Notable & Quotable: A Lesson of the 1967 War ‘The revisionists have much of the story right but they miss a crucial factor.’
https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-a-lesson-of-the-1967-war-1497998869
The Hudson Institute’s Michael Doran, testifying before the U.N. Security Council about the 50th anniversary of the Six Day War, June 20:
May I again remind you of the example of [Egypt’s] Gamal Abdel Nasser ? A revisionist school of historiography claims that he never wanted war in 1967. His best military units were bogged down in Yemen, his economy was a shambles, and his relations with Jordan and Syria, his putative allies, were abysmal. Why would a leader in such a precarious position behave so recklessly?
The revisionists have much of the story right but they miss a crucial factor. Nasser was applying lessons that he learned a decade earlier, during the Suez Crisis. Then, as in 1967, he had precipitated a war that he could not possibly win militarily, but which he believed he could win politically, because, he gambled, the superpowers and the United Nations would intercede on his behalf. In 1956, that proved a very smart bet. In 1967, however, it utterly failed—with disastrous consequences for Egypt—to say nothing of the Palestinians. How much better would it have been for all parties if, back in 1956, the United Nations had insisted that, in return for an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, Nasser must grant Israel meaningful security guarantees?
The key lesson of 1967 war is that peace is best achieved not by United Nations intercession but by facilitating direct negotiations between the parties.
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