PETER HUESSY: KEEPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM BEING USED AND PROLIFERATED
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/keeping-nuclear-weapons-from-being-used-and-proliferated-in-a-dangerous-world?f=puball
On November 7th, 2013, the former Commander of the US Strategic Air Command and Chief of Staff of the USAF, General Larry Welch, (retired), spoke at a Kings Bay, Georgia symposium on the enduring requirements of the US Strategic Nuclear Triad, an event I planned and hosted and which is one of a continued series of such events which will continue in April 16-17 at Crane/NavSea, Indiana. Here is my introduction and the remarks of General Larry Welch.
MR. HUESSY: General Welch has been speaking at my breakfast seminar series since he was SAC commander, and that’s 29 years ago, I believe. I think he has spoken at my series more than any other individual. I once noted at my seminar a couple of years ago that he was a national treasure, to which he replied that he had not yet taken up residence in the U.S. National Archives.
(Laughter).
He is, nonetheless, a voice of extraordinary wisdom and common sense. Would you please welcome our former United States Air Force chief of staff, our former SAC commander, former president of IDA, General Larry Welch?
(Applause).
MR. LARRY WELCH: When Peter asked me to do this, I thought this is a really good idea. I’m going to give a keynote speech and find something really useful to say to one of the most experienced, knowledgeable, committed, dedicated groups that I could imagine. But since Peter asked me to do it, I did what I always do when Peter asks, I said yes.
But I said yes for another reason, because I do have a message for a knowledgeable, experienced, committed, dedicated group of people. And the fact is, my message is about the message. It’s specifically about staying on message – staying on message about the strategic nuclear deterrent, the triad that underwrites that deterrent, and all the capabilities it takes to keep that triad effective. And I’m talking about policy, people, platforms and weapons.
And I raise that issue tonight because I think we need a much more intense focus by a knowledgeable, committed, experienced group of people in order to get us back on message. The issue is that the nation, in some respects, has drifted off message and it has created confusion in places where we don’t need confusion. Most certainly confusion in places where I expect confusion: those who believe that somehow if we just ignore them, nuclear weapons will go away. But I’m not talking about those people.
Confusion, where there shouldn’t be confusion, that I do worry about. So with any message, we ought to first start with what are we trying to do. And in this case I think its simplicity itself. The message is not complicated. And I suppose I should apologize for that – some of you will be bored, some of you will be insulted. That’s tough. That’s you’re problem, not mine.
(Laughter).
But we start with what we’re trying to do – we’re just trying to do two things. We’re trying to deter any potential adversary from a catastrophic action inimical to our national interest and those of our friends and allies – that is a nuclear attack. And we’re trying to assure our friends and allies, or at least a set of our friends and allies, that it is not in their national interest to develop their own nuclear weapons.
So what are the conditions required to create those two objectives? Again, they’re fairly straightforward. We have to persuade any potential adversary that the cost and risk of a nuclear attack against the U.S. or our allies far exceeds any possible gain. We know how to do that. We don’t need to study how to do that. We don’t need academic sophistication on how to do that. We know how to do that.
But we also need to assure a set of our friends and allies that we have the capability and will to extend our nuclear deterrent to meet their nuclear deterrent needs. Now there’s not some set of metrics so that I can tell you what does it take to satisfy those two conditions. But there are two long-term, long time historical precedents that certainly informs our thinking and informs our way to analyze this.
One is two coalitions with irreconcilable political doctrines, armed to the teeth with a heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons faced each other across a political border for half a century. Both decided that the constant risk of a nuclear action against a nuclear power far exceeded any possible gain. And the second historical example is there are some 30 nations around the world who either formally or informally have decided it is in their national interest to depend on the U.S. extended deterrent instead of developing their own capability when they clearly have the capability to do so. We have maintained the conditions that created those two historical examples, as we went from the 10,000-plus weapons that we targeted when I was commander of SAC and the director of the JSTPS, to the 6,000 in START I, to the 3,500 in proposals for START II, to the 2,250 to 2,200 in the Moscow Treaty, to the 1,550 in the New START Treaty.
And we did all that with confidence that the risk was acceptable. And that risk was deemed acceptable by both political and military leaders, including people who were directly responsible for the condition of the strategic forces and the success of the nuclear deterrent. And I have no argument with that. And we were able to do so by maintaining confidence in the effectiveness of that deterrent, and maintaining enough confidence and dependence on our extended deterrent so that it continues to work.
I would point out to you that’s a confidence and risk assessment. And an important part of the risk assessment was confidence in our nuclear deterrent. And that means confidence in the policies, the people, the platforms and the weapons. And we have, in fact, been able to maintain that even with these greatly reduced numbers of deployed warheads.
But you can’t keep doing that forever. And we are now running into an obstacle that has taken us off message, and I would say that obstacle is cost. And I will tell you, probably several times before I’m through, I do not believe we have a budget problem. I believe we have a priorities problem.
In many respects, what is causing the sticker shock that has made cost such an issue, it’s not really cost. It’s the fact that we have conditioned people over the years to expect that we will maintain a nuclear deterrent for a very long time with weapons and platforms that far exceed their expected life, and we will be able to maintain this deterrent by just building on past investments. And we get no credit for the fact that those past investments have produced the most cost-effective set of conditions that anyone could imagine.
The first Ohio-class submarine went to sea more than 30 years ago. When I was CINC-SAC I sailed on Alaska on its first sea trial 28 years ago. We expect to replace the first of those platforms sometime beyond 2020.
We built the last B-52H half a century ago. We expect to begin replacing the B-52H sometime in the mid-2020s. The cruise missile is almost 30 years old and we are now trying to decide what to do about the cruise missiles. Minuteman III – fielded almost 30 years ago – and we are now doing an analysis of alternatives to determine what we will do to replace that platform. So we have platform after platform exceeding all expectations of service for the investment so how about the weapons?
They were designed for 20 years life. The B-61 Mod 3 and 4 were fielded 35 years ago. And we are currently working on a program, the B-61-12 is to begin to replace those in 2020. The W-78 entered service almost 30 years ago, and we are planning a life extension program to replace those. I could go on about the tremendous cost effectiveness of the nuclear forces that we have become accustomed to. And you would think that with that example of cost-effectiveness, there would be lavish praise for what we have accomplished in the nuclear deterrent force. But, of course, that’s a joke. We’re not going to expect that, so I wouldn’t worry about the shock that might come from that particular experience.
Forces and warheads, no matter what we do, no matter how carefully we sustain them, eventually require major investment. They require major investment in platforms and major investment in warheads, and we are at that point in time. We can no longer leverage to the extent that we have all of those past investments.
Some of the most experienced, brightest, knowledgeable people on the planet in terms of nuclear weapons design, some who meet the same description in terms of nuclear forces, and thought-leaders in terms of strategic deterrence, have come together over the last decade and planned a path ahead. And we were seeing, over the last decade, convergence on that path ahead, until recently, and now we are seeing people slip off message, which is the reason that I’m talking about this subject.
So there is a strategy. There is a plan. Every weapons system that we will retain in the inventory for a long period of time, with the exception of the W-76 which is currently undergoing and LEP, will require a major life extension program sooner or later. That is a fact of life. The question is not if life extension is a necessity. The question is, how do we do it? Do we do it in a way that we end up 30 years from now with a better stockpile, a stockpile that fits our purposes and supports the deterrent more effectively; or do we end up with refurbishing a Cold War stockpile that is already 30 years old?
I guess I would simply suggest what we get from doing it right. What we get for doing it right is a very long list. The 3 + 2 strategy is three ballistic missile warheads, two of which are adaptable to either the SLBM or the ICBM, and two warheads for bombs and cruise missiles. That particular strategy, which we thought we had widespread agreement on – certainly General Kehler has led the effort to get widespread agreement on that – has been put at risk because of the cost issue.
So what do we get for that? What do we get for the incremental cost between doing it the cheapest way possible and ending up with something no better than what we had 20 years ago and the kind of stockpile that really fits the 21st century? We get a stockpile that remains highly reliable for decades, reduces the needed numbers of non-deployed weapons to support any level of deployed weapons, cuts the numbers of warhead types just about in half, reduces the technical risks associated with a lack of alternative warheads for some important part of our stockpile, provides increased confidence in the long-term capability to maintain these weapons without a return to nuclear explosive testing, leverages the past investment in nuclear components by reusing nuclear components instead of just designing new ones, and provides for quickly expanding the capabilities of our most survivable part of the triad. So what’s not to like about that set of capabilities?
There are only four problems that we see right now: political will, decision accountability, national priorities, and wishful thinking about the nature of the world that we live in. Given that we finally get back on message and that we actually conduct the kind of life extension programs that will lead to the kind of stockpile we get, then we are able to maintain the triad. So let me say a word about the triad.
The triad is not just about three different legs of the nuclear deterrent. The triad is about a set of characteristics embodied in those three legs of the triad that ensure there is no gap in the deterrent that any potential adversary can leverage or exploit to materially impact or materially compromise the effectiveness of our deterrent. During the Cold War, every leg of the triad provided pretty much a full set of characteristics. That’s not the case anymore.
Each leg of the triad carries a very heavy burden for some particularly important characteristic of the deterrent. I would list those military characteristics as assured unquestionable response, assured second strike, resilience, and the ability to make a convincing demonstration of will and consequences when we chose to do so. So in today’s triad, there is a single leg that leads or bears the major responsibility for each of those characteristics.
The SLBM leg provides the assured survivable second strike, which means that regardless of what any adversary does, regardless of what kind of attack they’re able to mount against us, they will face a devastating response and there’s no possibility that any rational decision-maker could ever believe they could pull off a first strike. As for the resilience piece, there is a leg of the triad against which there is no possibility of a cheap attack, there is no possibility of any kind of attrition campaign that can compromise the nuclear deterrent, and that’s the ICBM leg of the triad. As long as we have several hundred ICBMs out there, it is not possible to concentrate all your attention on any single leg of the triad and it is not possible to come up with a technological breakthrough or some kind of operational opportunity that will compromise the triad.
During the Cold War, the bomber leg spread across all of the characteristics. Bombers on alert were survivable. With the number of bases we had – some 25 bases when I was commander of SAC – and the number of dispersal bases we had, we had high assurance against any kind of an attrition campaign or any kind of a cheap attack. And most importantly, they provided that clearly visible demonstration of will.
Some of you may remember that during period of high tension, we kept B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons airborne 24 hours a day, and made very certain that the Soviet leadership knew that. It was visible, it was there, and they knew what it meant. In several crises, that could have become nuclear crises, it was those bombers airborne that helped keep things under control. They perform that service today.
But my point is, in aggregate, the three legs of the triad continue to ensure there is no gap in the deterrent capability that any potential adversary can exploit. And it takes all three legs of the triad to provide that capability. If we give up a leg of the triad, then we either undertake an enormous expense to provide that capability in another leg, or we give up that aspect of the deterrent force.
In terms of ensuring that we have the weapons – and the right weapons to continue to supply the three legs of the triad – I would remind you we have spent tens of billions of dollars on producing the knowledge and the tools to build the right kind of stockpile. And for someone today to say, having spent tens of billions of dollars on the capability to build the right kind of stockpile, that we can’t afford the incremental cost of doing that, is foolish and irresponsible. There’s no other description for it.
We have made the investment. We have made it for the right reason. It is highly successful. And if we don’t exploit it now, then I don’t know what to tell you about decision accountability. And that’s why I raised decision accountability as one of our challenges.
So that’s the message. I would hope the message is clear. It only has five points. I usually list three points. This time I have five.
The risk is, of course, there remains in the hands of a government that is not a reliable, trustworthy friend, a capability to quickly destroy much of the world. And there is in the hands of a group of nations highly inimical to the interests of this country and our allies, the capability to hold our allies at risk. And the objective of deterring a nuclear attack and extending our nuclear deterrent to friends and allies remains tremendously important. It is job one. It is the most compelling need to support national security that this nation has; not the most expensive, not the one that requires the most attention, but the most important.
Our strategic nuclear forces, delivery vehicles and weapons, have served for decades. And with the right kind of life extension programs they will serve for decades more. They ought to be a poster child – a poster child to cost effectiveness. And I would hope in spite of the environment we might live in, that we still haven’t lost sight of the importance of return on investment. And this is an enormously important and a successful return on investment.
The fourth is to sustain that deterrent, there’s a strategy and plan to do it right. And we have the knowledge and the tools to do it right. And we can afford to do it right. It’s just a matter of priorities.
And the incremental difference between the lowest cost approach that will give us a renewal of the Cold War inventory, and the right approach in the total scheme of things, is not worth your consideration. We just need to do it right. And finally, executing that strategy and that plan will continue to deliver a very high return on investment, and who can argue against that?
So that’s the message. I hope we can stay on it. We need your help.
Let me close my comments with – given the location of this particular conference – a reminder, unnecessary I hope, that every minute of every day the men and women in the three legs of the triad are dedicated, totally professional, and have a deep conviction about the importance of what they do. And they do it well and they do it every minute of every day. And what they deserve is the total support of our community to ensure that far into the future they will still have the capability that they need to perform that mission.
I hope that’s what this conference is about. It is certainly why I am here. Thank you very much.
(Applause).
You thought I was through, but not quite. I want to take just a moment to recognize the most senior active duty nuclear warrior this evening. He’s here with us, General Robert Kehler.
(Applause).
Genera Kehler joined the Air Force from the ROTC program at Penn State. Major Kehler attended his first conference of this kind, I presume in the company of someone somewhat more senior. He has spoken at these things plenty of times. He thinks maybe he has spoken for the last time. That’s not likely to be true, knowing Peter as well as I do.
He has helped build the force that won the Cold War. He was instrumental in helping with the force that sustained stability during those days when we were transitioning from the Cold War. And maybe more importantly, he kept the focus on this force during all of this focus on the global war on terrorism, when a lot of people didn’t seemed to think that this was very important anymore.
I think most important, from my viewpoint, he has provided a set of directions that I believe is unprecedented in terms of integrating strategic stabilities, not just nuclear but all the strategic capabilities, and focusing all those strategic capabilities on our national interests; and also in integrating those strategic capabilities with geographic commanders. Now some of us who have dealt with geographic commanders know that’s not easy. But he’s been able to do it and he’s been successful at it. He took charge – and of course he is used to taking charge – and he’s used to being accountable.
He commanded an ICBM squadron at Whiteman. He commanded an operational group at Maelstrom. He commanded the space wing at Vandenberg and a space wing at Peterson, and at Air Force Space Command and Strategic Command.
I recall years ago hearing Henry Kissinger say the day will come when we will look back on the Cold War with fond nostalgia. He didn’t really believe that and I don’t believe that, but the point he was making is every one of those assignments Bob Kehler has been in, this country has faced a more complex – not a less complex – but a more complex national security environment. And he has been one of the minds and one of those sets of courage that’s been able to address those.
So I hope I speak for all when I say, General Kehler, we appreciate that mind. We appreciate that courage. We appreciate that commitment. And if you think you’re through, you don’t know any of us.
Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland , a defense and national security consulting firm.
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