Obama’s Ineptitude in the Mideast: By Con Coughlin
It is hard to imagine a more damning indictment of the Obama administration’s inept approach to the Middle East than the pictures of the black flag of al Qaeda flying once more from the rooftops and minarets of Ramadi and Fallujah.
At the height of the sectarian violence that erupted in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s ousting, these Iraqi cities—situated in the country’s western Anbar Province—became synonymous with attempts by al Qaeda-backed militants to thwart Iraq’s transformation into a functioning democracy.
Disaffected local Sunni tribes that had previously pledged their loyalty to Saddam’s regime allowed al Qaeda militants, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to undertake a murderous terror campaign against coalition forces. Their efforts involved murder, kidnappings and the occasional public beheading.
An estimated 1,300 American troops died trying to crush the violent insurgency in Anbar. It ended when the Sunni tribes, angered by Zarqawi’s uncompromising pursuit of a radical Islamist agenda, turned on the al Qaeda interlopers and, as part of the so-called “Sunni Awakening,” backed U.S. efforts to eradicate al Qaeda. Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. missile strike on his hideout in the outskirts of Baghdad in 2006. The remainder of Iraq’s al Qaeda network was rolled up, and its black flags removed from public display, during the military surge masterminded by retired U.S. Gen. David Petraeus.
By any standard, the comprehensive defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq was a tremendous achievement. That makes the return of al Qaeda’s menacing emblem over these iconic Iraqi cities all the more galling for those who fought and died for their liberation.
The blame for this disastrous strategic reversal for American interests must lie squarely with the White House. Since taking office, President Barack Obama has sought to portray himself as the politician who brought the Bush Administration’s reckless wars to an end. This was particularly the case with Iraq, a conflict Mr. Obama had voted against when still a senator. The president sought to withdraw American forces at the earliest possible opportunity. But while Mr. Obama earned political capital among left-wing supporters for ending the war, his clumsy handling of the withdrawal negotiations contributed significantly to the current state of play in Anbar’s major population centers.
Such was Mr. Obama’s distaste for maintaining American involvement in his predecessor’s war that he made the cavalier decision to withdraw American forces in 2011 without reaching a proper agreement with Baghdad. Such an agreement would have allowed the U.S. to maintain a residual military presence in the country, which would have enabled Washington to continue to influence Iraq’s political development.
With the Obama administration no longer willing or able to fulfil its regional responsibilities, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has moved closer to neighboring Iran. The region’s Shiite superpower has readily backed Mr. Maliki’s attempts to exclude Iraq’s other main sectarian groups, the Sunnis and Kurds, from power.
As a predictable consequence, disaffected Sunni tribesmen in places such as Anbar have turned once again to al Qaeda and other Islamist groups—of which there is no shortage in neighboring Syria—to protect their interests.
Mr. Maliki has now ordered the Iraqi armed forces into action to prevent large tracts of his country from being turned into an al Qaeda-inspired fledgling Islamist state. But the very fact that al Qaeda has returned to Iraq in such strength serves as its own indictment of Mr. Obama’s handling of America’s withdrawal.
Nor is Iraq the only country in the region in which Mr. Obama’s lack of engagement threatens to squander a decade of costly American military and financial investment. In Afghanistan, where U.S.-led NATO forces are due to end combat operations this year, there are mounting concerns that the mission could suffer a similar fate. A National Intelligence Assessment published in Washington over the holidays predicts that, in the absence of political reconciliation with the Taliban, insurgent groups are likely to reoccupy territory vacated when international forces complete their withdrawal.
As in Iraq, a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, where American troops have paid the ultimate price, would represent a damning failure for Mr. Obama’s foreign policy. Afghanistan, after all, was supposed to be “Obama’s War.” Early in his presidency Mr. Obama gave his approval to an Iraq-style military surge to defeat the Taliban militarily and force them to the negotiating table.
But as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates writes in his new book, “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War,” even though Mr. Obama personally authorized the Afghanistan surge strategy in late 2009, his heart was never really in the mission. Mr. Gates writes that the president’s focus was “all about getting out,” and that he was “skeptical if not outright convinced” that his generals’ plans would end in failure. No wonder Mr. Obama forced two of his leading generals in Afghanistan—Gens. David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal —out of their jobs.
Mr. Obama may like to claim that one of the true achievements of his presidency is that he brought America’s long decade of war to an end. But if by so doing, he has merely gifted the advantage to America’s enemies, then this may well prove to be a boast that he lives to regret.
Mr. Coughlin is the Daily Telegraph’s defense editor and author of “Saddam: His Secret Life.” The American edition of his new book, ” Churchill’s First War,” will be published by Thomas Dunne books later this month.
The president’s fecklessness risks undoing a decade of sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is hard to imagine a more damning indictment of the Obama administration’s inept approach to the Middle East than the pictures of the black flag of al Qaeda flying once more from the rooftops and minarets of Ramadi and Fallujah.
At the height of the sectarian violence that erupted in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s ousting, these Iraqi cities—situated in the country’s western Anbar Province—became synonymous with attempts by al Qaeda-backed militants to thwart Iraq’s transformation into a functioning democracy.
Disaffected local Sunni tribes that had previously pledged their loyalty to Saddam’s regime allowed al Qaeda militants, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to undertake a murderous terror campaign against coalition forces. Their efforts involved murder, kidnappings and the occasional public beheading.
An estimated 1,300 American troops died trying to crush the violent insurgency in Anbar. It ended when the Sunni tribes, angered by Zarqawi’s uncompromising pursuit of a radical Islamist agenda, turned on the al Qaeda interlopers and, as part of the so-called “Sunni Awakening,” backed U.S. efforts to eradicate al Qaeda. Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. missile strike on his hideout in the outskirts of Baghdad in 2006. The remainder of Iraq’s al Qaeda network was rolled up, and its black flags removed from public display, during the military surge masterminded by retired U.S. Gen. David Petraeus.
By any standard, the comprehensive defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq was a tremendous achievement. That makes the return of al Qaeda’s menacing emblem over these iconic Iraqi cities all the more galling for those who fought and died for their liberation.
The blame for this disastrous strategic reversal for American interests must lie squarely with the White House. Since taking office, President Barack Obama has sought to portray himself as the politician who brought the Bush Administration’s reckless wars to an end. This was particularly the case with Iraq, a conflict Mr. Obama had voted against when still a senator. The president sought to withdraw American forces at the earliest possible opportunity. But while Mr. Obama earned political capital among left-wing supporters for ending the war, his clumsy handling of the withdrawal negotiations contributed significantly to the current state of play in Anbar’s major population centers.
Such was Mr. Obama’s distaste for maintaining American involvement in his predecessor’s war that he made the cavalier decision to withdraw American forces in 2011 without reaching a proper agreement with Baghdad. Such an agreement would have allowed the U.S. to maintain a residual military presence in the country, which would have enabled Washington to continue to influence Iraq’s political development.
With the Obama administration no longer willing or able to fulfil its regional responsibilities, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has moved closer to neighboring Iran. The region’s Shiite superpower has readily backed Mr. Maliki’s attempts to exclude Iraq’s other main sectarian groups, the Sunnis and Kurds, from power.
As a predictable consequence, disaffected Sunni tribesmen in places such as Anbar have turned once again to al Qaeda and other Islamist groups—of which there is no shortage in neighboring Syria—to protect their interests.
Mr. Maliki has now ordered the Iraqi armed forces into action to prevent large tracts of his country from being turned into an al Qaeda-inspired fledgling Islamist state. But the very fact that al Qaeda has returned to Iraq in such strength serves as its own indictment of Mr. Obama’s handling of America’s withdrawal.
Nor is Iraq the only country in the region in which Mr. Obama’s lack of engagement threatens to squander a decade of costly American military and financial investment. In Afghanistan, where U.S.-led NATO forces are due to end combat operations this year, there are mounting concerns that the mission could suffer a similar fate. A National Intelligence Assessment published in Washington over the holidays predicts that, in the absence of political reconciliation with the Taliban, insurgent groups are likely to reoccupy territory vacated when international forces complete their withdrawal.
As in Iraq, a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, where American troops have paid the ultimate price, would represent a damning failure for Mr. Obama’s foreign policy. Afghanistan, after all, was supposed to be “Obama’s War.” Early in his presidency Mr. Obama gave his approval to an Iraq-style military surge to defeat the Taliban militarily and force them to the negotiating table.
But as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates writes in his new book, “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War,” even though Mr. Obama personally authorized the Afghanistan surge strategy in late 2009, his heart was never really in the mission. Mr. Gates writes that the president’s focus was “all about getting out,” and that he was “skeptical if not outright convinced” that his generals’ plans would end in failure. No wonder Mr. Obama forced two of his leading generals in Afghanistan—Gens. David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal —out of their jobs.
Mr. Obama may like to claim that one of the true achievements of his presidency is that he brought America’s long decade of war to an end. But if by so doing, he has merely gifted the advantage to America’s enemies, then this may well prove to be a boast that he lives to regret.
Mr. Coughlin is the Daily Telegraph’s defense editor and author of “Saddam: His Secret Life.” The American edition of his new book, ” Churchill’s First War,” will be published by Thomas Dunne books later this month.
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