MICHAEL DORAN : EMBROILMENT….AN INTERVIEW BY TONY BADRAN
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Michael Doran is the Hertog Senior Fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings, a former senior director at the National Security Council and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. Author of “Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question,” Dr. Doran is currently writing a book on the Middle East strategy of President Eisenhower, who, like President Obama, contended with a region in the throes of revolutionary change.
Last year, he penned a seminal essay (PDF) in Foreign Affairs entitled “The Heirs of Nasser,” in which he argued that, much like Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser did in the 1950s, Iran’s strategy today would seek to turn the region’s upheaval to the disadvantage of the United States. In Egypt, Doran contended, Iran would look to incite violence against Israel through Hamas, with the aim of driving a wedge between Cairo and Washington. It was Nasser who had perfected this strategy, which, Doran explained, is known in Arabic as tawreet (“embroilment”). The recent war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas proved the prescience of Doran’s important essay.
I spoke to Dr. Doran about the Gaza war, Egypt, and more.
In your Foreign Affairs article, “The Heirs of Nasser,” you explained the concept of tawreet (“embroilment”). You defined tawreet as “goading [someone] to take actions against a third party that will result in political effects beneficial to you.” You then argued that the conditions are once again ripe for tawreet, especially in Egypt, “and that Iran would seek to embroil Cairo.” Do you see the recent conflagration in Gaza along those lines? Was this an attempt by Hamas, and perhaps behind it, Iran, to embroil Egypt? What was the calculus?
Doran: Yes, I assume that one of the motives behind Hamas’ escalation was an effort to shift the posture of Egypt, of President Morsi, so that it would be more supportive of Hamas and less cooperative with the United States and Israel. Provoking conflict with Israel was a means of appealing to Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood base, and Egyptian public opinion more generally, in an effort to pull him closer to Hamas.
Was it Hamas’ calculation alone, or did Tehran also push for it? No American observer has very precise knowledge regarding the extent of Tehran’s influence over Hamas. My working assumption is that the Iranians give Hamas the big arrow. Qassem Soleimani says, “We think some tension on the border would be advisable,” and then Hamas is left to translate this general advice into specific policies, determining the tactics and timing on its own.
The last report out of Israel on the bus bombing in Tel Aviv (which took place on the last day of the conflict) identified Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as a co-conspirator with Hamas. If true, that is significant evidence of a more direct Iranian role in operations. PIJ is very closely aligned, almost controlled, by Iran, so it’s safe to assume that any operation conducted by PIJ was ordered or sanctioned by Tehran. The timing of that particular outrage suggests that PIJ, meaning Iran, was trying to generate an Israeli escalation in the form of a ground incursion.
Personally, I find the question, “Did Iran give the order?” very interesting. But from a US policy perspective, the answer does not make much difference. For Washington, the strategically significant fact is that Hamas and Iran are still close, as evidenced, among other things, by the steady supply of rockets from Iran to Gaza. Therefore, it makes sense to treat Hamas’ escalation as a joint Iranian-Hamas effort to shift the posture of Egypt.
Many were worried that President Morsi would not be able to resist popular pressure to back Hamas. Were you surprised by Morsi’s stance, and how do you explain it?
Doran: No, I was not surprised. Hamas is an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. For Morsi, the strategic prize is control of Egypt. He approaches Gaza with one question in mind: Does conflict there help me with my key project? In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, I don’t see how any leader in Cairo, regardless of ideological affinities, would see an unrestrained Hamas as a value to Egypt. Hamas is nothing but a headache for Morsi. It complicates his relationship with the United States, provides rivals in Egypt with a club to beat him with, and it makes governing the Sinai all that much more difficult. Morsi wants a Hamas that will follow his orders; Hamas wants independence. There’s an inherent tension in the relationship which will not be made any easier, and in some ways will be more difficult, by the fact that they are both affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
There’s a view today that holds that Hamas has “won” this latest bout. Definitions of this supposed victory vary, but advocates claim that Hamas has made undeniable gains. Do you agree?
Doran: No. What are Hamas’ gains? It gained a sense of accomplishment from having stayed in the fight until the end and having deterred Israel, at this stage, from a ground invasion. It aroused significant feelings of popular sympathy in the Arab world. It generated a slightly higher level of diplomatic engagement from states like Turkey, which already engage with it. And it probably won an incremental loosening of the blockade. None of these, in my mind, are tangible enough or significant enough to lay claim to victory in a war that inflicted significant losses. In addition, Hamas advertised its continued association with Iran to the world, thus alienating significant players, such as Saudi Arabia. And it gave Israel a prime opportunity to test and showcase its missile defense capabilities. On top of this, I strongly suspect that it failed to move Morsi, and probably alienated him. On this point, we’ll have to wait and see. All signs, however, suggest that Morsi is going to treat Hamas just like Mubarak did, but without the warm and fuzzy feeling.
Did Turkey’s bet on sponsoring Hamas succeed? Where does Turkey go from here?
Doran: While Morsi came out with an improved international stature, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan appeared at best irrelevant and at worst un-statesmanlike. The limits of Turkey’s influence were exposed. The major external players in Gaza are Egypt and Iran. Turkey simply has no significant role to play. I suspect that many Turkish officials would like to normalize relations with Israel. The two countries share many interests, not least of which are common concerns regarding the conflict in Syria and the regional role of Iran. But Erdogan has made public demands against Israel from which he cannot walk away. He seeks both an apology for the deaths on the Mavi Marmara and an end to the blockade of Gaza. I don’t see Israel conceding on either of those anytime soon. So Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, are stuck playing cheerleader for Hamas yet getting nothing for it other than the domestic benefits. Those will atrophy as Turkey’s irrelevance to the real diplomacy becomes more apparent.
Some now claim Hamas is “in play,” and there have even been some calls in the US to engage the Palestinian group, with Egyptian involvement. What do you think?
Doran: Engaging Hamas at the current moment will have even less success than engaging the Assad regime had over the last decade. When Hamas drops its demand to destroy Israel, it will become a viable diplomatic partner for the United States.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.
You can follow Dr. Doran on Twitter @Doranimated
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