A New and Dangerous Great Game | London Center for Policy Research | National Security, Energy, and Risk Analysis
In 1904, after the long British struggle to control Afghanistan, and the Russian Empire’s efforts to expand into central Asia (and take control from the British), a British geographer, Halford MacKinder, published a paper suggesting that he who controlled the heartland of Asia would control Asia itself, and by extension, the world. In short, MacKinder explained why England and Russia had been vying for control of central Asia, what was known as ‘the Great Game.’ His theory, the Heartland Theory, was popular with the Russians (even before MacKinder gave it a name), and later with the Soviets, and has since been adopted by China.
Interestingly, an American strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had postulated in 1900 that Asia could be controlled from the sea. Mahan suggested that control of the Suez Canal and control of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca on one side of the South China Sea (SCS) would give a great power – one with a powerful navy – the ability to control trade into and out of Asia and therefore accomplish the same thing the Heartland Theory later suggested.
In the years following WWII the US Navy had an extensive presence in the SCS. However, the US slowly stopped paying attention to the SCS during the 1990s, following the break-up of the Soviet Union.
In 1947 the Republic of China published a map claiming ownership of most of the islands in the SCS. This map – the ‘9 Dash Line’ – was later taken by the People’s Republic of China as defining their claim in the SCS, and after some minor variations, they have used it to justify their current activities.
But until several years ago the Chinese claim mattered little. In the last several years, however, recognizing the extent of the power vacuum, China has been aggressively building on reefs and islands in the SCS. China intends to control the SCS. A new great game, between two nuclear powers, has started in the South China Sea.