RUTHFULLY YOURS

After reaching a certain age, one is rarely shocked by human behavior; one thinks of oneself as having gotten used to the ways of the world. But I have to admit that the scale of the revelations that began with Rowan Farrow’s exposé of Harvey Weinstein genuinely shocked me. Charlie Rose “groping female colleagues and walking around naked in their presence”? Met conductor James Levine molesting a boy of fifteen and continuing to do so for years? Matt Lauer installing a door lock under his desk to facilitate sexual assaults on colleagues? Kevin Spacey trying to rape a 14-year-old boy?

Two or three stories like this wouldn’t have shaken my world. But one after another of them, coming to light day after day? Mind-blowing. I never imagined that so many respected (in some cases beloved) public figures could be such sleazeballs – and creepily creative ones, at that. As an old friend of mine wrote the other day on Facebook, “It’s strange to suddenly discover in late middle age that I’ve always been even more of a straight-arrow type than I knew at the time.” It’s even stranger to make this discovery knowing that you were once, long ago, as I was, a white-bread, well-behaved-to-a-fault young gay guy who thought his sexual orientation made him the most aberrant thing in town.

The reckoning that Weinstein and others of his ilk have faced is necessary and gratifying. But the longer this has gone on, the less it has looked like a righteous round-up of rogues and the more like a witch hunt by people who are determined to take down every man who ever looked at a woman the wrong way. Last Saturday, front and center on the New York Times website was an article claiming that fashion photographer Bruce Weber had subjected male models to “unnecessary nudity and coercive sexual behavior.” One of the models said Weber had grabbed his equipment: “We never had sex or anything, but a lot of things happened. A lot of touching. A lot of molestation.”

The same article accused another photographer, Mario Testino, of subjecting male models to “sexual advances that in some cases included groping and masturbation.” I don’t know anything about Testino, but what I’ve seen of Weber’s oeuvre over the years consists largely of pictures that, oozing eroticism, seem to document the placid interludes in the midst of pansexual orgies. In other words, these models should have had a good idea of what they were getting into. As grown men, in any case, they were perfectly capable of saying no, of pushing away the hand of a photographer two or three times their age (Weber is now 71), and, if necessary, of simply putting on their clothes and walking away.

In a January 3, 2018 article for American Thinker, “The Left’s 1942,” J.R. Dunn argues that leftism may be approaching its last days, at least in the U.S. Its losses, failures, and absurdities have ensured its gradual demise. “While certainly not as dramatic as the events of WWII,” Dunn writes, “the political defeat of leftism may well be just as decisive.”

“Never in my memory,” Dunn concludes, “has leftism been so disarrayed and subdued. For the first time in many decades, we can turn our eyes toward the bright sunlit uplands, where liberty reigns, and where each may abide by his vine and fig tree and be not afraid.”

Dunn’s assessment deserves to be taken seriously. The author of a major political work, Death by Liberalism, he has considerable authority to pronounce on the present condition of the liberal-left project. In that book, Dunn expresses his conviction that any government that denies the social “compact” or “bargain” between government and governed will ultimately collapse, “as surely as the British went in 1781, as the imperial states after WWI, as the [USSR] went in 1991.” We may add that the latest instance of total socialist miscarriage is the oil-rich state of Venezuela, now officially out of gas.

This domino effect is certainly the case in individual historical episodes. But hybristic liberalism – aka utopianism, leftism, communism, fascism, or any of the sobriquets by which it is known – is a Hydra-headed phenomenon that, after every defeat, inevitably regenerates. As Jean-François Revel wrote in The Totalitarian Temptation (1976), “[t]he only way to reform [c]ommunism is to get rid of it,” yet even he, in Last Exit to Utopia (2000) admitted “[c]ommunism’s ongoing capacity for ideological terror.”

It seems to me that what we now call “leftism” or any of its nominal substitutes will always be with us. It is an indelible part of human nature, going back to time immemorial and probably rooted in the necessary sharing arrangements of primitive or subsistence societies. Socialism also has a message that it relentlessly disseminates. As Dunn himself points out in Death by Liberalism, dictatorial liberalism – that is, leftism – has profited and spread by virtue of an ideological component abetted by modern technology and communication systems. “Ideology provided the dictators,” he explains, “with a means of mobilizing support and instilling revolutionary zeal.” It was – and is – no longer merely a question of jackboots and tanks; the ideological message and missionary zeal guarantee the longevity of the doctrine being propagated.

David “Spengler” Goldman writes: Dr. Henry Kressel’s essay on industrial laboratories may be the most important piece of economic writing I have read in the past several years. It’s a practical guide to restoring American technological prowess and productivity growth.

Between 1999 and 2016, the U.S. share of global high technology exports dropped from 18 percent to 7 percent. From one of the world’s leading technology product exporters prior to 2000, the United States has become a net importer since then, and the deficit keeps growing. During this period, China’s share of exports increased from 3 percent to 26 percent, reflecting the shift of manufacturing overseas—including important high technology industries that were pioneered in the United States as early as the 1950s—suchas telecommunications systems, consumer electronic products, microelectronics, and solar energy converters.1

While we have seen the emergence of innovative U.S. companies in information industries, of which Google is a prime example, we have not seen a similar development in technology sectors involving domestic manufacturing. In fact, the sale of Westinghouse’s nuclear energy division to Toshiba is an example of a domestic loss of control over an industry vital to the United States Navy (though the company now appears likely to be sold back to U.S.-led private equity consortia). Or consider another example among many: key components of advanced computing technology essential in military systems, such as custom processing chips, may be designed here but are manufactured in Taiwan.

The domestic decline of important and vibrant technology industries impacts economic growth and contributes to the loss of well-paid manufacturing jobs. It also adversely affects military and other technological capabilities. The loss of a domestic manufacturing base for vital industries means that continuing innovations in those sectors are difficult to create or control. Computer displays, for example, are produced overseas, and that is where the innovations are now being developed and commercialized—because core innovations need to be embedded in the manufacturing process. While the migration of industries from developed to emerging countries is a common historical tendency, the shift away from the United States in recent decades has been unprecedented in its speed. To solve this problem, the United States must increase the rate of domestic industrial innovation and secure the domestic base of advanced industries. This calls for a major initiative involving industry, universities, and government over a period of many years. Every year we fall further behind makes it harder to recover.2

There are precedents for successful U.S. national efforts to boost critical technological innovation, such as the space program under President Kennedy and the ballistic missile defense initiatives (“Star Wars”) under President Reagan. With combined federal and corporate commitments and funding, remarkable progress can be made in moving breakthrough innovations from concept to product—and in the process creating major new industries.

Replicating those big innovation programs today, however, calls for a different execution strategy, because the industrial landscape has changed. The biggest change is the disappearance of corporate laboratories, which were part of large companies and had funding that allowed for long-term projects with potentially big impacts. These labs also brought together interdisciplinary teams of scientists and engineers for extended periods. Furthermore, the parent companies of these laboratories had the resources to move concepts into the market. The point is that maintaining a leading-edge economy the size of the United States requires combining the skills of the most talented people with appropriate resources to build market leadership, and corporate labs were critical components of this process.

America once had a few large, well-funded, and well-managed multidisciplinary corporate laboratories that housed some of the most brilliant technological researchers. They worked in environments where exceptionally creative people could innovate and see the fruits of their work translate into breakthrough products. A major virtue of such labs was that unexpected product ideas could emerge as researchers followed their curiosity to discover new phenomena. New materials and devices were invented without the pressure to produce quick results or to work only on low-risk, evolutionary product development—the typical task of most engineering departments associated with product divisions in corporations.