Bordering on the unknown Yoav Limor
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=45035
While the world is focused on the horrendous terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic State group and on the international campaign being waged against the organization in Iraq and Syria, the IDF is maintaining two intensive sectors opposite the group, in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
The majority of operations in both sectors is clandestine and is held as part of the IDF’s doctrine of the “campaign between the wars,” a title that encompasses a host of covert and low-intensity military and intelligence efforts to prevent enemy states and terrorist organizations from becoming stronger and thwart their offensive activity. Arab media reports about drone strikes in Sinai or the elimination of terrorist operatives on the Golan Heights usually receive only a casual mention, if that, in the Israeli and international media. The reason for that is simple: Barring a terrorist attack, there’s only minor media interest.
Keeping things on the down low involves intensive operational and intelligence activity seeking to ensure that Israel does not find itself in Islamic State’s crosshairs. The reason that the IDF has, until now, preferred to spare the public the details of its operations in these two sectors is two-pronged: the natural clandestine nature of things and the desire to keep a low profile vis-a-vis ISIS.
While the balance of power in the two sectors is clear to all, Israel has no interest in seeing ISIS operatives in Sinai or the Golan Heights train their sights on its territory. The fact that Wilayat Sinai, Islamic State’s proxy in the south, and the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, an ISIS-affiliate group based in the Syrian Golan Heights, are engaged in internal wars rather than fighting us, is very convenient for Israel.
This week, the IDF gave Israel Hayom an exclusive glimpse into the intensive, nightly counterterrorism operation against ISIS on the northern border, which aims to foil threats and ensure that the civil war raging in Syria and the parallel battles taking place in Sinai do not spill over into Israel.
No-man’s-land no more
The security fence in the southern part of the Golan Heights does not overlap with the border. For operational and topographical reasons, the IDF chose to place it in dominant areas across the ridgeline rather than adhering to the border itself. As a result, small “no-man’s-land” enclaves were formed between the border and the security fence. These enclaves — stretching up to 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) deep in some areas and merely dozens of meters in others — are separated from Israel by the security fence, but nothing separates them from enemy territory.
In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah used one of those enclaves, which the IDF refrains from operating in so not to risk breaching Lebanese territory, to abduct IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, triggering the Second Lebanon War. As part of the war’s lessons, the IDF decided to no longer leave the enclaves be, and then-GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizenkot ordered intensive activity in all of them, up to the very last inch.
The rationale was political — preserving Israel’s sovereignty over the entire territory; operational — removing the threat; and also psychological — shifting the balance of power back in the IDF’s favor by again positioning it as the party taking operational initiative.
The IDF is currently implementing similar policy in the enclaves in the Golan Heights. “No area is off limits” is the name of the game, and it entails dozens of nightly operations, some on the fence and some beyond it, with the sole purpose of preventing ISIS operatives in Syria from striking Israel.
Spearheading this activity over the past few months are Golani Brigade battalions, which are the on-the-ground manifestation of an intricate mesh of operations by Mossad and military intelligence, special forces and the Israeli Air Force. These efforts have been able to exclude Israel from the list of ISIS targets for the past three years.
This achievement cannot be taken lightly. ISIS may be focused on consolidating its grip on the areas under its control in southern Syria, but at the end of the day it is a Salafi terrorist group, complete with an ideology calling for death to all infidels, including Jews; the relentless enforcement of Shariah law; and an intransigent war against anyone perceived as an enemy or a threat.
The Khalid ibn al-Walid Army was formed in 2015 as an alliance of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, the Islamic Muthanna Movement and the Army of Jihad militias, three groups that were formed separately in the southern Golan Heights after the Syrian civil war erupted in March 2011. Once ISIS took center stage in the global arena, offering generous funding to those pledging allegiance to the notion of an Islamic caliphate under its leadership, the trio decided to join what at the time seemed like a winning trend. By doing so, the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army gained status, money and the formidable ISIS’ protection.
Israel recognized the threat posed by the jihadi alliance immediately and soon enough the familiar images appeared, as operatives began posting photos and videos of themselves with Israel’s northern border in the background on social media, with the customary threats of annihilation. At the same time, reports of the familiar atrocities flowed from the villages under their control: executions, caging and systematic abuse of those perceived as enemies.
Anyone deployed to the sector knows the stories about the atrocities committed by Khalid ibn al-Walid operatives, and while some of them could very well be exaggerated, it doesn’t matter. A ferocious, brutal enemy lies just beyond the border and it could decide to strike Israeli communities in the Golan Heights without warning. No one is willing to take the risk of a major attack against soldiers or civilians.
Walking through a minefield
Every crossing of the border fence, in every sector, is naturally tense, as intelligence and observations aside, it still involves stepping onto an area outside the IDF’s immediate reach. The concern is that someone, at some point, managed to slip through and plant explosives. For this reason, the troops observe the strictest of precautions: zero illumination, zero cellular communication and maximum operational alertness.
The majority of operations are carried out in the cover of night. In the past, some smaller operations took place in daylight, at times deliberately, to stress the IDF’s presence in the sector, but as Israel has no interest in a security escalation, those are kept to a minimum. To further avoid unnecessary friction, IDF troops sometimes refrain from shooting the armed militants roaming around the enclaves. As the area is not fenced off on its Syrian side and innocent civilians may enter it by mistake, the decision is that as long as there is no imminent threat, the troops will hold their fire.
The enclaves remain the only areas in the Golan Heights to still have land mines. Across the rest of the area, rebels collected the thousands of mines the Syrian army had scattered there since the 1973 Yom Kippur War to use them against President Bashar Assad’s troops. This change also enabled the IDF’s combat engineering companies to reduce their classic mine-clearing operations and focus on raids and counter-tunnel warfare.
This is also the purpose of IDF operations: to target an enemy weakness marked by the IDF as a route ISIS operatives may use to reach the fence or place explosives. An unmanned aerial vehicle operating in the sector flies over the troops at all times, and every move is coordinated with the command and control center, to avoid instances of friendly fire.
Just an arm’s length away, the Syrian villages under Islamic State’s control lie. Since February, the terrorist group has doubled the area under its control and it now lords over some 100,000 residents, and the battles that resulted in this takeover were closely monitored by the Israeli side. ISIS now has 1,000 operatives in the Syrian Golan Heights, equipped with light artillery, mortars, explosive charges, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. IDF troops often come across them as they patrol the area, gathering intelligence on Israel. The relative calm in the sector is deceptive, and the threat lurking on the border could erupt at any moment, and this motif runs through every operation and is drilled into the troops by their commanders.
The volatile situation is also why the IDF uses its elite forces to maintain the northern line, and Golani and Nahal Brigade troops are deployed there in rotation. The rationale here seeks to reduce the element of surprise, increase initiative, and allow significant operational flexibility opposite an unpredictable enemy.
Caliphate 2.0
The Aug. 17 terrorist attack in Barcelona, which killed 15 and wounded 100, slightly obscured ISIS’ true state. The organization’s territory is shrinking rapidly; it has lost almost all of its hold on Iraq and significant parts of its territory in Syria; and it is currently trying to stabilize what Israeli defense officials called “caliphate 2.0” — an area stretching between Deir ez-Zur and Abu Kamal in Syria. But pummeled by the Syrian army with its Russian aerial assistance in the west and the U.S.-backed Kurds in the north, it is unclear how long ISIS would be able to maintain any kind of “state.” Moreover, Islamic State’s leadership is also in dire straits: founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has not been heard from in months and many other top officials have either gone into hiding or have been killed.
Meanwhile, the caliphate vision still exists. Some 15,000 ISIS operatives continue to try and maintain the group’s hold on the gas and oil fields in eastern Syria, from which most of its revenues come. ISIS officials explain recent defeats as “a tactical loss en route to the great victory,” which is enough for them to be able to continue recruiting new operatives, but unlike in the past, most of them now come from the Middle East, mainly Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans.
The group has instructed the foreign supporters who once flocked to its ranks to stop arriving in the Middle East and focus on carrying out terrorist attacks in their homelands. While ISIS continues to operate a mechanism of foreign attacks, most of the recent attacks in Europe were carried out by cells operating independently, devoid of direct funding or instructions from ISIS, but fueled by its ideology. This “privatization” is also how ISIS handles its proxies in Sinai and Syria.
While Israel is on Islamic State’s list of enemies, the group and its proxies have so far refrained from targeting it. Intelligence experts do not know why exactly, and believe it is a combination of circumstances, mainly the ease of carrying out attacks in Europe versus the relative difficulty in Israel, and the extensive media coverage these attacks garner worldwide compared to “just another” terrorist attack in the Middle East.
Strange as it may sound, Islamic State’s proxies in Sinai and the Golan Heights see Israel as a “safe homefront.” Islamic State’s immediate concern is those who threaten its rule and very existence, but make no mistake — this is a radical, hostile organization that could, in the blink of an eye, change direction even if just to provoke Israel into a reaction that will unite all the elements in the region against it.
Israel strives to stay out of this fight, but also to preserve a quiet and, if possible, sane border. No one knows what the future holds for ISIS as an organization, let alone for his proxy in the Golan Heights, and whether it will continue to exist in the sector.
One possibility is that when the Syrian army defeats ISIS in the country’s east, it will turn its attention south, toward the border with Israel, and would retake the rogue sector near the border. Another possibility is that Islamic State’s proxy in the Golan Heights will transfer its allegiance to another patron, perhaps even whatever new organization rises from Islamic State’s ashes.
Of course, there is always the possibility that Khalid ibn al-Walid Army will remain independent and fighting on, perhaps against Israel as well. This is one of the scenarios Israel is preparing for because, at the end of the day, Israel knows it is alone in this story. No one else is interested in this small, remote corner of the Golan Heights, which at this moment is a unique area where you can look ISIS operatives in the eye and still come home safely — for now. This volatile sector could flare up in the next heartbeat.
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