November 24, 2014, looms as a strategic date in world history. At that time, a deadline for a deal with Iran will be reached. And, even though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, among others, has said “no deal is better than a bad deal,” it appears as if President Obama’s team and the so-called P5+1 group – the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, and China, plus Germany – are seeking any deal rather than no deal.
There is no surprise at the rising confidence of the Iranian government. Without the slightest fanfare or notice by the international press, Shia rebels supported by Iran captured the capital city of Sana’a in Yemen. This extraordinary geostrategic move gives Iran entrance to the Red Sea. Along with its command of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Iran will be in a position to control the sea lanes surrounding the Arab world.
With Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Sana’a under Iranian control and influence, the dream of a Shia Crescent appears as a reality. Moreover, with Yemen on the door step of Saudi Arabia, Iran has an ideal staging area for attacks against its main Sunni rival.
Through its virtual silence, the United States is complicit in these actions. Since Mr. Obama will not deploy U.S. ground forces in the war against ISIS, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is considered a surrogate army, even though no one in the U.S. State Department will admit to the concession. Iran’s role as a putative “stabilizer” in the roiling Middle East offers it enormous latitude at the Vienna negotiating table where a decision will be made about Iran’s nuclear capability.
Despite a bipartisan U.S. Congressional declaration opposing any deal that permits Iran to have or develop nuclear weapons, it appears as if the negotiating team representing the U.S. and most of the Europeans are willing to split the difference. In other words, there is a growing consensus that if Iran agrees not to weaponize its missiles at its Parchin military base, it would be allowed to retain enough enriched uranium to build a bomb at a later date. That’s what I have described as the “Japanese solution,” i.e. Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution prohibits the development of nuclear weapons, but it does not prohibit the storage of fissile material that could be used for nuclear weapons.