RUTHFULLY YOURS

Deterrent measures fall into two categories: actions the U.S. can take unilaterally, and steps that must be taken together with regional allies. East Asian countries increasingly are joining the U.S. in believing that a triumphant China will “treat us like dogs,” as one Asian diplomat remarked to me recently.

For starters, the U.S. Navy needs to expand its fleet. The Trump administration has committed to increasing the number of active ships to 355 from about 280 today. But this expansion must be carried out by 2030, rather than along the 30-year timeline the White House proposed. An accelerated naval buildup would give China proof of U.S. intent to resist its regional ambitions, speaking to President Xi Jinping in a language that needs no translation.

The U.S. could begin by commissioning an additional carrier strike group to be forward deployed in the Indo-Pacific region. The one U.S. aircraft carrier now based in Japan cannot cover the vast Indo-Pacific single-handed, nor can it provide the striking force the U.S. would need in a war. An additional carrier strike group would also allow the U.S. to increase patrols of the South China Sea, including the Taiwan Strait’s international waters. Involving U.S. allies in these patrols would advance like-minded nations’ interest in protecting freedom of navigation.

U.S. forces must also be prepared to respond in kind to Chinese provocation. China’s challenge of a U.S. destroyer near the Spratly Islands last month was an example of passive aggression. China recently has conducted cyberattacks against corporations, including defense contractors. The U.S. government also is a frequent target; China launched a cyberattack on the Naval War College as early as 2006. The White House published a new National Cyber Strategy last month, declaring that the U.S. will retaliate against all confirmed cyberattacks. This is sound deterrence. The administration will discourage China’s provocations by meting out commensurate punishments.

America’s advantage in artificial intelligence could enhance its edge in both cyber and kinetic warfare in coming years. AI will soon allow unmanned military platforms to operate against an enemy without immediate human direction. Picture a school of small submersibles that can communicate with each other and sink an enemy ship. Heightened emphasis on AI will assure continued U.S. military and naval dominance despite the quickening pace of Chinese militarization. This dominance could be compounded by removing bureaucratic obstacles within the Defense Department that slow the deployment of new technologies.

When it comes to regional alliances, no partner is more vital than Taiwan, the boldest active resister of China’s territorial claims. The Trump administration has approved two arms sales to Taipei since June and should expand cooperation with Taiwanese forces. The U.S. and Taiwan should build familiarity by arranging meetings between senior diplomats and military officers, and welcoming naval ships in each other’s ports. The U.S. also should provide assistance for Taiwan’s nascent submarine program. A more robust defense of Taiwan—especially against a blockade or amphibious assault—would raise the cost to China of seizing the island by force.

Another priority is greater attention to Japanese security. President Trump’s strong relationship with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should lead to closer collaboration on the seas. Tokyo has begun significantly improving its defensive capability, and the U.S. should aid its development with expanded arms transfers. Along with Taiwan, Japanese forces could be integrated into a joint command-and-control center that would monitor both nations’ coastal waters.

Finally, the U.S. should bolster its naval and Marine presence on Australia’s northern coast. Beijing must understand that U.S. allies will vigorously contest any attempt to control the archipelagic straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The maritime focus of the U.S. clash with China reverses the dynamic of the Cold War, which was a mainly land-based standoff. In the Cold War, the U.S. called on naval forces to harry the Soviets on their naval flanks and distract them from Germany’s heartland. A key objective today should be to distract China from its naval ambitions by pressing Beijing at its continental vulnerabilities.

Russia is the most obvious. The U.S. should encourage Moscow and Beijing’s many existing conflicts, such as dominance of Central Asia and the extraction of Arctic resources.

China’s large and restive Uighur population is another problem, promising to become a greater irritant to Beijing. Its dispute over Tibetan sovereignty dates to the 13th century, with no resolution in sight. These are complications in China’s insistent effort to consolidate its empire, and the U.S. should renew its links with these oppressed minorities in keeping with the commitment in Vice President Pence’s speech.

The U.S. should also back India in its effort to compete with China’s Belt and Road initiative, a plan to integrate and dominate Asian commerce with Europe. American industry can form partnerships with India to modernize its ports and land-transportation systems.

Mr. Pence pledged that the U.S. would remain the Pacific’s dominant power. He identified China as the greatest challenger. He correctly observed that China has a “whole of government” approach to advancing its hegemonic ambitions. To protect American security, assist allies, defend U.S. economic interests, and demonstrate that Washington is not disengaging from the world, the Trump administration should call on all the tools at its disposal as well. The objective in this strategic competition, as Ronald Reagan once put it: “We win, they lose.”

Mr. Cropsey is director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and is author of “Seablindness” (Encounter, 2017).