of rogue nations obtaining nuclear materials or radiation based weapons is something WMD preparedness folks like me are concerned about, this sounded worth forgoing an afternoon of sand boarding or indoor skiing. Wow, was I wrong!
The premise in a nutshell, and one apparently that the IAEA is highly touting, involves using computer forensics to examine the information storage – hard-drives, memory sticks and other devices – of suspected nations to search for information fragments that might demonstrate less than peaceful applications of their nuclear efforts. This is based upon the theory that these potential nuclear perpetrators are somehow going to carelessly leave a trail in the delete files on their computers. I kid you not.
I’m sorry, but did the IAEA really suggest they are pinning their hopes on the possibility that the same folks who have the sophistication to build secret nuclear programs under the watchful eyes of supposedly bright people are going to leave computer footprints to the porno and “nuclear weapons 101†websites they are clandestinely visiting? Or even the Swiss bank accounts or e-mail addresses of the Pakistani, North Korean and Russian scientists who are helping with the learning curve? Perhaps the invoice numbers and ship registry where the glow in the dark materials are coming from?
As if this wasn’t perversely amusing on its own, is the revelation this program is barely more than a school project. Yes that is right…the potential future of the world, if you believe nukes in the hands of crazy or evil people is a bad thing, will rest on a (graduate) school project. The concept of checking the delete file (okay, it is somewhat more sophisticated than this, but not by much) is a project by a graduate student studying preparedness. [Kudos deservedly sent to her for heart in the right place, trying to make a difference in the world.] But beyond the fact that the IAEA thinks this is cutting edge technology (NOT), is the realization of preparedness experts that our generation of “in the trenches†expertise is being replaced by a cottage industry of academic theoreticians. Voilà ! As an aside, though book smart and street smart are not mutually exclusive, when it comes to disarming bad stuff, I’d prefer someone with hands-on experience to someone who only read about it, even if the books were written by really credible people. But, I digress.
The speaker went on to emphasize that utilizing the information forensics, like other inspections, will rely upon cooperation and compliance from member states. Let me get this straight – we are concerned about a nation going off the reservation with nuclear material and yet we still need to rely upon the individual nation’s cooperation. Does anyone but me think voluntary, announced inspections are doomed to failure? Any parent will tell you how well that works.
They plan on rolling it out in the future on a few folks to test the theory. Considering the open source nature of the program – preparedness speak for “the cat’s out of the bag†if folks haven’t invested in drive scrubbers, they might, perish the thought, use different computers – one set that they show to the IAEA and one that has the real information. Hmm, would bad guys use two sets of books? Imagine that!
Then the speaker started giving the audience a primer on why the delete key does not truly delete information from the hard-drive, and how they (IAEA) can exploit that to discover meaningful information which can be utilized to identify technology that is not used for the purposes as officially stated to IAEA. Beyond the obvious questionable strategy of giving a basic course on computer security to a room full of seasoned security professionals, was the unfair demand upon our collective physical strength to sit there with straight faces and not laugh ourselves silly. Congratulations, IAEA – you have just discovered …the past! Speak about attending the school of “been there, done that.â€
The IAEA really thinks cyber forensics is an alternate way to catch secretive nuclear wannabes. I had to repeat that to myself a few times. Okay, let’s willingly suspend reality and disbelief for a moment. Like the reality that the same folks who are assisting the rogue states (Iran, North Korea), which the speaker conspicuously avoided naming, Russia and China – are two of the leading cyber crime and cyber terrorism nations on planet earth. Russia is so advanced in cyber technology, whether Russian Mafia or their security apparatus, that much of the identify theft leaves “spasiba†on the thank you note. Russia is working closely with Cuba, and has an advanced cyber program just 90 miles off the Florida coast. Does it make sense that the very nations helping Iran develop a nuclear program often in secret over the last 20 years, would overlook such obvious areas of inquiry as leaving behind classified information as computer traces? Does anyone but the village idiot believe that the most sophisticated cyber nations on the planet who are helping Iran develop their uranium (and plutonium) programs would have forgotten to send along computer experts with the nuclear scientists, missile defense experts and radioactive materials? Would you bet your life on that? No one said criminals were geniuses; we all laugh at the 11 p.m. news where a masked, would-be bank robber uses a deposit ticket for the demand note. And it is likely someone will be stupid in their efforts to obtain nuclear materials and perhaps, just perhaps this forensic approach will catch someone. But it is not the “second coming†in catching the bad guys red handed. Let’s not pitch it that way. The serious players will not be caught so easily. And even if perchance they would, what then? Even when Iran admits they hid the truth, what are the consequences? And it wasn’t IAEA that caught Tehran red-handed to begin with.
When I asked if they were deploying a team to Iran I was told that nation might be included but not right away and certainly not as the first or only nation. If we did that, I was told, it would appear that the IAEA was singling them out and that would be unfair.
Terribly sporting of you chaps to worry about Iran’s feelings.
Of course, the IAEA doesn’t feel so compelled to worry about insulting the United States – the speaker was quick to suggest that the U.S. was seen in the world, well at least until the 2008 election, as a cowboy nation, taking matters into its own hands. She went on to offer that the U.S. should leave identifying nuclear threats to the United Nations, the IAEA and other formal organizations that are expert at handling this sort of thing. Perhaps feeling protective for the Stars and Stripes or realizing that I had just blown off a great afternoon of extreme sports for a “Sesame Street†level preparedness talk, I countered with, “But didn’t the IAEA get blindsided by Iran for about 20 years? And with such a track record of deception, if their technology was to prove itself and provide actionable information, wouldn’t it be useful to try it on a nation that continues to hide the truth?â€
Clearly the IAEA’s watchdog arm never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Perhaps they attended “the college of that is so yesterday†when they should be at “the class of the here and now.†As an aside, this cyber forensic technology was tried before, and quelle surprise, well I offer you North Korea and Iran. While IAEA is to be commended for trying to look outside the box with their cyber approach, and perhaps with collaboration from some very savvy folks at MIT, Cal Poly and, mon Dieu, even asking NSA for help, they might be onto something if done in future thought not yesterday technology. Sadly this part scientific and part watch dog agency tends to sound a bit schizophrenic – that is understandable in any political organization that changes course with the wind; as the wind changes direction so does the attitude and strategy from the organization. To be clear, the IAEA is not without merit or value. But….
What’s up with the IAEA?
The IAEA is more than an anti-proliferation body. It is also a scientific, even medical resource. And within that realm it provides high quality services that are enormously useful. To be fair, the IAEA is a complex organization which was saddled with some fundamental problems from inception.
First, it is affiliated with the UN. That alone is near guarantee of being more political than practical – in a word, doomed from the start. The UN, and by extension the IAEA is a Coke can with a bunch of strings pulling at it in different directions – the largest ones from the Security Council – a body politic that by definition and constituency cannot do much more than incremental actions. The UN is also at the whim of the loudest whiners. One nation, one vote. Not surprisingly, there is a tug of war between the developed and developing members.
Second, IAEA suffers from mission creep – just what is the role of the IAEA? As watchdog to prevent proliferation? To ensure the peaceful and safe use of nuclear power and materials? Which is emphasized depends upon the philosophy of the current director general, the UN, global opinion, and who is writing the checks. As a scientific resource for the peaceful use of nuclear power, the IAEA has a decent track record – providing training, expertise and guidelines. And IAEA does it on a very small budget. Therein lies the next problem….
Third, small budget for big challenges. No surprise, we invest in what we value. Apparently we think IAEA should be able to do Herculean work on beggars’ wages. If we truly believe in the mission of the IAEA, then let us pony up and support it as the World at Risk Report suggested.
Fourth, no power to compel. There are no real consequences to ignoring the IAEA beyond the Agency going to the UN and either through regulatory cover or outcry, obtaining sanctions and diplomatic approaches. How’s that working with Iran? If you have to ask… On the other hand, there is Mosad and the Israeli Air Force. So far they are two for two in reducing the number of nuclear rogues (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007). Perhaps we should invest more in the IAF and less in the IAEA?
The IAEA has an important job but without the mandate, money, manpower or unified mission mindset to get the watchdog job done. In the World at Risk report, the Commission wrote about the importance of upgrading the IAEA and enhancing its capabilities.
The world needs an effective watchdog agency but one that is above sympathizing with the very nations it is supposed to investigate, and beyond partaking in the politics of jealousy, anti-West victim mentality which it has demonstrated, especially through its most recent director El Baradei. In spite of Iran being caught deceiving and trying to continue a near 20 year pattern of concealing its nuclear program – whether the recently publicized centrifuge enrichment sites at Netanz and Qom, or as some of us have written about the overlooked laser enrichment sites at Lashkar Ab’ad and Karaj, as well as numerous other critical sites, Mohamed El Baradei continued to downplay these events. Whether out of denial that he was hoodwinked or obvious sympathy towards Iran’s sensibilities which aren’t too difficult to identify, he continues to reject the obvious. El Baradei opined “there was no concrete proof†Tehran was developing nuclear weapons. Clearly, El Baradei sounds more lapdog than watchdog; an apt characterization. He has persistently ignored his own IAEA experts’ warnings on the advancements Iran has achieved towards weapons capability, overlooked that nation’s duplicity, and all but excused Tehran’s repeated treaty breaches. El Baradei seems blithely unaware or perhaps unconcerned that Ahmadinejad has all but sent out announcement cards – “We’re nuclear, Western Nations, deal with it!†More on this in Part Two.
The leadership process of IAEA is also part of the problem. Directors are selected from career diplomats instead of preparedness experts. Baradei made his bones siding with the developing world and fighting the U.S. and Israel – the only nations really doing anything about Iran – and in the process got a Nobel Prize to show for it. It is one thing to negotiate with potential proliferators, it is another to recognize this is not merely a political or diplomatic endeavor, it is a protection assignment.
Iran didn’t get nuclear technology, material or manpower from Nukes R Us or Amazon.com. The Mr. Wizard home kit for thermonuclear devices or “home heating through fission†has not made it to the shelves of Discovery stores yet. It is time the IAEA become less of a political body and more a watchdog agency – one of the core missions is to prevent nuclear proliferation. Perhaps we should send a primer on nuclear threats to the IAEA and the trade routes where rogue nations are obtaining their expertise, materials, and support. It’s not, if you’ll excuse the phrase, rocket science! The materials with which rogue nations are building advanced technologies and weapons have “made in Russia†and “made in China†on them. Perhaps we need to put more pressure on the dealers and well as the users.
Can’t single Iran out? Are you kidding? Speak about being afraid to tell someone to stop running with scissors.
On October 28, 2008, Dr Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stood at the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly and warned the world about nuclear terror. “The possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remains a grave threat,†said Dr El Baradei. “The number of incidents reported to the Agency involving the theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive material is disturbingly high,†he said. “Equally troubling is the fact that much of this material is not subsequently recovered. Sometimes material is found which had not been reported missing.†Shocking – the bad guys didn’t tell the truth. In 2009, he was making excuses for or just plain ignoring Iran for the very acts he decried in 2008, until the magnitude of media coverage was too great for El Baradei to overlook.
Maybe the IAEA ought to rent the movie Pirates of the Caribbean if they really are serious about how to handle the bad guys. Consider the highly instructive scene wherein Captain Jack Sparrow played by Johnny Depp is fencing with a naïve but goodhearted young swordsman played by Orlando Bloom. It is a close duel until Depp’s character pulls a gun on Blooms. The shocked younger man is in total dismay as if the ungentlemanly act was completely unexpected. He says to Captain Sparrow – “you cheated?!†To which the pirate responds referring to himself with a demeanor meant to match the words “hello, I’m a pirate!†What a shocker – pirates cheat! What a concept Iran misleads.
Everyone states the obvious – Iran is a problem. What to do about it remains the elephant in the room, not unlike the reality that, yes, Iran is a nuclear weapons nation – some assembly requiredperhaps, but nevertheless, a nuclear power, fledgling though it may be.
Discussion
To date the IAEA watchdog arm has failed miserably to identify emerging threats, or to curtail them….As a watchdog they have too long empathized with, excused, ignored or pandered to folks who needed inspecting and containment. In the process the IAEA as a political organization has betrayed its responsibility as a credible or effective watchdog. Without Israel, nations such as Iraq and Syria would also be on their way towards nuclear weapons. Will the world have to let Israel be Israel again to address the Iran as nuclear threat? Why do we have a UN when the world’s most difficult problems repeatedly get solved by the U.S. and the U.S.-led coalition, including most often Great Britain, Australia, Canada and Israel? More importantly, given the near anemic capabilities and even more inexcusable lack of resolve to call Iran out for its threatening behavior, should we trust the IAEA anymore? Or can the anti-proliferation arm of the agency be reformed, redirected? Is it irrelevant in comparison to the containment capabilities of the U.S., Israel and other nations?
At least on the good news front, El Baradei is gone. But will his successor have the courage, wisdom and impartiality to redirect and reform the IAEA? Was the West even paying attention when the election for a new director was going on? The West needs to exert more influence on and expend greater interest in the IAEA. And the U.S. cannot abandon its leadership role as honest broker. As the sole super power, at least for the moment, it is incumbent for the U.S. to counter the rhetoric of Iran, its supporters, even the IAEA and not get lost in the misdirection of futile conversations and delaying tactics. Censure and sanctions, unless they really go to the heart of Iran’s soft spot – energy – oil and gas, anything short of force will be futile. Negotiations only delay the inevitable and almost always favor the perpetrators. So far, Iran has played the talk card very well and bought a lot of time to work on its nuclear program. Diplomacy has a role but not when it is misused as a tactical advantage by the bad guys.
Conclusion
A Nuclear Iran: in January 2010, who would you trust your life to – Israel or the IAEA?
The IAEA has multiple tasks before it. As a scientific body and source of expertise for the peaceful use of atomic power it has over the years distinguished itself and those who have fulfilled that role have done so with great professionalism. Many of their courses, training programs and materials are first rate and have been enormously useful for medical and scientific personnel. Their willingness to collaborate in preparedness and to enhance response capabilities is laudable and high quality. Any discussion of the IAEA in terms of proliferation cannot and should not impugn their medical or scientific contributions globally.
The IAEA is underfunded, was poorly led, and remains an underpowered organization with a faltering watch dog component that is more political than practical. For 20 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been deceived by Iran and North Korea as well as other nations. It only recently in the face of numerous infractions tepidly denounced Iran for not being honest about their capabilities. Shocking! Twenty years of secret programs, misrepresenting their nuclear assets and we still are surprised by anything Iran does? Yet IAEA leadership gave it political cover! The world, especially the IAEA and increasingly this Administration are much like Charlie Brown playing football with Lucy. The good guys, like Charlie Brown, never quite get it that Lucy will remove the football right before he tries to kick it, resulting in a gigantic thud as he lands hard on his keester. Ahmadinejad is Lucy; and toys with the Charlie Brown West.
According to National Intelligence Estimates by the U.S., as well as security evaluations from Interpol and other global watch-dog agencies, there is high likelihood of increasing numbers of nuclear nations, including Iran in the not distant future, as well as increased trafficking of radiological materials – for legal and peacetime uses and black-market enterprises. The future stability of Pakistan is a significant source of concern as a nuclear nation, that is, increasing its arsenal; their ability to secure those weapons in an unstable and dangerous region remains unknown. In a 2007 poll sponsored by the well-respected magazine Foreign Policy, among 117 terrorism experts queried about nuclear threats, 74 percent considered Pakistan the country most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists in the next three to five years. The World at Risk Report also expressed concern about their FATA region. But much of this was pre-nuclear Iran. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia is a great concern as a source for radioactive materials.
Of all the nations with nuclear toys, given Iran is a major terrorist nation, do we doubt an off the truck gift to Hamas or Hezbollah in the future?
Although the speaker suggested the world, and specifically mentioned the US should trust the IAEA to handle potential nuclear threats, the reality is simple – just think Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Iraq. Others won’t be far behind…Turkey and Egypt for starters. Just put a radiation tag on Russian diplomats and you will know who might be next shopping at the Moscow Nuclear Mart. And were it not for the U.S. and Israel, instead of only Iran and North Korea having nuclear capabilities, everyone on that list would!
While the world should give the IAEA an “F†on its nuclear watchdog, stopping proliferation report card especially under the leadership of El Baradei, a new director is about to take the helm. Perhaps with greater attention focused on this agency, more transparency internally and more stakeholder action (translation holding IAEA accountable) leveled towards it externally, the IAEA can reemerge as a valuable tool against nuclear proliferation. For the sake of global security, let’s fix the IAEA sooner than later.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Robin McFee is a physician and medical toxicologist. An expert in WMD preparedness, she is a consultant to government agencies, corporations and the media. Dr. McFee is a member of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council of ASIS International. She has authored numerous articles on terrorism, health care and preparedness, and coauthored two books: Toxico-Terrorism by McGraw Hill and The Handbook of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Agents, published by Informa/CRC Press.
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