THE JIHADISTS’ GATEWAY TO AFRICA: DANIEL NISMAN
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324624404578255330637047510.html
While France gets bogged down in Mali, far more dangerous extremists have entrenched themselves in eastern Libya.
Mapping out drone strikes over the past year would be one way to understand U.S. policy toward al Qaeda and the war on terror. Unrelenting missile attacks in Yemen and Pakistan, compared with near-inaction against al Qaeda cells in north Africa and the Sahel, suggest that Washington won’t aggressively pursue jihadists if they don’t pose a direct threat to U.S. interests abroad or in the North American continent.
The conflict in northern Mali is a telling example. As long as jihadist networks controlling northern Mali don’t extend their tentacles outside the region, the U.S. can excuse itself from taking the lead. But while the U.S. warily watches from the sidelines as France gets bogged down in the sands of Mali, far more dangerous Islamic extremists have entrenched themselves in eastern Libya and have every intention of making a global impact. Four months after the killing of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Benghazi consulate, Islamic extremists in this part of Libya are stronger than ever.
Following the Sept. 11, 2012 attacks, the people of Benghazi won praise from U.S. politicians and captivated global media attention after they forced Islamist militants from their urban strongholds and began retaking control of their city’s destiny. Their victory was short lived. Now local residents in Benghazi report that the same militias who were forced from their strongholds have quietly re-infiltrated the city. Some have even returned to their old compounds in central areas, but have refrained from raising the black jihadist flag.
The return of Islamist militias to Benghazi has coincided with a stark rise in clashes between rival secular militias and security forces in the area, forcing the central government to take drastic measures. Following ongoing assassinations of government officials, the government of Ali Zidan replaced the city’s security chief with a known anti-Islamist revolutionary general, who promptly said he was considering nightly curfew to combat militants.
AFP/Getty ImagesA woman stands near trucks destroyed in aerial strikes in Diabaly, Mali.
Benghazi’s resurgent Islamist problem only scratches the surface. The vast desert expanses east of the city have become a jihadist haven rife with weapons smuggling and training camps, administered by battle-hardened al Qaeda veterans from across the region. Among these figures is Sufian Qumu, a native Libyan and former aid to Osama bin Laden, who spent time in Guantanamo Bay and Libyan prisons before returning to his hometown of Derna. Qumu is often dismissed by some locals as incompetent but nonetheless has succeeded in establishing Derna as the beating heart of al Qaeda’s operations on the African continent.
Located 260 kilometers east of Benghazi on the international coastal road, Derna has historically served as an international trading hub but now acts as a jihadist gateway to Africa. In the past year, aspiring jihadists from as far away as Pakistan have arrived in the area for training, before being transferred to combat zones in Mali.
Islamist manpower isn’t the only thing passing through Derna. Much of the advanced weapons and anti-aircraft missiles being proliferated to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere in the region were transferred from Moammar Gadhafi’s bunkers by Islamist smugglers in eastern Libya. These smugglers appear to effectively control the vicinity of the Egyptian border crossing near the Libyan port city of Tobruk. Their sentiments towards the Libyan government’s presence in the area were most recently highlighted by an assassination attempt on Defense Minister Mohammed al-Bargati during a visit on Jan. 20.
Derna and its environs are just one of several jihadist strongholds emerging in Libya. Others include those near the southwestern town of Sabha, close to the borders with Algeria and Niger. The growing cooperation of these networks has largely facilitated funding and equipment for al Qaeda elements in Mali and across Africa, and most likely provided a launch pad for the attacks on Algeria’s In Amenas facility.
If that deadly hostage crisis last week proved one thing, it is that the consequences of Islamic extremism in Africa cannot be confined to the vast Sahara Desert. The French fight to eradicate extremism in northern Mali will quickly become an exhausting game of whack-a-mole without decisive action against Libya’s own Islamist quasi-states.
As with the U.S. campaign in Yemen, or the French operation in Mali, the cooperation of local governments is a key component in any foreign intervention effort. The government of Ali Zidan could be that partner in Libya, having declared its intentions to prevent Libya from becoming a jihadist haven. Since the start of the Arab Spring, Prime Minister Zidan has emerged as one of the only Arab leaders to openly call for increased ties with the U.S.
With the French pursuing al Qaeda in Mali and the Algerian government hardening its stance against jihadists, Libya’s jihadist problem can no longer be dismissed as a local nuisance. It’s time for the U.S. to strike.
Mr. Nisman is the intelligence manager of the Middle East and North Africa division of Max Security Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm based in Tel Aviv. Follow him on Twitter @DannyNis.
Comments are closed.
