Between an ambitious India and a North American energy renaissance, Iran’s horizons narrow.
The Middle East is where generalizations go to die, but suffer a few: The Whac-A-Mole approach to jihadist franchises more or less closely affiliated with al-Qaeda will necessarily continue for the foreseeable future, and those organizations, though they pose a real threat, will be a relatively small problem except where they enjoy state sponsorship and the resources and safe haven that go along with it. Sunni–Shiite cooperation in jihadist projects, uneasy though it may be, will continue to present dangers beyond the expectations of many American analysts. Potential allies in and around Iraq, having been burnt more than once by a seemingly fickle United States that is unsure of itself and its interests, will seek out regional allies and hedge their positions vis-à-vis American power. All of which serves to underline a point repeated by a half-dozen military and foreign-affairs scholars during National Review’s floating policy salon aboard the Allure of the Seas last week: The short-term problem in the Middle East may be the Islamic State or some other du jour gang of stateless beheaders, but the long-term problem is Iran.
Iran is, in a sense, the sort of problem we want to have in the Middle East. It is not an amorphous, slithering coalition of non-state organizations and ad hoc militias; rather, it is a nation-state with infrastructure, institutions, and interests — i.e., a target-rich environment with a great many vulnerabilities. Its young people are restive, and recent sanctions showed Tehran — and the world — exactly what sort of sandy foundation its economy rests upon: Iranian exports fell by half, and the rial lost some 80 percent of its value. And by “Iranian exports” we mean petroleum and minerals, after which dates and figs loom large in the Iranian economy.
It is unknown whether or how or when military action might be undertaken to prevent Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, which would be a truly catastrophic development. Some of Israel’s most sincere and well-informed admirers believe that Benjamin Netanyahu, recently denounced as a “chickens***” by one of Barack Obama’s suavity-dripping diplomatic lieutenants, does not in fact have the military capacity to undo Iran’s nuclear program, a mission that would be quite a bit more complex and challenging than the bombing of an Iraqi reactor in Operation Opera a generation ago. It is also unknown whether the United States would stand alongside its only reliable ally in the Middle East during the inevitably bloodthirsty retaliation from such an action. Likewise, the timing and conditions of any future U.S. military engagements in the area are impossible to forecast.
But some long-term developments are foreseeable, and the United States should make the most of these in its confrontation with Iran, forcing the Tehran regime to fight a war — economic, diplomatic, cultural, and, if it comes to it, military — on two fronts.