Proceed With Caution on a Defense Pact With Israel A treaty looks attractive to both Washington and Jerusalem, but potential pitfalls remain. By Douglas J. Feith
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proceed-with-caution-on-a-defense-pact-with-israel-11569538318
For all their longstanding defense ties, Israel and the U.S. have no mutual defense treaty. In the weeks before Israel’s Sept. 17 elections President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu both spoke favorably of negotiating one. Whether they were serious or simply wanted to bolster Mr. Netanyahu’s political support is unclear. In any case, a few observations are in order.
The U.S. is party to various kinds of defense treaties. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most far-reaching. The treaty states that “an armed attack against one [ally] . . . shall be considered an attack against them all.” Other bilateral U.S. defense treaties create lesser obligations—to consult about threats, to recognize that an attack on one would endanger peace and safety of the other, to meet common dangers in accordance with one’s own constitutional processes.
American and Israeli officials have long refrained from negotiating a mutual defense treaty because it was judged unnecessary and potentially harmful to both countries. Israelis worried mainly about their own freedom of action; they didn’t want to have to ask U.S. permission before taking steps to defend their state. U.S. officials didn’t want to have to grant or deny such permission—or to “own” Israeli military operations.
Sometimes U.S. officials have been pleased when Israel took tough and risky military actions—against Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, against terrorist leaders or operatives during the Second Intifada, and against Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007. The U.S. could disavow any responsibility but, if the actions succeeded, benefit nonetheless.
In a crisis, the help the U.S. would give Israel (or Israel would give the U.S.) wouldn’t likely increase as a result of a mutual defense treaty. Historically, such assistance has been provided out of national interest, not legal obligation.
The U.S. resupplied Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War even though it had no treaty obligation to do so. Israel helped the U.S. in Jordan in 1970 although no treaty required it. Israel and the U.S. gave each other substantial defense-related help after the 9/11 attacks absent a treaty.
Yet there are reasons to favor a treaty if it is properly limited. U.S. law designates Israel a “major non-NATO ally.” The U.S. and Israel have numerous nontreaty agreements on intelligence-sharing, military aid, defense industrial cooperation, trade and other matters. An umbrella agreement—a broad statement of friendship giving a treaty structure to the various executive agreements already in place—could make sense.
A carefully circumscribed agreement of that kind would elevate Israel to the status of treaty ally of the U.S. Although such a treaty would change little in the way of policy, it would signal American-Israeli friendship and cooperation. It might also help preserve bipartisan U.S. support for Israel. There is value in that.
Yet the longstanding reasons not to conclude a NATO-type mutual defense treaty with Jerusalem remain. Neither country would benefit from a treaty that either impedes Israel’s freedom to act or obliges America to endorse every Israeli action. Leaders in both countries should heed the physicians’ oath—first, do no harm.
Mr. Feith, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, served as undersecretary of defense for policy in the George W. Bush administration. This article is adapted from a report by the University of Haifa-Hudson Institute Consortium on the Eastern Mediterranean.
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