The lessons of the 1973 Yom Kippur War are relevant to today’s threats.
If finally compelled to do so, Israel is able to destroy the Iranian nuclear-weapons program, even if at breathtaking risk. Whether or not Israel succeeds on that front, it faces yet another existential military problem, less immediate and on a different register, in regard to which it has made the wrong choice.
Though history may never repeat itself exactly, it does have affection for certain themes. One of these is that of a nation suicidally disarming because it rests upon the laurels of the past, or believes in the satisfying delusion that by intellectual formulation it can safely predict the future intentions and capabilities of rivals and enemies.
Prior to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel was so intoxicated by its brilliant victories in 1967 that (substituting excessive confidence for military prudence) it was very nearly destroyed. After shattering Israel’s defenses, the Egyptian army halted only because of Israel’s nuclear deterrent, after which the tide of war turned only because of an extraordinary American resupply effort authorized by President Nixon, something that would hardly have been a certainty with a President Obama.
Because Israel is understandably tired of war and wants to tend its vineyards, and because its military, like America’s, has come down with a potentially fatal case of think-tankitis, the government believes that, as recently expressed by Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon, “Wars of military versus military—in the format we last met 40 years ago in the Yom Kippur War—are becoming less and less relevant.” Accordingly, Israel plans to cut its already diminished defense budget by more than one dollar in 20; release a large proportion of career officers; and reduce further the numbers of its planes, tanks and warships. The military will be shaped to fight Hamas, Hezbollah, and intifadas rather than the armies of Egypt, Syria, and whoever might join them.