WHY RUSH TO RATIFY START? ADRIAN MORGAN
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.8177/pub_detail.asp
On April 8, 2010 in Prague in the Czech Republic, President Obama and his Russian counterpart President Medvedev signed the New START treaty. Now, in the Lame Duck Congress, whose members will be replaced on January 3 after the holiday recess, the administration is urging that the treaty should be ratified. The issue of having a Senate whose members have no ongoing mandate deciding issues of future national security is an issue of democratic accountability. Certain figures on the Republican side such as Senator Jon Kyl have been accused of delaying the ratification for “political” means, but the issue of hurrying the ratification of New START is also a “political” measure.
In November, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) published an article urging swift ratification of the START treaty. The article stated:
Altogether, in a nuclear spending spree that would have been inconceivable during the Bush administration, the Obama administration plans to spend well over $180 billion to modernize nuclear weapons delivery systems and production facilities over the next decade.
There is a real risk that in the coming years, this modernization could backfire and undermine the second pillar of U.S. nuclear policy: strengthening nonproliferation.
The reason is simple: U.S. nonproliferation efforts [are] dependent upon international support, but if the international community sees the increased nuclear modernizations as contradicting the U.S. pledge to work toward nuclear disarmament, some countries may well decide not to support the administration’s nonproliferation agenda.
FAS argued that with NATO’s new Strategic Concept coming up for review at that time, which would commit NATO countries to a ten-year policy, involving nuclear defense, it would encourage some countries to reject non-proliferation. The NATO summit at Lisbon on November 18 saw the approval of the new Strategic Concept (downloadable here as a pdf document). The Strategic Concept holds NATO to a pledge to reinforce cooperation with Russia. NATO’s Strategic Concept
“commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.”
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish prime minister, is the secretary general of NATO. Almost immediately after the acceptance of the NATO Strategic Concept, he urged America to have the New START Treaty signed speedily. Rasmussen said of Russia’s agreement to cooperate on missile defense:
“The practical benefits are clear. By exchanging information that we share, a bigger, wider picture of the skies above Europe we get more warning of a threat and we could, conceivably, even cooperate eventually in shooting down an incoming missile.”
Plans to laser-target and destroy an incoming ICBM missile – first touted in Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” concept – live on, and are still being technically explored and perfected, but a system that is completely efficient at short notice is not in service now.
The Strange Case of the Abandoned Czech/Polish Missile Defense Plan
On September 17, 2009, President Obama decided to scrap a defense plan that had been created by his predecessor. In negotiations that had commenced in 2003, George W. Bush had persuaded the Czech Republic and Poland to implement a missile defense policy which had enraged Russia. The two nations, which had both been annexed by the Soviets (Czechoslovakia in 1967, Poland in 1939) took great risks when they agreed to allow their nations to be part of a missile defense shield against the threat of Iranian long-range missiles. In Poland, there had been plans to install missile interceptors, and to install radar systems in the adjacent Czech Republic (closer to Iran on the same “corridor” that the Islamist regime could use to hit European targets).
When the Obama administration decided to abandon the plans for a missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, it seemed that it was an act designed to appease Russia, though this was never admitted. The administrations in the Czech Republic and Poland were angry at the White House decision to abandon the project.
The White House claimed in September 2009 that it had overestimated Iran’s capacity for long-range missile strikes. However, five months later, its own officials were admitting that Iran had received nineteen long-range missiles from North Korea. One of the few useful revelations produced recently by WikiLeaks came from a US diplomatic cable dated February 24, 2010. In this cable is recorded a meeting between Russian officials and an American delegation led by Vann H. Van Diepen of the State Department’s nonproliferation department. The Obama administration requested last week that the NYT would not reproduce all the details. However, the missiles that were brought from North Korea are based upon a Russian design and ARE capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Perhaps – if the Obama administration had properly assessed the risk from Iran it would not now be in such a hurry to (apparently) placate Russia, in a desperate attempt to keep it within the NATO “Strategic Concept” fold. Russia appears to intimate that, should the New START treaty fail to be ratified immediately, it will throw its toys out of the pram and refuse to engage in a ten-year NATO commitment. If this is Russia’s approach to issues of long-term international security, should it be trusted?
There are still issues in New START that appear to give Russia more of an advantage, and these contentious issues could be solved by having an added clause. The shortcomings of the Treaty should be discussed by a new Senate, one that is chosen on a recent mandate, not by a Senate that is preparing for its imminent apopstosis.
The current administration has dragged its heels on the Iranian issue, minimizing the threat that Iran poses until it becomes a genuine and looming threat. So why rush to ratification with Russia? Until full discussion and possible amendments are made, as an interim measure the president could make a personal commitment to hold back on developing new missile capabilities, on the condition that Russia would do the same. Ronald Reagan adopted this tactic in 1981, even though there was no working arms limitation treaty in operation at the time.
In September 2009 the White House could have brazened out the complaints of Russia, which claimed that a radar array and missile interception system – defensive rather than offensive – was aimed at itself. It seems that in order to keep Russia sitting at the NATO table, America must show itself to be operating at the beck and call of the Putin-Medvedev oligarchy. If Russia is showing itself to be unwilling to show patience, perhaps it is time to play it at its own game.
In the past, even with a weak and ineffective Democrat president at America’s helm, ratification of one Soviet arms limitation treaty was withheld altogether. This refusal to ratify was decided not by disgruntled Republican members of a squabbling Senate but by the same president who had signed the treaty – Jimmy Carter.
Previous Treaties
Russian SS-18 SATAN missile.
The first START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was signed on July 31, 1991, by President George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev. It was ratified by the Senate on October 1, 1992 and came into force in December 1994. As well as reducing existing weaponry from the parties’ nuclear arsenals START I allowed (subject to limitations) both entities to monitor certain of their counterpart’s installations.
In 1991-2, America was lagging behind in the effective strike capacity of its ICBMs (Inter-Continental ballistic missiles). The Soviets had “heavy” ICBMS, characterized by being able to carry between 5 and 9 metric tons. START I banned further production of these. At the time, only Russia, which had the SS-18 or SATAN missiles, had heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs required silos for storage and launching. The American range of Titan ICBMs – the largest missiles ever made by the United States – were classed as heavy ICBMs. As ICBMs, the Titans were already virtually disbanded by 1991 for reasons of safety and cost, though the Titan III (a development from the Titan II) continues to be used as a delivery system for USAF satellites and related space launches.
Additionally, when START I had commenced, American use of Titans had been severely reduced due to the terms of the SALT agreements, first discussed between 1969 and 1972, and formalized though the SALT II Treaty. SALT II and its Protocol had been signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979 by Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, but in the same year the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. As a result of the Soviet invasion, Carter did not present SALT II before the Senate for ratification. On March 3, 1981, President Ronald Reagan announced that the U.S. would adhere to the terms of the SALT treaties, but only as long as the Soviets also adhered to the terms.
SALT II eventually foundered in 1984-5 after the Soviets appeared to be failing in their commitment to its terms. On May 26, 1986 President Ronald Reagan announced that due to Soviet non-compliance:
“Given this situation, … in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure….”
The exercise in brinkmanship created tensions between America and Soviet Russia but did not harm America’s economic position. Nor did it put the two parties onto an immediate war footing. The Soviet war in Afghanistan led to an American boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics and a reciprocal boycott had taken place against the Los Angeles Olympics.
However, though SALT II was abandoned, there were still negotiations to create a reduction in arms. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had been made the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party. In November of that year, he met Ronald Reagan in Geneva and they announced an “interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces [INF]” These shorter range weapons classed as INF, were subject to propositions and discussions by both sides culminating in Reagan and Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. The INF Treaty with additions made in May 1998 included a Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols committing to inspection and to full elimination of INFs by the year 2000.
The START I Treaty limited Russian SATAN heavy ICBMs to only 90. Now, at the time of writing, Russia claims to have only 58 SATANs. The nearest rival to the SATAN class of missiles is the American Minuteman.
Minuteman missile in its silo.
The Minuteman III and the SS-18 range were the only missiles allowed under START I which were classed as MIRVs or “Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle(s)”. These had the capacity to carry multiple smaller missiles which could be sent on to different targets.
When the first START treaty was signed, Russia had already been pushing forward in its Glasnost program, when there was increased freedom in the Soviet Union and it seemed that Russia was moving to rapprochement with the West. The treaty was made as an act of political goodwill on both sides. The START I treaty had come about after a decade of deliberation, and if Gorbachev had not been in power (and the Soviet Union bankrupted by its arms and space race ambitions), it may have taken more than a decade to gain an agreement. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved, but America continued to assume that the terms of the INF would be followed by the 12 states that emerged with the cessation of the USSR.
The first START Treaty was extended by a Protocol called START II that was signed by President George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993. This aimed to raise the number of warheads that START I had agreed would be removed by the two main parties from the initial figure of 9,000 to ensure that 14,000 warheads would be eventually disassembled. Additionally, American inspectors were granted further access to oversee the dismantling of SS-18 silos. Additionally, START II ruled that by the end of its two phases, all ICBMs would only be allowed to carry single warheads and there would eventually be no MIRV ICBMs.
The American ICBM missile that was capable of carrying the most MIRV capacity was the LGM-118A Peacekeeper, which could carry up to 10 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It could also hold up to 11 Mk-21 RVs (re-entry vehicles, each capable of holding a thermonuclear device). By the end of 2000, America had 50 Peacekeeper missiles and 500 Minuteman III missiles. Both of these missile types were four-stage rockets. The Peacekeeper, though considerably larger than the Minuteman, was housed in a silo within a canister that used high pressure steam to clear it to an altitude of 50 to 100 meters. Once ejected from the silo, the first stage of the rocket was ignited. This launching method, first demonstrated on August 23, 1985, allowed the Peacekeeper to be fired from silos designed for the smaller Minuteman III.
Gas-propelled launch of Peacekeeper missile.
In a radio address to the nation, delivered on December 11, 1982, President Ronald Reagan urged the development of the 118A Peacekeeper (MX) and told Americans:
If we’re willing to cancel a weapon system without getting something in return, why should they offer to eliminate or reduce weapons that give them an advantage over us?
In 1977 my predecessor sent his Secretary of State to Moscow with a proposal that the Soviets reduce the number of their heavy SS-18 missiles. At the time, we had nothing comparable to the SS-18 and no new missiles to deploy. The result was what you’d expect. The Soviets refused to even consider the proposal. I can’t believe the American people want to make that mistake a second time. The stakes are just too high.
Without the Peacekeeper, we weaken our ability to deter war, and we may lose a valuable opportunity to achieve a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons on both sides. With it, we make progress on—both paths to peace. On both counts, there’s no doubt that we need it.
When they appeared in the 1980s, the Peacekeepers had been the most radical new design of missile for more than two decades. Even though President Reagan had seen the need to continue with development and refinement of these missiles, in the summer of 2001, George W. Bush had agreed to remove America’s 50 Peacekeepers. The missiles were scheduled to be disassembled by 2004.
On May 24, 2002, President George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a further agreement, the SORT treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) which would come into force on June 1, 2003. This treaty agreed to limit the “aggregate number” of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 – 2,200 for each party.
Russia v. Rogue States
Even though the Bush administration drew the curtain down on the Peacekeeper in August 2001, in an attempt to forge better relations with Russia, it was keenly aware of the potential nuclear threat that was posed by rogue states.
A 2001 Department of Defense memo from the Office of Public Afffairs (10-F-1229) stated (page 8 of the pdf document):
Several nations including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran and Syria are developing ballistic missiles.
And (page 7 of the same):
North Korea has demonstrated a capability for intercontinental reach with its rockets. Iran has hundreds of short-range missiles and is building the Shahab – which will reach Israel, most of Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The Shahab -4 and -5 are on the drawing boards, the latter with intercontinental range.
It is bizarre in the extreme that the Bush administration was aware of the threats from rogue states but the Obama administration could declare on September 17, 2009, that:
Based on updated intelligence assessments of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and advances in U.S. missile defense technology, the new system will not require elements to be housed in either country [Czech Republic and Poland], and the new approach “will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems, and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack” than the previous strategy, Obama said.
Updated U.S. intelligence assessments emphasize threats from Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles, such as the Shahab-3, which are capable of reaching Europe, rather than the threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as envisioned under the 2007 plan. In addition, “we have made specific and proven advances in our missile defense technology, particularly with regard to land- and sea-based interceptors and the sensors that support them,” Obama said.
This agreement to instead “modernize” missile detection was denounced by Iranian mullahs. Days after the White House decision to replace land-based interception with sea and air-based units, Ayatollah Ali Khameini declared:
“This is something that is in the doctrine of anti-Iranianism, since the policy and the 30-year-old history of the Islamic Republic has proven that Iran wants to live in peace and under the spirit of equality and fraternity, with its Muslim neighbors and the rest of the world.”
As I mentioned at the start of this article, the decision to disband Czech and Polish-based missile and radar defences appeared to have been made at the behest of Russia. Five months later the White House became aware of Iran possessing 19 BM-25 ICBMs, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, though it chose to keep this information secret. The administration became aware of this information on February 24, 2010, before the New START Treaty was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010.
NATO’s Weakest Link
The NATO New Strategic Concept of November 18, 2010 commits NATO members to nuclear defense, and to work with Russia. This should be a guarantee of peace between the West and Russia, though there are so many flaws within the structure of the European Union and in the anti-democratic nature of Russia under Medvedev and Putin that it is hard to see that the new NATO strategy will achieve anything.
Already, one key NATO member – Turkey – is moving towards Islamism, and its Islamist prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently declared that his nation mutually removed border controls with Syria, Libya Lebanon and Jordan. Two of these countries are governed by anti-Western tyrannies, and Lebanon has a large contingent of Iranian-funded Hizballah (Hezbollah) terrorists. In September, the Telegraph newspaper reported that Erdogan’s Islamist AKP party would be receiving $25 million in funding from Iran. The story has now gone from its archives. In May 2010, Iran agreed to exchange nuclear fuel with Turkey and in September Turkish president Abdullah Gul questioned the need for sanctions against Iran.
Iran is a rogue state that has been developing nuclear weaponry while claiming it has no such ambitions. Russia has helped Iran to develop its “peaceful” nuclear energy program and has consistently defended the mullahocracy when it could have brought pressure to bear on its illicit nuclear weapons program.
Russia’s objections to the Czech and Polish missile defense programs – abandoned by Obama on September 17 – highlight the real problem at the heart of NATO – the European Union itself. The EU has a guiding principle that is reminiscent of the precarious “alliances” that led to the eruption of World War I. Essentially, to be a member of the European Union, one must agree to the principle that if any one of the 27 member states is attacked or invaded, all of the other states must unite to make war upon the aggressor.
This principle may allow the bureaucrats in the European Parliament to delude themselves that this is a recipe for security but they live in a Fool’s Paradise, especially in relation to Russia under Putin. When Russia decided that missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland were an affront against its sovereignty and an act of aggression, the former Soviet hub could easily have invaded these countries. After all, Russia had invaded Georgia on the flimsiest of pretexts in 2008.
The “defensive” structure of the EU would inextricably commit to war in such a scenario and there is so little democratic representation within the EU that there would be chaos. NATO strategists should seriously revisit their history books and examine how the web of alliances made between nations from 1909 onwards led to complete chaos and the 1914-18 World War – after a leading figure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was shot in Sarajevo and Belgium became occupied.
The New START treaty has flaws. These aspects could conceivably be renegotiated. More importantly, these need to be fully discussed with the assent of the American people and their chosen representatives before any ratification takes place. This administration has developed a bad habit of appointing unpopular figures during recess and rushing unpopular bills through Congress at awkward times. The ObamacCare bill was brought in during the Christmas period when many politicians would usually be travelling back to their homes to be with their families. There are intimations that the administration could try the same gambit this Christmas.
As well as being undemocratic, any measure to rush ratification now with a Lame Duck Congress (rather than one with a popular mandate) would be a gamble with American national security. It would also do little to enhace global security.
Russia, should New START be ratified now, would have a strategic advantage. As Taylor Dinerman writes at the Hudson Institute:
The New START Treaty with its dramatic reduction is the number of “deployed'”warheads cuts the US overall nuclear force to 1550, on 700 deployed delivery vehicles; and a total of “800 deployed and non deployed delivery vehicles.” This category of non-deployed delivery vehicles is a cunning way of touching on the issue of reloadable silos, and, with the deployment of Russia’s land mobile “Topal” missile, reloadable mobile launchers as well.
This Treaty gives the Russians a serious warfighting advantage: they will have land-mobile missiles — possibly a larger number than we know about — while the US has nothing comparable.
John Bolton (pictured), former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has described New START as “unilateral disarmament.” He has wisely advised:
Senators need to probe far more deeply than they have into New Start’s impact for our conventional force capabilities. Mr. Obama will try to ram the treaty through the Senate, but our defenses need prudence and deliberation.
There is a bigger world than US/NATO and Russia. China has extended its wing to protect the rogue state of North Korea which has already detonated two underground nuclear weapons and is threatening to make war upon South Korea. China is already engaged in the largest military expansion since the time of Chairman Mao. Iran is close to developing a nuclear warhead, and it already shares its technology with North Korea and Syria.
Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal and it too is virtually a failed state. With anti-democratic Islamists in its intelligence agencies, who knows how secure are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and which country could gain access to these at some future date?
New START should only be ratified when there has been time for Congress to discuss it properly, and has been given a chance to suggest amendments. Should the administration force ratification during this Christmas period, with a Lame Duck Congress, the legacy that this administration would bequeath to future historians would be more ignominious than it has already been.
To ratify New START at this current time would be to reify the maxim: “Act in haste, repent at leisure.”
GLOSSARY of ACRONYMS
ICBM: Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles
INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
MIRV: Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle
RV: Reentry vehicle
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SNDV: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SORT: Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
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