RUTHFULLY YOURS

Bishkek also offers a window into the future of Chinese power. The five countries in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—stretch from the Tien Shan mountains to the Caspian Sea. They contain majestic mountains, fertile valleys and vast reserves of minerals, oil and gas. They are also central to China’s ambitious attempt to transform international trade so that land routes across Asia replace the sea routes between Europe and Asia.

Many Western observers think China’s rise to primacy in Central Asia, where Russia has traditionally dominated, is inevitable. Russia’s economy is stagnant, while the appeal of China’s vast market, its cheap consumer goods, and its multibillion-dollar commitment to build a rail and road network throughout the region all tend to pull these countries away from Moscow and toward Beijing.

But in Bishkek, things look different. While China clearly plays an important role in the economy, Kyrgyz and foreign observers alike agree that Russian influence remains paramount—and many Kyrgyz want it to stay that way.

One reason is that while Beijing provides capital, Moscow offers jobs. Average monthly wages in Kyrgyzstan are only about $220 a month. More than 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s population works abroad, the overwhelming majority in Russia. Remittances from these workers amount to more than a third of Kyrgyzstan’s gross domestic product and keep many families afloat. This means Russia has enormous leverage in Bishkek without spending a dime of its strained budget; any moves by Moscow to limit the access of Kyrgyz workers to Russian jobs would cripple the country and cause a major political crisis.

Russia also has deep links with Kyrgyz security and military services. The Kyrgyz press is largely dominated by pro-Russian outlets, many of which recycle Kremlin propaganda—including that the U.S. supports ISIS. An airbase at Kant trained such luminaries as former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Soviet days; today it is critical to Russian air defense across Central Asia.

Far from resting on its laurels, Russia is moving to strengthen its ties with this South Dakota-size nation of six million. In late March, President Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan and announced $6 billion in economic agreements and an expansion of Russia’s airbase. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has hinted that Russia might be interested in a second military facility.

Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan has been controversial. A corruption case involving eight allies of former President Almazbek Atambayev in connection with a large Chinese loan is attracting widespread publicity at a time when Kyrgyzstan’s indebtedness to China is growing quickly. Angry villagers locked the Chinese managers of a gold-mining company in a shipping container last September. A bid by Huawei to provide closed-circuit TV surveillance in Kyrgyz cities was rejected amid concerns that the Chinese government would use the data for its own purposes. I’m told a Russia-backed firm landed the contract instead.

China’s proposed Belt and Road investments have also inflamed suspicions. Beijing would like to build an east-west rail link across Kyrgyzstan to facilitate shipping toward Europe. Kyrgyz officials want a north-south route that would promote internal communication between the more developed north and the rural, impoverished south.

Worse, China’s repression of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities has angered and alarmed Kyrgyzstan, where around 90% of the population is Muslim. Some Kyrgyz have relatives who have disappeared in China. Demonstrations against China’s persecution of Muslims and against illegal immigration from China into Kyrgyzstan seem to enjoy wide sympathy.

China’s prospects in Central Asia may be significantly dimmer, and Russia’s brighter, than many believe. From the standpoint of American foreign policy, that could be a problem. Many American analysts hope Russia will ultimately join a U.S.-led coalition to balance China in Eurasia.

But the more secure Russia’s position in Central Asia, the less likely it is that fear of China will drive Moscow to rebuild its ties with the West. If Chinese economic investments along the Silk Road leave Russian political primacy intact, Beijing and Moscow’s anti-U.S. partnership could prove to be more durable than the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s.