http://frontpagemag.com/2012/robert-spencer/dealing-with-the-devil-in-syria/ A video circulating this week of Syrian rebels shouting “Allahu akbar” and executing four Assad partisans has horrified many in the West, but there have been numerous indications before this that the resistance to the Assad regime is not made up of the democratic pluralists of mainstream media myth. Not surprisingly, that hasn’t stopped […]
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/313035/desert-rose-affair-returns-jonathan-foreman
ANNA WINTOUR, LATELY THE STAR OF AN AD FOR OBAMA IS MOST AT FAULT….SHE IS EDITOR IN CHIEF….SEE HER COO FOR OBAMA:
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2012/06/04/anna_wintour_obama_ad_vogue_editor_makes_fundraising_pitch_for_president.html
Early in 2011 the Vogue writer Joan Juliet Buck took a lot of stick for a profile she wrote of the glamorous wife of the Syria’s dictator Bashir Assad. As you might expect of such a piece, “A Rose in the Desert” focused on Mrs. Assad’s good looks, elegant wardrobe, and charitable hobbies, rather than the Assad regime’s harsh way with dissidents or its equally wholehearted hospitality to terrorists.
One critic rather hyperbolically likened Ms. Buck to a journalist going to Berlin in the mid-1930s to fawn over Eva Braun. It was not fair because at the time of the interview and even at the time it was published, Mr. Assad himself had not yet ordered the gunning down of unarmed protesters. It was not yet obvious that Bashir had inherited the ruthlessness of his father, a man who had deliberately slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians.
On the other hand it was fairly well known that, under Bashir’s rule, Syria sent hundreds of “volunteers” to back up the Saddam Hussein regime when the Coalition invaded from Kuwait. It was better known that Bashir provided both a sanctuary and logistical support to Islamist and Baathist Iraqi insurgents attacking U.S. forces and the new Iraqi government for several years after Saddam’s fall. These insurgents were responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians as well as hundreds of Coalition troops.
(Of course, for some Americans on the left, sending militants to kill American troops or elected officials of the post-Saddam government would not be seen as particularly blameworthy. The same goes for Syria’s notorious sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas.)
Putin Expands Crackdown as Obama Clings to ‘Reset’
http://pjmedia.com/blog/putin-expands-crackdown-as-obama-clings-to-reset/?print=1
BUSH ON PUTIN IN 2001: READ http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html
ONE CAN ONLY PRAY THAT MITT ROMNEY WON’T BE BUSH REDUX….RSK
The words [1] George W. Bush spoke at Brdo Castle in Brdo Pri Kranju, Slovenia, in June 2001 are hard to distinguish from those of Barack Obama. Both in their content and their consequences, the devastating impact of these speeches may imperil U.S. foreign policy for ages to come.
In Slovenia, Bush referred to the Cold War as a relic of the past, and declared it was “time to move beyond suspicion and towards straight talk, beyond mutually assured destruction and towards mutually earned respect.” Infamously, he also said he had looked Russia’s new ruler Vladimir Putin in the eye, “got a sense of his soul,” and found him to be a trustworthy partner. We were told that Putin’s long history as a proud KGB spy was irrelevant — this was a new man and a new Russia.
This was just what Putin wanted to hear. Long before Bush’s first term had ended, Putin had launched a vicious crackdown on the forces of democracy in Russia. Dead were Sergei Yushenkov and Yuri Shchekochikhin, arrested were Mikhail Trepashkin and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Putin left office just as Obama was coming in, and Obama adopted the Bush doctrine regarding Putin’s supposed successor Dmitri Medvedev, inviting him to Washington and munching cheeseburgers with him. Obama brought in Michael McFaul from the Hoover Institution to implement a “reset” of relations with Russia, a policy which would make the Bush doctrine towards Russia look like that of Ronald Reagan by comparison.
Putin was overjoyed. The Americans had taken the bait and would drop their guard as he used Medvedev to bide his time and return to power as president for life. That now accomplished, Putin has moved on to a second phase of his crackdown.
This week, it was announced [2] that opposition leader Alexei Navalny would go the way of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the only difference being that instead of being accused of stealing oil — as was Khodorkovsky — Navalny would be accused of stealing timber. Same result, though. Ten years or so in Siberia to cool off any thoughts of challenging Putin for power.
Back in June, security forces acting at the order of Putin carried out almost a dozen deeply disturbing raids on leaders of the Russian democracy movement and their families, seizing computers and other things they believed to be evidence of illegal activity. Navalny was included. The move smacked of the USSR, and once again — of course — the Obama administration did nothing. It is clear that the Putin regime took this silence as an invitation to proceed with arrests and prosecutions of key opposition leaders like Navalny.
http://pjmedia.com/blog/fort-hood-congressman-grills-fbi-official-at-what-point-is-it-islamic-terrorism/?print=1
Lawmakers expressed concern that a recently released review of the FBI’s actions in the Fort Hood shootings showed an agency that let “political sensitivities” temper the aggressiveness of their investigation into Army Major Nidal Hasan.“An active duty member of the military communicating with a known radicalizer and recruiter should have been taken more seriously than it was,” said Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies at a hearing to review the findings yesterday.
Former FBI Director William H. Webster led a commission probing the November 2009 shootings that left 13 dead. The commission’s report was released two weeks ago, and included 18 specific recommendations for changes at the FBI but not any recommendations of disciplinary action related to the Hasan case.
Hasan visited the website of radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a recruiter for al-Qaeda in Yemen, in 2008 and later sent the terrorist messages. A “belated, incomplete and rushed” assessment by the FBI of Hasan concluded that the Army psychologist was not “involved in terrorist activities.”
However, the FBI didn’t interview Hasan about the al-Awlaki connections, didn’t dig deeper to find any further contact between Hasan and al-Awlaki, and let too much time lapse before pursing leads on Hasan, the report concluded.
“While the commission found that the decision not to interview Hasan was flawed, I’m concerned that the current FBI guidelines and culture made this the path of least resistance,” Wolf said.
Wolf said he was disappointed that FBI Director Robert Mueller, who asked Webster to investigate the agency, didn’t come testify; instead, Mark Giuliano, the FBI’s executive assistant director for national security, appeared before the panel.
http://www.americanthinker.com/printpage/?url=http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/../2012/08/why_muslims_must_hate_jews.html Recently, a Pakistani religious leader, Pirzada Muhammad Raza Saqib Mustafai, said: “When the Jews are wiped out … the sun of peace [will] begin to rise on the entire world.” The same preaching is routinely done not only by clerics, but by politicians — in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere. This is not […]
http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/
Weekly Jihad Report
Jul . 21 – Jul. 27
Jihad Attacks:
65
Allahu Akbars*:
2
Dead Bodies:
344
Critically Injured:
625
*Suicide Attacks
Monthly Jihad Report
July, 2012
Jihad Attacks:
225
Countries:
24
Religions:
5
Dead Bodies:
1075
Critically Injured:
1907
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/08/02/Pollak-Dershowitz-Face-Off-Over-Obama-Romney-Israel-in-Jerusalem-Post
Breitbart News editor-in-chief Joel Pollak and Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz faced off this week in the pages of the Jerusalem Post over whether Barack Obama or Mitt Romney is the better choice for pro-Israel voters. Their debate reprises an exchange they had in the Post during the 2008 election.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-hate-that-dare-not-speak-its-name/
LATE REPORTS CONFIRM THAT VIDAL REMAINS DEAD BUT THE RAGAZINE “THE NATION” IS STILL ON LIFE SUPPORT….HERE IS THEIR LATEST HEADLINE:….RSK
Let’s Just Say It: The Republicans AND the Media Are the Problem
No wonder the public remains so misinformed, as bigfoot pundits not only whitewash Republican extremism but paint Obama’s soggy centrism in false hues as its ideological equivalent. Eric Alterman
Last March, in a special issue commemorating its 120th anniversary, the Nation published an article by the novelist Gore Vidal entitled “The Empire Lovers Strike Back” which impressed me and many other people as the most blatantly anti-Semitic outburst to have appeared in a respectable American periodical since World War II. The Nation is a left-wing (or, some would say, a liberal) magazine run by an editor, Victor Navasky, who is himself Jewish. Yet one reader (who happened not to be Jewish) wrote in a personal letter to Navasky that he could not recall encountering “that kind of naked anti-Semitism” even in papers of the lunatic-fringe Right which specialize in attacks on Jews; to find its like one had to go back to the Völkische Beobachter. Nor was he the only reader to be reminded of the Nazi gutter press. “I thought I was back in the 30′s reading Der Stürmer,” wrote another.
Actually, however, it was not the crackpot racism of Julius Streicher that Vidal was drawing on, but sources closer to home. Prominent among these, I would guess, was Henry Adams, about whom Vidal has written admiringly and with whom he often seems to identify. Adams, as a descendant of two Presidents, was a preeminent member of the old American patriciate—the class to which Vidal also, if somewhat dubiously, claims to belong—and his resentment at the changes which came over the United States in the decades of industrialization and mass immigration after the Civil War knew no bounds. The country was being ruined, and Adams blamed it all on the Jews: “I tell you Rome was a blessed garden of paradise beside the rotten, unsexed, swindling, lying Jews, represented by Pierpont Morgan and the gang who have been manipulating the country for the last few years.” It made no difference that J.P. Morgan was neither Jewish himself nor in any sense a representative of the Jews. For as Adams wrote in another of his letters: “The Jew has got into the soul. I see him—or her—now everywhere, and wherever he—or she—goes, there must remain a taint in the blood forever.”
In Vidal’s diatribe there is no explicit mention of blood, but there is its functional equivalent in the idea that Jews born in the United States nevertheless remain foreigners living here by the gracious sufferance of the natives. Incorrigibly alien though the Jews may be, however, they exercise enormous and malevolent power over the politics of what Vidal, conjuring up the long discredited spirit of 19th-century nativism, does not hesitate to call “the host country.”
http://news.yahoo.com/panetta-asks-israel-patience-iran-124202234.html
JERUSALEM (AP) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, standing next to the U.S. defense chief, said Wednesday without qualification that international economic sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s nuclear program and suggested Israeli patience was wearing thin, a statement that amounted to an indictment of President Barack Obama’s policy toward the Islamic republic. Netanyahu dismissed U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s assurances that the United States shared its goal of a non-nuclear Iran, saying the central features of Washington’s strategy for stopping the Islamic republic’s nuclear ambitions — sanctions and diplomacy — were perilously close to failure.
Netanyahu did not explicitly threaten to attack Iran, but that was the unspoken implication of his assertion that all non-military measures have proven ineffective in persuading Iran to change its course.
“Right now the Iranian regime believes that the international community does not have the will to stop its nuclear program,” Netanyahu said. “This must change, and it must change quickly because time to resolve this issue peacefully is running out.”
His message was particularly striking, given that he delivered it beside Panetta, who spent two days in Israel offering reassurances that the two allies shared the same goals on Iran.
“I want to reassert again the position of the United States that with regards to Iran, we will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Period,” the Pentagon chief said. “We will not allow them to develop a nuclear weapon. And we will exert all options in the effort to ensure that that does not happen.”
http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques
THIS IS FROM SUMMER OF 2011 AND WORTH ANOTHER VISIT….DR. KEDAR IS COMING TO THE UNITED STATES AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS IN JANUARY 2013
How great is the danger of extremist violence in the name of Islam in the United States? Recent congressional hearings into this question by Rep. Peter King (Republican of New York), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, have generated a firestorm of controversy among his colleagues, the press, and the general public. Though similar hearings have taken place at least fourteen times since 2001,[1] King was labeled a latter-day Joe McCarthy and the hearings called an assault on civil liberties and a contemporary witch-hunt. Yet the larger dilemmas outlined by both the congressman and some of his witnesses remain: To what extent are American Muslims, native-born as well as naturalized, being radicalized by Islamists? And what steps can those who are sworn to the protection of American citizenry take that will uncover and disrupt the plots of those willing to take up arms against others for the sake of jihad?
Root Causes and Enabling Mechanisms
A comprehensive study of the relationship between Shari’a adherence and incitement to violence in American mosques found that mosques that segregated men from women during prayer service were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than those where men and women were not segregated.
While scholarly inquiry into the root causes and factors supportive of terrorism has accelerated since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, there are few empirical studies that attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and support for terrorism. To date, almost all of the professional and academic work in this field has been anecdotal surveys or case studies tracing backward through the personal profiles of terrorists and the socioeconomic and political environments from which they came.[2]
One study by Quintan Wiktorowicz, assistant professor of international studies at Rhodes College and now on the staff of the National Security Council,[3] noted that modern jihadists legitimize their violent activities by relying on the same textual works as their nonviolent Salafist counterparts. However, the approach taken to these texts by the violent jihadist may be distinguished from that of the nonviolent Salafist insofar as the jihadist uses the principles advanced by both classical and modern Islamic scholars and ideologues and adapts them to modern situations in a way that provides a broader sanction for the permissible use of violence.[4]
Further, in 2007, Paul Gill concluded that terrorist organizations seek societal support by creating a “culture of martyrdom” and that one theme common to suicide bombers was the support they received from a community that esteemed the concept of martyrdom. Thus, a complex dynamic is at work between a terrorist organization, society, and individuals with the interplay between these three dimensions enabling radicalization and terrorist attacks.[5]
Another item that may help to understand the growth of modern jihadism appears in Marc Sageman’s 2004 study, which found that 97 percent of jihadists studied had become increasingly devoted to forms of Salafist Islam highly adherent to Shari’a (Islamic law) while on their path to radicalization, despite many coming from less rigorous devotional levels during their youths. This increase in devotion to Salafist Islam was measured by outwardly observable behaviors such as wearing traditional Arabic, Pakistani, or Afghan clothing or growing a beard.[6]
When viewed together, a picture emerges that may give researchers, as well as law enforcement officials, a way to monitor or potentially to predict where violent jihad may take root. Potential recruits who are swept up in this movement may find their inspiration and encouragement in a place with ready access to classic and modern literature that is positive toward jihad and violence, where highly Shari’a-adherent behavior is practiced, and where a society exists that in some form promotes a culture of martyrdom or at least engages in activities that are supportive of violent jihad. The mosque can be such a place.
That the mosque is a societal apparatus that might serve as a support mechanism for violent jihad may seem self-evident, but for it to be a useful means for measuring radicalization requires empirical evidence. A 2007 study by the New York city police department noted that, in the context of the mosque, high levels of Shari’a adherence, termed “Salafi ideology” by the authors of the report, may relate to support for violent jihad. Specifically, it found that highly Shari’a-adherent mosques have played a prominent role in radicalization.[7] Another study found a relationship between frequency of mosque attendance and a predilection for supporting suicide attacks but discovered no empirical evidence linking support for suicide bombings to some measure of religious devotion (defined and measured by frequency of prayer).[8]
However, the study suffers from a major methodological flaw, namely, reliance on self- reporting of prayer frequency. Muslims would be under social and psychological pressure to report greater prayer frequency because their status as good or pious believers is linked to whether they fulfill the religious obligation to pray five times a day.[9] This piety is not dependent on regular mosque attendance as Muslims are permitted to pray outside of a mosque environment whenever necessary.[10] Hence, the pressure to over-report exists for self-reporting of prayer frequency but is not present in self-reporting of frequency of mosque attendance, which is a measure of both coalitional or group commitment and religious devotion.
Thus, there is a need for the study and corroboration of a relationship between high levels of Shari’a adherence as a form of religious devotion and coalitional commitment, Islamic literature that shows violence in a positive light, and institutional support for violent jihad. By way of filling this lacuna, the authors of this article undertook a survey specifically designed to determine empirically whether a correlation exists between observable measures of religious devotion linked to Shari’a adherence in American mosques and the presence of violence-positive materials at those mosques. The survey also sought to ascertain whether a correlation exists between the presence of violence-positive materials at a mosque and the promotion of jihadism by the mosque’s leadership through recommending the study of these materials or other manifest behaviors.
Identifying Shari’a-Adherent Behaviors
Shari’a is the Islamic system of law based primarily on two sources held by Muslims to be respectively direct revelation from God and divinely inspired: the Qur’an and the Sunna (sayings, actions, and traditions of Muhammad). There are other jurisprudential sources for Shari’a derived from the legal rulings of Islamic scholars. These scholars, in turn, may be adherents of differing schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Notwithstanding those differences, the divergence at the level of actual law is, given the fullness of the corpus juris, confined to relatively few marginal issues. Thus, there is general unity and agreement across the Sunni-Shiite divide and across the various Sunni madh’habs (jurisprudential schools) on core normative behaviors.[11]
Surveyors were asked to observe and record selected behaviors deemed to be Shari’a-adherent. These behaviors were selected precisely because they constitute observable and measurable practices of an orthodox form of Islam as opposed to internalized, non-observable articles of faith. Such visible modes of conduct are considered by traditionalists to have been either exhibited or commanded by Muhammad as recorded in the Sunna and later discussed and preserved in canonical Shari’a literature. The selected behaviors are among the most broadly accepted by legal practitioners of Islam and are not those practiced only by a rigid subgroup within Islam—Salafists, for example.
Among the behaviors observed at the mosques and scored as Shari’a-adherent were: (a) women wearing the hijab (head covering) or niqab (full-length shift covering the entire female form except for the eyes); (b) gender segregation during mosque prayers; and (c) enforcement of straight prayer lines. Behaviors that were not scored as Shari’a-adherent included: (a) women wearing just a modern hijab, a scarf-like covering that does not cover all of the hair, or no covering; (b) men and women praying together in the same room; and (c) no enforcement by the imam, lay leader, or worshipers of straight prayer lines.
The normative importance of a woman’s hair covering is evidenced by two central texts, discussed at length below, Reliance of the Traveller and Fiqh as-Sunna (Law of the Sunna), both of which express agreement on the obligation of a woman to wear the hijab:
There is no such dispute over what constitutes a woman’s aurah [private parts/nakedness]. It is stated that her entire body is aurah and must be covered, except her hands and face … God does not accept the prayer of an adult woman unless she is wearing a head covering (khimar, hijab).[12]
The nakedness of a woman (even if a young girl) consists of the whole body except the face and hands. The nakedness of a woman is that which invalidates the prayer if exposed. … It is recommended for a woman to wear a covering over her head (khimar), a full length shift, and a heavy slip under it that does not cling to the body.[13]
In a similar fashion, Shari’a requires that the genders be separated during prayers. While both Reliance of the Traveller and Fiqh as-Sunna express a preference that women should pray at home rather than the mosque,[14] they agree that if women do pray in the mosque, they should pray in lines separate from the men.[15] Additionally, authoritative Shari’a literature agrees that the men’s prayer lines should be straight, that men should be close together within those lines, and that the imam should enforce prayer line alignment.[16]
Sanctioned Violence
The mosques surveyed contained a variety of texts, ranging from contemporary printed pamphlets and handouts to classic texts of the Islamic canon. From the perspective of promoting violent jihad, the literature types were ranked in the survey from severe to moderate to nonexistent. The texts selected were all written to serve as normative and instructive tracts and are not scriptural. This is important because a believer is free to understand scripture literally, figuratively, or merely poetically when it does not have a normative or legal gloss provided by Islamic jurisprudence.
The moderate-rated literature was authored by respected Shari’a religious and/or legal authorities; while expressing positive attitudes toward violence, it was predominantly concerned with the more mundane aspects of religious worship and ritual. The severe material, by contrast, largely consists of relatively recent texts written by ideologues, rather than Shari’a scholars, such as Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. These, as well as materials published and disseminated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, are primarily, if not exclusively, aimed at using Islam to advance a violent political agenda.
Mawdudi (1903-79), for one, believed that it was legitimate to wage violent jihad against “infidel colonizers” in order to gain independence and spread Islam. His Jihad in Islam, found in many of the mosques surveyed, instructed followers to employ force in pursuit of a Shari’a-based order:
These [Muslim] men who propagate religion are not mere preachers or missionaries, but the functionaries of God [so that they may be witnesses for the people], and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness, and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms.[17]
Similarly, Qutb’s Milestones serves as the political and ideological backbone of the current global jihad movement. Qutb, for example, sanctions violence against those who stand in the way of Islam’s expansion:
If someone does this [prevents others from accepting Islam], then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission.[18]
These materials differ from other severe- and moderate-rated materials because they are not Islamic legal texts per se but rather are polemical works seeking to advance a politicized Islam through violence, if necessary. Nor are these authors recognized Shari’a scholars.
The same cannot be said for some classical works that are also supportive of violence in the name of Islam. Works by several respected jurists and scholars from the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence, dating from the eighth to fourteenth centuries, are all in agreement that violent jihad against non-Muslims is a religious obligation.[19] Such behavior is normative, legally-sanctioned violence not confined to modern writers with a political axe to grind. Nor does its presence in classical Muslim works make it a relic of some medieval past. While Umdat as-Salik (Reliance of the Traveler) may have been compiled in the fourteenth century, al-Azhar University, perhaps the preeminent center of Sunni learning in the world, stated in its 1991 certification of the English translation that the book “conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni community.”[20] While addressing a host of theological matters and detailed instructions as to how Muslims should order their daily routine to demonstrate piety and commitment to Islam, this certified, authoritative text spends eleven pages expounding on the applicability of jihad as violence directed against non-Muslims, stating for example:
The caliph … makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians … provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax.[21]
The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim … because they are not a people with a book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax.[22]
The Fiqh as-Sunna and Tafsir Ibn Kathir are examples of works that were rated “moderate” for purposes of this survey. The former, which focuses primarily on the internal Muslim community, the family, and the individual believer and not on violent jihad, was especially moderate in its endorsement of violence. Relatively speaking, the Fiqh as-Sunna expresses a more restrained view of violent jihad, in that it does not explicitly call for a holy war against the West even though it understands the Western influence on Islamic governments as a force that is destructive to Islam itself.[23]
Nonetheless, such texts do express positive views toward the use of violence against “the other,” as expressed in the following:
Ibn Abbas reported that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, “The ties of Islam and the principles of the religion are three, and whoever leaves one of them becomes an unbeliever, and his blood becomes lawful: testifying that there is no god except God, the obligatory prayers, and the fast of Ramadan.” … Another narration states, “If anyone leaves one of [the three principles], by God he becomes an unbeliever, and no voluntary deeds or recompense will be accepted from him, and his blood and wealth become lawful.” This is a clear indication that such a person is to be killed.[24]
Similarly in Tafsir Ibn Kathir:
Perform jihad against the disbelievers with the sword, and be harsh with the hypocrites with words, and this is the jihad performed against them.[25]
The survey’s findings, explored in depth below, were that 51 percent of mosques had texts that either advocated the use of violence in the pursuit of a Shari’a-based political order or advocated violent jihad as a duty that should be of paramount importance to a Muslim; 30 percent had only texts that were moderately supportive of violence like the Tafsir Ibn Kathir and Fiqh as-Sunna; 19 percent had no violent texts at all.
Survey Findings
A representative sample of one hundred mosques throughout the United States was surveyed. Table 1 presents the distribution of mosques by state. One quarter of the mosques had 10 or fewer worshipers; 50 percent had up to 28 worshipers; 75 percent had up to 70; the largest mosque had an estimated 1,700 worshipers.
Table 1: Number of Mosques Surveyed by State
n= Percent
Arizona 2 2
California 26 26
District of Columbia 1 1
Florida 12 12
Georgia 1 1
Michigan 8 8
New Jersey 5 5
New York 3 3
North Carolina 12 12
Pennsylvania 1 1
South Carolina 2 2
Tennessee 2 2
Texas 9 9
Utah 3 3
Virginia 13 13
Total 100 100
The study found a statistically significant association between the severity of violence-positive texts on mosque premises and Shari’a-adherent behaviors. As indicated in Table 2, mosques that segregated men from women during prayer service were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than those mosques where men and women were not segregated. Mosques that did not segregate genders were also less likely to possess violence-positive materials (26 percent) but nonetheless did carry both moderate (27 percent) and severe materials (47 percent).
Table 2: Shari’a-adherent Mosques and Violence-positive Materials
No material (n=19) Moderate [i] (n=30) Severe (n=51) [ii] Total Chi-square
(all df=2)
Prayer service [iii]
Segregation in prayer 6.48, p=.04
No 16 (26%) 17 (27%) 29 (47%) 62
Yes 2 (5%) 13 (35%) 22 (60%) 37
Alignment of prayer lines 16.86, p<.001
No 16 (36%) 10 (22%) 19 (42%) 45
Yes 2 (4%) 20 (37%) 32 (59%) 54
Description of imam or lay leader [iv]
Imam or lay leader has Sunna beard
No [v] 13 (26%) 14 (28%) 23 (46%) 50 6.62, p=.04
Yes [vi] 3 (7%) 15 (33%) 28 (61%) 46
Imam wore head covering
No 9 (20%) 16 (35%) 21 (46%) 46 1.98, p=.37
Yes 7 (14%) 13 (26%) 30 (60%) 50
Imam wore traditional (non-Western garb) 4.97, p=.08
No 11 (25%) 14 (32%) 19 (43%) 44
Yes 5 (10%) 15 (29%) 32 (62%) 52
Imam wore watch on right wrist [vii] 2.61, p=.27
No 15 (18%) 23 (28%) 45 (54%) 83
Yes 1 (8%) 6 (50%) 5 (42%) 12
[i] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh as-Sunna (n=20).
[ii] Has Riyadh as-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[iii] In 1 mosque there was no prayer and surveyor could not determine the usual practice.
[iv] 4 mosques did not have a leader.
[v] 3 with no beard included in this category.
[vi] 3 had traditional beards with henna; and all were in the severe group. They were combined with this group for ease of reporting.
[vii] In 1 case it was not determined.
As was the case with gender segregation, those mosques that displayed strict alignment of men's prayer lines were more likely than their less observant counterparts to contain materials from both the moderate and severe categories. Thus, 59 percent of such mosques contained severe texts as opposed to 42 percent of mosques that did not enforce strict prayer line alignment. Conversely, only 4 percent of mosques with strict prayer line alignment possessed no violence-positive texts while 36 percent of their less observant counterparts exhibited no such literature.
Whether the mosque's imam or lay leader wore a traditional beard was also predictive of whether the mosque would contain violence-positive materials on premises. Of the mosques led by traditionally bearded imams, 61 percent contained literature in the severe category, 33 percent contained only moderate-rated materials, and 7 percent did not contain any. Forty-six percent of the mosques in which the imam did not wear a traditional beard contained severe materials, 28 percent had moderate-rated texts, and 26 percent contained none on site. Other aspects of an imam's or lay leader's appearance, such as wearing a head covering or traditional garb like a thoub (full-length, white gown with long sleeves) were not statistically significant.
