Only a direct and unequivocal US commitment can truly reassure Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that their recent grim histories of invasion, occupation and oppression will not be repeated. Obama has proven himself unequal to the task. Will the next president be any better?
Next month, my wife and leave on a trip to Europe. First, we will visit Lithuania, my wife’s home country, for two weeks to catch up with her family and old friends. This is my second visit to Lithuania, and I hope to gain further insights to the hopes and fears of the local people, ranging from 90-year-olds, who lived under both Nazi and Soviet occupation, to young adults, born after independence.
For Lithuania, along with Latvia and Estonia, geopolitical vulnerability is a permanent fact of life. Historical experience has taught harsh lessons. The enforced incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union back in 1940, notwithstanding their declared neutrality, has impelled them to choose a side.
As soon as accession to NATO was offered, they jumped at the chance to shore up their security. After all, Article 5 of this mutual defence pact reads:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
But does anybody seriously believe that either Germany or France, or for that matter, any other European country would have either the capacity or willingness to come to the aid of the Baltic States, if a resurgent Russia decided to put the treaty to the test? Consider the historical record. The Baltic states have long been expendable pawns. Remember Germany’s seizure of Klaipeda (Memel) from neutral Lithuania in March, 1939, and the secret clauses of the Ribbentrop/Molotov Pact of August, 1939, which doomed the Baltic States to Soviet occupation.
Lest we imagine that the denial of freedom and independence for the Baltic states was merely a totalitarian exercise, we read in, The President, The Pope and The Prime Minister, by Quadrant Editor John O’Sullivan, that independence for the Baltic States was very nearly thwarted, not merely by the still existent Soviet Union but also by Jacques Delors, chairman of the European Commission, Francois Mitterand of France, Helmut Kohl of Germany and the Bush Administration. Only Margaret Thatcher’s heroic intervention at the Rome summit of the European Community in October, 1990, saved the day for Baltic freedom. Remember, this was after the fall of the Berlin wall. As O’Sullivan records on pages 322-323 :
The United States was already applying pressure on the Baltic states against independence. Secretary of State James Baker had told the Lithuanians in May 1990 that they should “freeze” their declaration of independence – and the United States continued to exert such public and private pressure throughout that summer. At Rome, European Commission chairman Jacques Delors further proposed that the EC issue a declaration in favour of preserving the existing external borders of the USSR. That would have meant formal European approval for imprisoning the Baltics indefinitely, and would have damaged their morale, which was already depressed by the lack of Western support.