RUTHFULLY YOURS

Days after U.S. legislators applauded Mr. Guaidó, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was in Caracas, offering aid and comfort to the beleaguered government of Nicolás Maduro. The message seemed clear: Russia is prepared to stand up to the U.S., even in the Western Hemisphere, to protect its Venezuelan allies.

For the Trump administration’s foreign policy, the tangle with Russia over Venezuela is a local problem with global consequences. When I interviewed him recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo identified a short list of administration priorities for 2020. Real progress toward change in Venezuela and an improved relationship with Russia are both high on the list. With both Russiagate and Ukrainegate in the rearview mirror, it would appear that the administration has a new freedom to reach out diplomatically to the Kremlin—but that hardly comports with the rock-star treatment given to Mr. Guaidó in Washington last week.

More than three years into the Trump administration, the U.S.-Russia relationship remains icy. The U.S. has placed sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would connect Germany to Russian natural gas. In northeastern Syria, American and Russian forces have engaged in tense standoffs even as Vladimir Putin doubles down on his support for Bashar Assad. The week before the State of the Union, Mr. Pompeo visited Ukraine, bringing promises of aid and support. This looks and feels more like a Cold War than another “reset” of the U.S.-Russia relationship. What’s going on?

One possibility is that the U.S. and Russian governments are both working to improve their bargaining position. The Lavrov visit served both to shore up the Maduro regime and to remind Washington that Moscow matters. Is Russia’s support of Venezuela for sale? If so, what’s the price—an end to American support for Ukraine? U.S. acquiescence to the Assad regime’s reasserting control over all of Syria?

Anything can happen with Mr. Trump in the White House, but officials close to Venezuela policy believe that conventional policy tools carefully deployed can cripple Caracas and persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro. The key is to make it impossible for Venezuela to sell oil abroad.

What keeps Mr. Maduro afloat and Russia engaged, insiders say, is the commercial value of Venezuelan oil shipments. At great cost to its suffering people, Caracas paid off a significant portion of its multibillion-dollar debt to Russia last year. At the same time, Venezuelan firms the U.S. has blacklisted are selling oil to Russian companies at a steep discount. The Russians then smuggle the product out of the area and sell it cheaply but at a handsome profit abroad.

That flow of oil is vulnerable to U.S. pressure. Officials have a good sense of where it is going (India is a big customer) and believe that diplomacy and additional sanctions can make Venezuelan oil much less attractive globally. Companies like Rosneft may find themselves the target of serious sanctions as well. A campaign against Venezuelan oil exports that is as far-reaching as the policies that have largely cut Iran off from world markets will change calculations in both Caracas and Moscow, officials believe.

While Washington’s methods are tough, its goals seem relatively moderate. The Trump administration wants to end the economic collapse and social distress in Venezuela, which threaten regional prosperity and stability. It also wants to honor the Venezuelan people’s right to decide their own future in genuinely free elections, and to bring Venezuelan oil back onto world markets. This wouldn’t require a revolution or a coup but a negotiated opening to fair presidential elections. A peaceful transition could potentially include amnesty for members of the current regime and an agreement to allow them to keep their wealth. Russian and Chinese commercial interests could be taken into account.

For this president, and for his electoral base, old-fashioned political ideas like the Monroe Doctrine really matter. Chinese and Russian meddling in Latin America isn’t a mild irritant for this administration. It’s a source of deep strategic concern and an opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. The congressional ovation for Mr. Guaidó suggests that many Democrats are prepared to support policies aimed at easing both Russia and Mr. Maduro from power in Caracas. This could be a dramatic year in the politics of the Western Hemisphere.