RUTHFULLY YOURS

It is now so easy for the Republicans to blame Clinton and Obama for North Korea’s nuke rattling, and while they certainly deserve plenty of blame, George Bush(2) and his Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice should also share the blame. This is a column written by Rice, who was as deluded as Madeleine Halfbright in facing down the nasty Papa King.

Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea By Condoleezza Rice June 2008
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121443815539505367
North Korea will soon make a declaration of its nuclear programs, facilities and materials. This is an important, if initial, step and we will demand that it be verifiable as complete and accurate.

Amidst all the focus on our diplomatic tactics, it is important to keep two broader points in mind. One, we are learning more about Pyongyang’s nuclear efforts through the six-party framework than we otherwise would be. And two, this policy is our best option to achieve the strategic goal of verifiably eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs.

North Korea now faces a clear choice about its future. If it chooses confrontation ; violating international law, pursuing nuclear weapons, and threatening the region ; it will face serious consequences not only from the United States, but also from Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, as it did in 2006 after testing a nuclear device.

If, however, North Korea chooses cooperation ; by fulfilling its pledge from the September 2005 Joint Statement to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs”; a path is open for it to achieve the better and more secure relationship it says it wants with the international community. That includes the U.S. We have no permanent enemies.

Any effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula must contend with the fact that North Korea is the most secretive and opaque regime on the planet. Our intelligence is far from complete. Despite these inherent limitations, consider what we have achieved and learned thus far through the six-party framework, and how much more could still be possible.

North Korea is now disabling its plutonium production facility at Yongbyon ; not freezing it, as before, but disabling it for the purpose of abandonment. U.S. inspectors are monitoring this process on the ground.

In its declaration, North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We will insist on verification. North Korea has already turned over nearly 19,000 pages of production records from its Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities. With additional information we expect to receive; access to other documents, relevant sites, key personnel and the reactor itself – these records will help to verify the accuracy and completeness of Pyongyang’s declaration. North Korea’s plutonium program has been by far its largest nuclear effort over many decades, and we believe our policy could verifiably get the regime out of the plutonium-making business.

Getting a handle on North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is harder, because we simply do not know its full scale or what it yielded. And yet, because of our current policy, we now know more about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment efforts than before, and we are learning more still ; much of it troubling. North Korea acknowledges our concerns about its uranium-enrichment program, and we will insist on getting to the bottom of this issue.

Last fall, American pop culture celebrated “Back to the Future Day” — marking the date, 10/21/2015, to which Marty McFly leaps forward from the Reagan ’80s in Back to the Future Part II.

It was a slightly daft commemoration of a pleasant but hardly memorable sequel, and it felt almost like a way for people not to come to grips with the most striking thing about Back to the Future’s 30th anniversary: that we’re now as far from the Reagan 1980s as the teenage Marty was from his parents’ 1950s, and yet the gulf of years separating us from 1985 feels far narrower than the distance from the Eisenhower era that the original film used to such great effect.

The power of the first Back to the Future depended not just on an arbitrary 30-year period, that is, but on how radically America had changed across those decades: Marty’s adolescence and his parents’ courtship lay on opposite sides of (among many other things) rock ’n’ roll, civil rights, Vietnam, the sexual revolution, drug culture, the moon landing, feminism, the apocalyptic ’70s, and, finally, the conservative turn that made this magazine’s 30th anniversary a happy one.

Whereas if you remade Back to the Future now and sent Martina McFly back to ’85, you would have a lot of jokes about life without the iPhone, some shocking shoulder pads, and some sort of “comic” critique of Reagan-era unenlightenment on same-sex marriage. But you wouldn’t have the sense of visiting a past that’s actually another country.

Since National Review spans the same 60 years as the McFly-family saga, Back to the Future offers a useful prism through which to view our situation as the magazine turns (a youthful) 60. For NR’s first 30 years, the history that William F. Buckley Jr. wanted to stand athwart often proceeded at a breakneck pace. But during its second 30, and especially since Communism’s fall, there has been a general slowing, a sense of drift and repetition, a feeling that American society is somehow stuck in place.

‘Things change fast in Benghazi,” we are told near the opening of Michael Bay’s 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, and the dynamism with which the film presents the events of September 11, 2012, makes the quote ring true.

As the film starts, we land with former SEAL turned private-security-officer Jack Silva (The Office’s John Krasinski) in the middle of a post-Qaddafi Libyan hellscape. Benghazi is dominated by local security forces and militias indistinguishable from one another that can and will switch sides on the turn of a dime. We are reminded constantly that everyone is a bad guy “until they’re not.”

As anyone familiar with the Benghazi attack will know, a disaster is looming for the security contractors and their CIA liaisons on the ground. Only our own State Department remained seemingly unaware of the cauldron of tribal extremism that Benghazi had become — as the film shows, Foggy Bottom had all but abandoned or disavowed knowledge of the CIA outpost in the city. “We have no f***ing support,” one of the few U.S. security personnel on the ground declares as he attempts to talk his way past a militia roadblock.

That doesn’t stop Ambassador Chris Stevens from giving the CIA station chief (played by David Costabile) and Global Response Staff (GRS) forces led by “Rone” (The Departed’s James Badge Dale in a long-overdue leading tough-guy role) a hopeful pep talk about the future of Benghazi and Libya in general. Stevens is an idealist and an optimist, a “true believer” as he’s described during security prep for his arrival on Monday September 10, 2012. What Silva finds is a heavily under-equipped consulate with an under-prepared security detail, “Real dot gov s***,” he laments.

When the assault on Stevens’s compound starts just after sundown on September 11, (and notably, without the film’s showing protests) we are thrown suddenly into the middle of the chaos, with the “Ambo” (as the ex-special forces agents refer to Stevens), Foreign Service officer Sean Smith (Christopher Dingli), and the security personnel at the consulate hunkering down and begging for backup. As the first wave of the attack roars by, Bay is at his kinetic best, like an anxious kid with his hand on the detonator.