RUTHFULLY YOURS

PETER HUESSY: MORE NUCLEAR ZERO GLOBALONEY

Posted By Ruth King on February 5th, 2014

http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/more-nuclear-zero-globaloney?f=puball

The current push by America’s radical left to reduce America’s nuclear deterrent to zero is increasingly characterized by wrong-headed assumptions wrapped around highly questionable assertions ending in outright falsehoods.

The most recent example is an essay on January 20, 2014 by Eugene Chow in “The Week”, titled “Why are all of America’s nuclear missiles aimed at Russia?”

Chow makes four claims: all American ICBM missiles are aimed at Russia; that they are on hair trigger alert; that they must be fired early in a crisis but before the US is certain we have been attacked; and as such can safely be eliminated so that the US relies solely on our submarines and bombers for deterrence.

Ironically, Chow gets one thing right in his 700 word essay. But he is so confused about both nuclear deterrence and the characteristics of the ICBM force that while he makes a correct statement early in his analysis–that Russia would not have any interest in attacking our 450 Minuteman ICBMs in their hardened silos—he seems unaware that it completely contradicts the entirety of his analysis so as to make his accompanying alarming conclusions go up in smoke.

Let me explain.

As I noted, Chow gets one thing right.

He understands that Russia would not try and target all 450 Minuteman missile silos located over five American western and mid-western states because as he admits “There is little political incentive for the Russians to initiate Armageddon”.

That is exactly why deploying such a expanded force of 450 Minuteman missiles on sovereign US territory makes it impossible technically for an nuclear armed adversary–limited in warheads as Russia is under New START, to try in a crisis to eliminate all US nuclear weapons in a first strike as a tactic to get the US out of the nuclear business.

Chow thus completely misses the point of his own conclusion. Of course Russia will not initiate Armageddon.

But having acknowledged the obvious, Chow then declares that American ICBMs have to be launched within seconds of an emerging crisis because there ARE vulnerable to a Russian attack, which the reader is left assuming will be automatically forthcoming. From this erroneous conclusion Chow then determines that ICBMs are destabilizing.

But given the impossibility of an adversary being able to successfully strike all US nuclear assets simultaneously in a crisis, (and avoid a US retaliatory response), and having no incentive to do so which Chow admits, the US will always have a secure second-strike retaliatory capability.

This thus makes the early or prompt use of nuclear weapons–a genuine fear during the Cold War– in a crisis unnecessary. This underscores the entire point of deterrence: our weapons will be used only in retaliation, and because some significant percentage of our nuclear deterrent will survive any hypothetical attack, we do not have to use such weapons in a crisis and thus we can avoid their use both at the beginning and during a crisis. Stability is preserved, and a crisis need not end in conflict. That is deterrence–the non-launch of nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Chow seems unaware of this point.

Having got this central point wrong, Chow compounds his error by adding even more errors of fact and logic to his essay. I counted at least 13 major problems with his analysis.

For example, first, all American missiles are currently not aimed at any adversary–they are not even targeted on a day to day basis. Chow says they are all targeted at Russia.

Second, the US stockpile of nuclear weapons is roughly 2130, based on submarines, ICBMs and bombers, with somewhat half that number–about 1000 warheads– on alert on a day to day basis. This is not over 4000 as he asserts or the 7700 used by a recent NRDC study.

Although the US does have warheads in reserve, it is not a quick thing to add warheads to either our ICBM or SLBM force should we need to do so in an emergency or crisis. Our current inventory of nuclear weapons must serve to maintain deterrence now and in the immediate future should a crisis emerge.

Third, the US missile arsenal is not capable of “only attacking” Russia. Flight paths are available that require no such over-flight of Russia. But more importantly, since the use of such missiles would be in a retaliatory mode, having them available to use against Russia targets in a retaliatory mode would mean a US deterrent posture designed not to initiate a conflict but designed to terminate such a conflict before it even starts.

In short, given the posture of the current and planned US deterrent, no use of nuclear forces by Russia or China or any other nuclear force against the United States makes any sense because the US will always be able to retaliate.

The one exception is a surreptitious attack against the United States from our maritime territory or a weapon smuggled into the United States by freighter–but be definition such a surreptitious nuclear terrorist attack would not be deterred by any portion of our nuclear deterrent. And no amount of mumbo jumbo about a “nimble” US nuclear deterrent would transform our Triad into a counter terrorist capability unless we could determine the origin of such an attack.

And if that is the case–we know the origin of a nuclear attack–then the presence of a robust deterrent is an advantage and deterrent not a handicap. In addition, the barrage of criticism leveled at the US nuclear deterrent by both advocates of Global Zero or a minimized deterrent deflects attention from the serious proliferation problems in North Korea and Iran, as well as prevents the US from fully appreciating the security challenges we face with an increasingly capable Chinese nuclear and conventional capability as well as an increasingly assertive Russian Federation–both of which are fully modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Fourth, ICBMs are indeed capable of attacking Russian military assets because that is the essence of deterrence–being able to hold at risk critical Russian military capabilities that cannot remain in a sanctuary from which they can be used at will. In a retaliatory framework, no American President need be under any pressure to use our weapons quickly as we have a secure retaliatory capability especially of submarines at sea.

Fifth, the significant capability of the ICBM fleet is that its dimensions–450 silos and roughly 50 launch control facilities–would require an adversary to use about 1000 warheads just to eliminate one leg–Minuteman missiles– of the US nuclear Triad, while leaving Navy submarines at sea and airborne bombers available for a secure retaliatory strike.

But sixth, and this is where Crow’s argument falls flat, limiting our force structure to submarines and bombers as he recommends, limits the force structure to 12 submarines, of which 6-8 are in ocean transit to their patrol areas or in their ocean patrol “box”, the remaining at two Navy bases, and some number of bombers at two bases. That target set is roughly 10-12 discrete targets rather than over 500 under the current and planned deterrent force posture.

Why would we make an adversaries targeting job 50 times easier with 98% fewer targets to worry about? 

Seventh, Chow echoes a number totally spurious claims of the nuclear Global Zero crowd including the fiction that American ICBMs are on a “hair trigger”. Chow even goes so far as to claim ICBMs require an “itchy finger”.

This whole notion is made up out of whole cloth. It is nonsensical. The only person in the world that has the authority to launch such weapons is the President of the United States. In nearly 70 years of the nuclear age, during all of the Cold War, no American President has used such weapons. This is exactly as our deterrent posture is so arranged–never should these weapons be used and as long as an adversary does not strike the US first we do not have to use our nuclear weapons.

Eighth, our submarines in port are not an elusive target and in fact are a very soft target. But it would be ludicrous to attack those two submarine bases as our other ICBMs and submarines at sea are all available for retaliation. As for our bombers, not now being on a day to day alert status, they too are highly vulnerable and are soft targets. But in the context of our divergent and diversified Triad, they are not going to be attacked pre-emptively by any sane adversary especially if during a crisis they are put on alert and are airborne. Of course, if an adversary is insane, then the particular force posture of the US nuclear deterrent will not matter.

Ninth, as recent expert analysis at a Kings Bay, Georgia conference in November 2013 has underscored, relying solely on our submarines at sea for our sole secure retaliatory deterrent,  risks–down the road–such ocean patrolling submarines being found as a result of advances in anti-submarine warfare. Remember our current and replacement submarines will have a great capability to remain undetected–using today’s technology. But they must survive in our deterrent for the next half century and perhaps beyond, and here an adversary is not limited to ASW technology only available today or in the near future.

Tenth, Chow then claims supporters of ICBMs favor American “overwhelming numerical superiority” in nuclear weapons to deter other nations. One is at a loss to find examples of such views and to understand whom Chow is describing.

I have hosted some 1750+ seminars on nuclear deterrence and related issues since 1983. The speakers have included the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Vice President’s of the United States and Commanders of both the Strategic Air Command and Strategic Command, as well as senior members of the House and Senate defense committees.

To the best of my understanding, all supporters of a robust nuclear deterrent within the context of START I and START II, the Moscow Treaty and now the New Start treaty have supported equal deployed strategic numerical limits between the United States and first the Soviet Union and then Russia. They have indeed nearly universally supported a strategic US deterrent “second to none”, even as we acknowledge the Russians have far superior numbers of tactical or theater nuclear weapons the US has no plans to match. Perhaps Mr. Chow might rethink which country is seeking or has nuclear superiority.

Eleventh, Chow also inexplicitly claims that while somehow it makes no sense to target Russia with our nuclear deterrent–a country that has thousands more weapons than the United States–we should worry about having a “nimble deterrent” to deal with China, North Korea and Iran. Well, how does eliminating one third of our current deterrent–as killing the ICBM leg of the Triad would do–help with that task? How does making deterrence less likely to succeed make the US more safe?

Twelfth, the idea that China has only 300 nuclear weapons is not borne out by the facts known of China’s current nuclear modernization plans. Admittedly, the US does not know the exact number but reasonable expert estimates range from 400 to in the 3000 range according to Professor Karber of Georgetown University. Building an additional 50 SS-18 type missiles could easily put China in the neighborhood of current US warhead levels.

When this is taken into account, it is well within the boundaries of their projected capabilities that China now has at the low end at least 500-800 strategic deployed weapons. Taking the higher estimates of this range, the Chinese arsenal could be close to the 900 warheads Chow says the United States should deploy in the future. Thus the Chinese inventory hardly constitutes the 6% Chow claims it is compared to the current US deployed strategic inventory of about 2000 warheads. The actual number of Chinese warheads could be 20% at the low end and 150% at the high end if the range of 400-3000 Chinese warheads is used.

Thirteen, under the current New Start treaty, our 12 submarines can account for no more than roughly 1000 nuclear warheads. If deployed each with 288 warheads which Chow claims can be done, (to argue  as he does that one American Trident submarine can match the entirety of China’s strategic nuclear forces), the fleet of 12 American Trident boats would together deploy nearly 3500 warheads, some 2000 more than is allowed by Treaty law.

Under the future Ohio/Trident replacement program, the 12 new modern submarines would carry 16 missiles each–not 20 as they do currently– and thus will deploy far fewer warheads than Chow claims even at their top capacity. The numbers will be even lower assuming the New Start treaty limits are either maintained or substituted with a new arms control agreement into the future.

Fourteenth, and most importantly, the constant criticism of America’s nuclear deterrent posture which Chow embraces comes at a price. We are getting sidelined and are paying less attention to the serious proliferation problems we face in North Korea and Iran and the extent to which a nuclear armed China will seriously undermine US security.

As Clark Murdock of CSIS and Mathew Kroenig of Georgetown University have both concluded, further reductions in the US nuclear arsenal are not having any positive impact on proliferation, in fact just the opposite may be the case.

For these 14 reasons, Chow’s assertions that ICBMs are less safe, or less resilient or less capable turn to rhetorical dust, unable to withstand the slightest factual scrutiny or examination.

As the least expensive leg of the Triad, and a leg that contributes dramatically to stability–as do the other two legs of the Triad–ICBMs need to be maintained as part of our nuclear deterrent enterprise just as they did for 35 years of the Cold War and the 20 years since.

In short, if we adopted Chow’s recommendations, we would make the targeting task of our enemies 98% easier; make deterrence and crisis stability significantly less likely to be sustained; and break what has worked now for nearly three-quarters of a century to keep the peace between the great powers. That definitely qualifies as wrong-headed, questionable and foolish.

Comments are closed.