Why didn’t intelligence agencies prevent 9/11? According to the 9/11 Commission, before the attacks, information from intelligence agencies “often failed to make its way to criminal investigators” at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
By the summer of 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency already knew that two future hijackers were associates of known terrorists, that both men held visas to enter the U.S., and that one had in fact flown to Los Angeles in March 2000. Unfortunately, the FBI learned of this in August 2001—at which point the men had already made their last, fateful entry into the U.S. With better information-sharing, the FBI might have arrested the terrorists and prevented the 9/11 attacks.
Some members of Congress now propose to erect new barriers against information-sharing within the intelligence community that could make it even more difficult for officials to spot future terrorists before they strike.
The proposal would affect Section 702, a 2008 law that allows the intelligence community to collect the communications of foreign intelligence targets when the communications travel across U.S. internet cables or are stored on U.S. servers. This has been an effective counterterrorism tool because foreign targets’ messages often touch the U.S. internet infrastructure.
Foreign targets are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, so the government has the authority to collect their messages under Section 702 without a warrant. But when foreign targets communicate with Americans, those messages are collected as well, raising privacy concerns.
Another key aspect of the privacy debate around Section 702 is what intelligence agencies should be allowed to do with that data. Courts have allowed agencies to search their 702 records for foreign intelligence purposes and, in the FBI’s case, for evidence of crime, which sometimes includes searches for information about Americans.
Privacy-minded House members from both parties are now reportedly considering amending Section 702 to bar government officials from searching 702 data for information about an American unless they get a warrant, based on probable cause, from a federal judge. Reformers have leverage this year because Congress must pass a 702 reauthorization bill before the law sunsets on Dec. 31.
But keeping officials from searching this data would make it more difficult to prevent homegrown terrorist attacks. In 2009 the National Security Agency used 702 to collect emails in which an unknown person in the U.S. asked an al Qaeda member in Pakistan for advice on making explosives. Those emails led the FBI to Najibullah Zazi, a Colorado man with imminent plans to bomb the New York subway system. Catching him saved dozens if not hundreds of lives. If an American appears to be radicalizing, the first thing the FBI should do is check the information already in its database to see whether that person has been in contact with known ISIS or al Qaeda operatives. CONTINUE AT SITE