“Almost immediately after” Donald Trump was sworn in as president, the New York Times reports that defense counsel for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl – the deserter for whom former President Barack Obama exchanged five Taliban commanders – asked a court-martial to dismiss charges against him. The motion cites Trump’s denunciation of Bergdahl as a “dirty rotten traitor,” a staple of his campaign rallies – as were Trump gesticulations and sound effects, imagining Bergdahl before a firing squad.
Bergdahl’s lawyer, Eugene Fidell (whom, the Times takes pains to add, “teaches military justice at Yale Law School), contends that the statements violate the prohibition against “unlawful command influence,” which the Gray Lady – that well-known stickler for legal principle – emphasizes is “a bedrock of military justice.” It prohibits commanders from behavior that could prejudice a defendant’s case.
It is a frivolous claim, notwithstanding the gravitas with which the Times imbues it, as it often does Mr. Fidell’s work. Trump was a candidate not a commander when he made the statements in question.
Clearly, Fidell and his note-takers are mindful of this inconvenience. Thus, they endeavor to stretch the command-influence prohibition beyond recognition. It applies, we are told, not only to commanders but to “anyone with the ‘mantle of command authority’” – a term said to be mined from an opinion by a military appeals court. Perhaps … but the “anyone” in question still has to be in the military chain of command at the time the “influence” is exerted.
Out on the campaign trail, Trump did not have the mantle of command influence. He was a civilian seeking to be elected commander-in-chief. No sensible person would have seen him as vested with any military authority. He was not any part of the chain-of-command – not formally, and not by any reasonable perception.
Obviously, Fidell knows this. otherwise, he would not have waited until Trump was sworn in as president to bring the motion. Counsel nonetheless tries to bootstrap Trump’s pre-presidential meanderings to his later commander-in-chief duties because the new president will now have a say over the promotion and assignments of military officers who are responsible for Bergdahl’s court-martial (like Gen. Robert B. Abrams, who ordered Bergdahl to a court-martial). Those officers, according to Fidell’s theory, will be guided not by the law and the evidence but the campaign bombast.
Nonsense. To flout the principle Fidell invokes, there must be an exercise of influence that is both unlawful and related to an existing command relationship. Regardless of what one thinks of Trump’s red-meat campaign riffs, there was nothing unlawful about them. They could only have been deemed “unlawful” if, at the time, he had been in command and thus obliged to protect the integrity of military proceedings. He wasn’t.
It is the flimsiest of speculation that his campaign statements might influence the conduct of Bergdahl’s case. Court’s don’t dismiss charges based on speculation.