The perpetrators of Islamist attacks in London, Nice, Orlando and Sydney underline the problem that no matter how small the percentage of radical Muslims, we can hardly tell who they are among the broader population of their co-religionists.
The High Court of Australia has consistently recognised that the right to religious freedom is not absolute in this country. That being so, not every interference with religion is a breach of section 116 of the Constitution, only those that are considered an “undue infringement of religious freedom”. As former Chief Justice Anthony Mason and Justice Gerard Brennan pointed out, “general laws to preserve and protect society are not defeated by a plea of religious obligation to breach them”.
Religious freedom is therefore a properly qualified freedom. This is the understanding that in 1898 led many of the Australian framers to resist any idea of absolute freedom of religion as posing unacceptable risks to the community. During the convention debates that ultimately led to the draft of the Constitution, there was a suggestion that the federal Parliament should have power to prohibit religious “practices which have been regarded by large numbers of people as essentially evil and wicked”. Edward Braddon, though eventually supporting Henry Higgins’s proposal that ultimately led to the final wording in section 116, had initially sought to amend it by adding the words: “But shall prevent the performance of any such religious rites as are of a cruel and demoralizing character or contrary to the law of the Commonwealth”. Similarly, Edmund Barton, who hesitated over Higgins’s proposal but finally voted against it, was troubled by the difficulty of drafting a satisfactory formula to ensure that the constitutional protection would be limited to practices that are not inhuman or barbaric. As Barton pointed out:
The trouble arises when you try to insert a proviso modifying this prohibition. For instance, if it were desired to prevent the application of the clause to any fiendish or demoralizing rite, that might be done by inserting the words “so long as these observances are inconsistent with the criminal laws of the state”, [but even] if there were no criminal law in existence at the time with which these observances are inconsistent, it would be possible for the state to pass such a law, and so, to use a common expression, euchre the whole business.
Against the background of qualified affirmation of religious freedom, Justice Latham, in the Jehovah’s Witnesses case during the Second World War, turned to a catalogue of the evils and horrors sometimes practised in the name of religion that should not be tolerated at all. Latham fell back on a variation of the classical liberal formula which permits limitations on freedom only in the interests of freedom itself. The particular version of this formula quoted in Latham’s judgment was taken directly from John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty: “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any or their number, is self-protection.” This statement in Mill’s book was taken in the sense of society’s self-preservation. But in fact, as law professor Tony Blackshield explains:
what [Latham] seemed rather to have in mind was the Kantian version, according to which freedom may be restricted only so far as is necessary to ensure an equal freedom for others, or to ensure the underlying preconditions of freedom for all.