RUTHFULLY YOURS

President Obama has just committed his most flagrant violation of the U.S. Constitution to date. He purported to commit the United States to a legally binding treaty without first obtaining consent by two thirds of the Senators present, as required under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Obama is using the United Nations to end run the Senate with regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change negotiated last December.

Last week, Obama submitted an instrument to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, for deposit with the UN, which he claims signifies official “acceptance” of the Paris Agreement by the United States. Obama said he and China’s President Xi Jinping together decided to “commit formally to joining the agreement ahead of schedule.”

Obama was constitutionally entitled to sign the Paris Agreement as an executive act, which he did in April of this year. However, signing the Paris Agreement was only the first step. In order for the Paris Agreement to actually take effect and enter into legal force, at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of global emissions need to formally join the Paris Agreement. This requires the further step of member states’ “ratification, acceptance or approval” of the Paris Agreement before their emissions can be counted towards fulfilling the 55 percent of global emissions threshold.

The United States is the second highest emitter of emissions, after China. Together the U.S. and China account for around 40 percent of global emissions. If the United States and China were to formally join the Paris Agreement via ratification, acceptance or approval, the 55 percent threshold target would be well within reach.

China presumably had no problem moving forward to formally join the Paris Agreement. However, in order to do his part so that the UN could declare the Paris Agreement to be in legal force sooner rather than later, Obama had to find a way to justify skipping over the constitutional requirement of U.S. Senate consent and still cause the U.S. to become bound to a treaty. The answer was to pretend that what the UN itself regards as a treaty, to which its parties would be legally bound once it came into force, was not really a treaty after all. It was only an executive agreement, the Obama administration argues, that is within the president’s power to enter into without any congressional involvement.

White House senior adviser Brian Deese offered up this sophistry at a White House press conference, held before Obama’s visit to China for the G-20 summit where he would act on the power he was usurping from the legislative branch. Deese claimed that Obama was using “his authority that has been used in dozens of executive agreements in the past to join and formally deposit our instrument of acceptance, and therefore put our country as a party to the Paris Agreement.” Deese tried to distinguish between “treaties that require advice and consent from the Senate” and “a broad category of executive agreements where the executive can enter into those agreements without that advice and consent.”

Stephen Harper’s career as a Canadian politician spanned three decades, in which he belonged to three right-leaning parties, won three election victories, and served three terms as prime minister. After resigning his federal seat on August 26, he is highly unlikely to return for another stint in politics.

After losing last October’s federal election to Justin Trudeau and the Liberals, Harper stepped down as Conservative party leader that night. He remained a backbench MP for ten more months — which surprised some people, but enabled him to exit the stage in a quiet, dignified manner. He participated in 99 votes (coincidentally enough, 99 is the total number of Conservatives currently in Parliament), didn’t interfere with interim Conservative party leader Rona Ambrose’s agenda, and never rose to speak in the House of Commons again.

Naturally, the discussion has now shifted to an analysis of his political legacy.

I’ve known Harper for more than 20 years, long before I worked for him as one of his speechwriters. He’s intelligent, well-read, determined, and an astute political thinker. He’s a great admirer of Ronald Reagan, Winston Churchill, and Margaret Thatcher, among other notable conservative leaders. He holds a master’s degree in economics from the University of Calgary, and always worked to secure Canada’s financial health and future economic success.

Alas, his political ambitions came at a time when Canadian conservatives were heading into the political wilderness. The split between the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform Party of Canada (later the Canadian Alliance) between 1987 and 2003 tore apart the conservative political movement, and gave the Liberals a much easier road to power.

Harper was an influential Reform MP from 1993–1997, but left after his relations with then–Reform leader Preston Manning became strained. While serving as the National Citizens Coalition’s president, Harper watched his old party morph into the Canadian Alliance in 2000.

When the Alliance struggled mightily under the leadership of Stockwell Day, he saw his moment to become a white knight for Canadian conservatism. Harper triumphantly returned to politics, and was elected party leader in 2002. He pushed hard to unite the political Right, and merged the Alliance with Peter MacKay’s Progressive Conservatives in December 2003 to form the Conservative Party of Canada.

Harper was elected the new party’s first leader. Although he lost the 2004 federal election to Paul Martin and the Liberals, it was reduced to a minority government. He would beat them in 2006 to become Canada’s first right-leaning prime minister in 13 years.

The United Nations was founded as a global pact among states, but over the decades in the name of transparency and to further the aim of globalization, it has opened its doors to more than 6,150 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While governments wring their hands over incitement to terror and dangerous uses of social media, they ignore the alarming focal point within arms’ reach: the United Nations. An examination of U.N. NGOs reveals that the U.N. has handed a global megaphone to groups spreading hatred and inciting terror from the world stage. In short, the so-called representatives of “civil society” aren’t so civil after all.

In theory, the U.N. has processes for accreditation that share a common requirement: respect for the purposes and principles of the organization. In order to qualify for accreditation, NGOs must operate in conformity with, or promote, the U.N Charter. They must affirm “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”

In practice, NGOs have been welcomed into the world of international diplomacy and have gained access to international media platforms while they are simultaneously betraying the core U.N mission by advocating terror and intolerance.

Most striking for an organization founded on the ashes of the Holocaust, the U.N. has accredited NGOs that play a central role in promoting modern anti-Semitism and encouraging the destruction of the Jewish state.

The benefits of U.N. accreditation for NGOs are tangible and significant: the ability to sponsor speakers, mount exhibits, and screen films in the same U.N. facilities that house an international press corps; the right to speak at U.N. meetings and have their words translated and broadcast via U.N. webcasts worldwide; the capacity to publish written statements and have them disseminated by the U.N.; the opportunity to attend negotiating sessions and to influence the world’s diplomats. U.N. websites even link directly to selected NGO websites, greatly enhancing their traffic and messaging.

Scattered around the U.N. system are a few disclaimers of responsibility for the content of NGO events and websites. But NGO events on U.N. premises are permitted only after detailed applications and approval by U.N. representatives. NGO website links are selectively posted on U.N. sites by U.N. officials. And NGOs are regularly singled out for coveted speaking gigs by U.N. representatives. U.N. selection and approval procedures, from accreditation on, belie claims that U.N. officials and envoys are ignorant of the purposes and content of the NGOs they choose.

In May 2016, many of the world’s major NGOs complained that the accreditation processes were unfair because applications were being thwarted by certain member states for fear of empowering critics of these states. And, indeed, many of the states running the U.N. accreditation processes — such as China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Sudan — inhibit free speech and curtail the freedom of association in their own backyards. At the same time, these nations use their powers on the U.N. NGO Committee to protect themselves in the international arena.

A conflict is brewing over the shape of the international order. It centers around an idea—a biblical idea—long thought discredited by political elites.

Britain’s June 23 referendum on independence was the most important vote in a democratic nation in a generation. Many Americans assume that events in Western Europe can’t have that kind of significance, and in fact the U.S. media paid scant attention to the upheaval taking place in the UK right up until the official returns showing an impending British exit (or “Brexit”) from the European Union.

But in the aftermath, all this changed. The fear, outrage, and despair that Britain’s vote for independence provoked in elite opinion in Europe and in many circles in the United States points to a political event of massive proportions. Even before the vote, a campaign orchestrated by the Cameron government sought to play upon the sense of trepidation that had become evident among a portion of the electorate. The government’s message, Douglas Murray wrote, was “unmistakable”:

With Brexit, the country [would] be taking a leap into the unknown with the possibility of becoming a basket case and causing a world war. Memories of the mid-1970s were conjured up: the three-day work week, the uncollected rubbish, the unburied dead.

And that was the Tories speaking. In the aftermath of the vote, much the same message could be heard from all sides of the political establishment in tones that were, if anything, even more hysterical.

But the principal revelation here—and the phenomenon to keep our eyes on—is not only the fact that, for many both in the UK and elsewhere, the prospect of British independence is genuinely an object of dread. It is also the countervailing fact that the possible re-emergence of a free and independent Britain has rallied profound admiration and enthusiasm among countless others. The fissure between these powerfully held and irreconcilable views was there earlier. But Brexit has turned the floodlights on it, exposing, so that all can readily see, the deepest fault line in the politics of Western nations today. It is along this line that the bitterest and most fateful political battles in our time are likely to be fought.

What is this all about? Many commentators have pointed to the Brexit vote, and this year’s American presidential campaign, as contests between policies favoring economic “globalization” and those informed by a more protectionist and insular “nationalism.” And there is much to be said for that characterization. But what divides the emerging camps also runs quite a bit deeper than is suggested by framing things in terms of one set of economic and foreign-policy preferences against another. What we are seeing is the beginning of a struggle over the character of the international political order itself.

For 350 years, Western peoples have lived in a world in which national independence and self-determination were seen as foundational principles. Indeed, these things were held to be among the most precious human possessions, and the basis of all of our freedoms. Since World War II, however, these intuitions have been gradually attenuated and finally even discredited, especially among academics and intellectuals, media opinion-makers, and business and political elites. Today, many in the West have come to regard an intense personal loyalty to the national state and its right to chart an independent course as something not only unnecessary but morally suspect. They no longer see national loyalties and traditions as necessarily providing a sound basis for determining the laws we live by, for regulating the economy or making decisions about defense and security, for establishing public norms concerning religion or education, or for deciding who gets to live in what part of the world.

But those who have made this transition in fundamental political orientation have done so without making sure that everyone else was on board. Millions of people, especially outside the centers of elite opinion, still hold fast to the old understanding that the independence and self-determination of one’s nation hold the key to a life of honor and freedom. These are people who believe that no one ever consulted them about giving up on the freedom of their nation to protect its people, their interests, and their traditions. And when people think they weren’t consulted about giving up such precious commodities, they are apt to respond in dramatic, harsh, and often violent ways.

This means that the clash of fundamental political assumptions we are watching unfold is already much more extreme than has been fully understood. As what is at stake comes better into focus, political parties will realign. Entire countries will realign. The Brexit vote is only the first shot fired in a protracted conflict that will play itself out throughout the West and elsewhere.

A look at how this came to be can help us better to understand where we are headed.

Always good for a laugh, Australia’s high priests of the catastropharian faith have been peppering acolytes with missives about each other’s motives, competence and acumen. If someone hasn’t called a lawyer, they’re even sillier than the current contretemps suggests.
Emeritus Professor of Climate Catastrophism at the ANU Will Steffen and his Climate Council team appear to have belatedly realized that they are not immune from the law of libel. On September 6, Steffen sent out an urgent missive that re-wrote his email circular of September 5. “Please delete our previous email,” he begged.

The two emails were headed, “Breaking ranks”. From the email’s wording, I’d say a heading “Breaking banks” would be more appropriate as far as Steffen’s and the council’s finances are concerned.

Steffen’s two emails were despatched to a big contact list of “Friends”, including myself, from the Council’s computer and in Steffen’s capacity as a Councillor.

Steffen, famous for his ‘death threat’ panic in 2010 after an overheard conversation about kangaroo culling, blathers on in the email about an alleged dissenting report to the official Climate Authority’s report on how Australia should meet its obligations under the Paris climate agreement.[1]

Apart from the naughty bits of the email (which I’ll get to eventually), the “dissenting report” itself has been disowned by the Authority. In a website posting on September 5, headed, “Clarification—misleading report”, chair Wendy Craik AM says,

“The Climate Change Authority is aware that a report released on 5 September 2016 incorrectly purports to be a minority report to the Authority’s third and final report of its special review, Towards a Climate Policy Toolkit . The report released this morning was not released or endorsed by the Authority, and has no status as an Authority report.”

How odd that Steffen and the Council, set up to tout the alleged “facts” on climate change, can’t get even their own basic facts right.

Today the Authority’s chair, Craik, added further:

“Firstly, the suggestion that the Authority secretariat staff are inexpert or incompetent is manifestly false. The staff have a truly impressive depth of knowledge on all aspects of climate policy and have worked tirelessly, with a high degree of professionalism, to produce a high quality report under difficult circumstances. The Authority acknowledged this great effort by the secretariat staff in our report: Towards a Climate Policy Toolkit.

I also reject strongly any suggestion that the Authority has been politically influenced or motivated by political considerations in its work on the special review. In preparing Towards a Climate Policy Toolkit , the Authority exercised its independence in recommending a set of policies that we believe can chart a sustainable, durable and scalable course for Australia’s climate change response in the years and decades ahead. To suggest otherwise is both offensive and untrue.

With the move to Canberra, the Authority looks forward to taking its place amongst a number of other independent agencies, including the Productivity Commission and the Clean Energy Regulator.”

All the settlements created by Israel before the Oslo accords are legitimate, including the new Israeli housing estates created in the extended boundaries of Jerusalem. As long as the “interim period” envisaged in those accords remains in force, Israel is allowed to build within the originally defined pre-Oslo boundaries of the settlements, but is not allowed to change their pre-Oslo status. The Palestinians are not excluded from demanding a total Israeli withdrawal to the ceasefire lines of 1949, but Israel is likewise not excluded from demanding the retention not merely of the settlements but also of any other part of the Mandatory Palestine of 1947.

The Fourth Geneva Convention contains a Part I that applies to wars both within a Power and between Powers. Otherwise, the Convention applies primarily to wars between Powers alone. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians began as a civil war under the British Mandate for Palestine and continued as such until at least the late 1980s. Until then, consequently, Part I of the Convention applied to the conflict, including Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line, but Part III – which purportedly forbids the existence of such settlements – did not yet apply. Part III became relevant, if at all, only for events that postdated the Oslo accords of the 1990s.

If there is anything that perplexes good friends of Israel, it is the issue of settlements beyond the “Green Line” (a misleading term, as we shall see). In a familiar phenomenon, a foreign politician arrives in Jerusalem to make a speech that manifests genuine admiration of the State of Israel and its achievements, but proceeds to an equally genuine cry of distress over its settlement policies. Why? Because they are supposedly “illegal under international law.”

These friends, as we shall see, are making a widespread basic mistake. Because of the endless talk of a “two-state solution,” the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is viewed as if it had always been a war between two states. In fact, it began as a civil war under the British Mandate for Palestine and continued as such until at least the late 1980s. By that time, almost all the present settlements were already in existence. Consequently, the provisions of international law that should apply to them are those that pertain to civil wars, not to inter-state wars.
Preliminaries

To start with, let us set aside some questions whose answer is relatively simple. First, the present Israeli occupation of lands acquired during the Six Day War of 1967 is not illegal per se, because it resulted from aggression by the neighboring states concerned. Hostilities with Egypt started when Egypt blockaded the Israeli port of Eilat, an act of aggression that was followed by Egypt’s demand for the removal of United Nations peacekeepers from the border between the two states (obviously in preparation for further acts of aggression). Hostilities with Jordan began with a Jordanian bombardment of the Israeli part of Jerusalem. As for Syria, it had for years been engaged in constant aggression by way of encroachments into Israeli territory and bombardment of Israeli villages from the Golan Heights. Moreover, a recent expert report (2012) of the International Committee of the Red Cross emphasized that International Humanitarian Law “did not set any limits to the time span of an occupation” (see p. 72); rather, the longer the occupation lasted, the more the “occupying power” was required to upgrade the infrastructure, etc., for the benefit of the inhabitants.