Friends and Colleagues, some travel over the last couple of weeks left me unable to circulate columns and posts as usual (and some time off meant there were fewer of those anyway). Today I am sending out the latest, including the full version of a feature article about Hillary Clinton written for the print version of National Review, from our August 1 special Democratic Convention issue (which is available online only to subscribers). Links to other columns are below that article. Hope everyone enjoys what’s left of the summer. All the best, Andy
In early July, in a performance as legally baffling as it was politically predictable, Federal Bureau of Investigation director James B. Comey recommended against a felony prosecution of the former secretary of state and certain Democratic presidential nominee. The recommendation was gratuitous: It is the FBI’s function to investigate crimes; the Justice Department alone exercises charging discretion. It is a commonplace for case agents and government prosecutors to consult on both investigative tactics and charging decisions. It is a rarity, though, for the FBI director to get directly involved in, much less make, an indictment decision. That, in effect, is what Comey did. That his recommendation was uncalled for makes it all the more indefensible.
To stick for a moment with the FBI’s actual function, let’s note that its agents performed admirably, particularly in the forensic aspects of the investigation: the examination of Mrs. Clinton’s “homebrew” servers, the painstaking reassembly of millions of bits of data into thousands of e-mails (out of the 30,000 e-mails that Clinton and her phalanx of lawyers and aides had quite intentionally sought to delete and destroy). The FBI thus carried its burden to uncover evidence that can be used to establish the essential elements of crimes defined in federal penal laws. In this instance, according to Director Comey’s unusually transparent and devastating account of what his investigators found, it is simply incontestable that then–secretary of state Clinton (a) mishandled classified information in a manner that was grossly negligent (indeed, Comey called it “extremely careless”) and (b) concealed and destroyed federal records.
Yet Comey claimed not only that no prosecution was warranted but also that no reasonable prosecutor could disagree with this conclusion. The first assertion is flatly wrong; the second is breathtaking, and it evoked aptly spirited dissenting reactions from such iconic former prosecutors as Rudolph W. Giuliani, the former New York City mayor who, as U.S. attorney in Manhattan, hired Comey as a young prosecutor in the mid Eighties, and Michael B. Mukasey, the distinguished former federal judge who served as U.S. attorney general in the George W. Bush administration not long after Comey served as deputy attorney general. (Like Comey, whom I have known as a friend and sometime colleague for nearly 30 years, I was hired as an assistant U.S. attorney by Mr. Giuliani.)
When Comey testified before a House committee just two days after rejecting an indictment of Clinton, the flaws in his rationale were painfully apparent. He suggested that “American tradition” and the Constitution forbid criminal prosecution on an offense as serious as mishandling classified information — a felony carrying a potential ten-year prison term — if the required mens rea (state of mind) element of the crime in the relevant statute calls for mere negligence rather than intent to do harm. To the contrary, many state and federal crimes do not require proof of intentional or willful wrongdoing — indeed, virtually every state has long criminalized negligent homicide. Moreover, Comey inaccurately portrayed the gross-negligence offense as if it were an isolated excrescence in federal law; in fact, it is the bottom of a sliding scale of crimes involving national-defense secrets, carefully calibrated by Congress so that the most serious offense — classic espionage involving intended harm to the U.S. — is at the top. Appropriately, the least serious offense of gross negligence involving national-defense secrets is narrowly tailored: It applies not to all Americans but to officials with security clearances who are intimately familiar with rules governing their special obligation to safeguard intelligence.
But in any case, far from being merely negligent, Clinton’s outrageous conduct screams of willfulness. She intentionally set up an unlawful non-government communication system specifically to evade federal disclosure and accountability laws. In her position at the pinnacle of American foreign relations, she had to know it was inevitable that extremely sensitive intelligence matters would be discussed over the system. The hundreds of classified e-mails discovered included 110 (in 52 e-mail chains) sent or received by Clinton herself. Seven of these involved “top secret/special access program” intelligence — the most highly classified secrets in government, concerning deep-cover informants and closely guarded intelligence-collection techniques (meaning: information the revelation of which can get our agents killed and fold up vital national-security operations).
“Any reasonable person in Secretary Clinton’s position,” Comey admonished, “should have known that an unclassified system was no place for” such exchanges. The director further acknowledged that Clinton’s homebrew system was woefully unsecure: It would have been better, though still against the rules, to use Gmail. Top Clinton aides exacerbated these security compromises, Comey recounted, by using unsecure communication systems while they were outside the United States and “in the territory of sophisticated adversaries.” Clinton clearly knew this practice was a major security breach, assuming she read her own memoir Hard Choices, which — though unmentioned by Comey — takes pains to describe the extraordinary communications precautions that must be taken overseas. The director, in fact, said it was almost certain that Clinton’s system had been penetrated by hostile foreign intelligence operatives (the deftness of whose methods prevents apodictic certainty). He further ruefully observed that, under Clinton, “the culture of the State Department in general” was cavalier, compared with that of other government agencies, when it came to safeguarding intelligence.