Iran is on both sides of the table
It is a general rule of negotiations that you don’t negotiate with yourself. This advice is intended to prevent one side from being the only party that offers bridging proposals or compromises, and continues to offer more even after every offer is rejected as inadequate by the second party.
In such cases, the negative party simply waits to see how far the offering party will go, and whether it will eventually come around to fully accepting every demand. The offering party proves, by its succession of improved offers and its unwillingness to give up on the negotiations, to be the more desirous, even desperate, to conclude a deal. Such a strategy inevitably means that the offering side will lose on the substance of the negotiations.
However, if the real goal of the offering side is simply to conclude a deal, any deal, and the terms of the deal itself are less significant, then it may still regard a negotiating defeat as a victory.
The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program have provided pretty clear evidence that the United States has been playing the role of the offering party, and Iran that of the negative party. The other members of the P5+1 have been somewhere in between, also anxious to reach a deal and resume commercial activity with Iran, but not as anxious as the Obama administration to give away the store on the various features of Iran’s current nuclear program that they will be allowed to retain and on the inspections regime going forward. In fact, one member of the P5+1, France, has even argued that the United States has at critical stages in the negotiations all but lobbied for Iran’s position in the negotiations with the other P5+1 members, U.S. President Barack Obama has made it clear that his real goal in chasing after Iran for almost all of his six-plus years in office, was to conclude a deal over Iran’s nuclear program that would enable Iran to rejoin the “community of nations,” whatever that term might mean to him.