India Is a Natural U.S. Ally in the New Cold War America beat the Soviets by helping democracies get rich. In Asia, it’s high time to revive that approach. By Walter Russell Mead
https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-is-a-natural-u-s-ally-in-the-new-cold-war-11590600011?mod=opinion_featst_pos1
It’s been an interesting week in India. A heat wave took temperatures up to 117 degrees in the sweltering north. An earthquake shook the northeastern state of Manipur as a massive cyclone slammed into coastal Odisha. Swarms of locusts have descended on cities and farms across the northwest. Record numbers of new cases were reported in India’s rapidly escalating Covid-19 epidemic. Meanwhile, villagers in Kashmir spotted and captured a “spy pigeon” with a coded message attached to a ring on its leg. As the code has not yet been broken, the pigeon’s mission remains unknown. Despite both a costly lockdown and a continuing surge in new Covid cases, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to dominate the political scene, with approval ratings of 80% or more in recent polls.
With the emerging cold war between the U.S. and China threatening to become the new central axis of world politics, the subcontinent has been pulled into the storm. Chinese and Indian troops have clashed this spring and the standoff continues. Pakistan is among the largest recipients of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative investments. Swallowing whatever qualms the Islamists among Pakistan’s leadership have about the plight of the Uighurs, the country has turned increasingly to China for aid, trade and diplomatic support. That is hardly surprising. With a population of 212 million and a gross domestic product of $325 billion, Pakistan can only maintain its rivalry with India (population 1.35 billion, GDP $2.7 trillion) with the help of a great-power ally.
American strategists, meanwhile, are anxiously—and correctly—keeping a close watch on India’s development. A wealthy, powerful and democratic India would help frustrate China’s hegemonic ambitions and substantially offset Chinese influence in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. The stronger India becomes the less the U.S. must contribute to a balancing coalition of India, Japan, Australia and Vietnam that keeps Chinese ambitions in check.
In that kind of world, the nascent Washington-Beijing rivalry could fade into the background, and the U.S. could enjoy trade relationships with a rich Asia that posed fewer threats to American security. India’s emergence as an economic superpower would also strengthen the cause of democracy, demonstrating that people don’t have to give up their freedom to thrive.
That rosy scenario is a long way away. China’s economy is $10 trillion larger than India’s. Byzantine land and labor laws, concerns about corruption, and rickety infrastructure continue to limit India’s ability to attract foreign capital, even as many companies look to diversify their supply chains away from China.
Under the leadership of the Congress Party during the Cold War, India’s state-led economy slogged along at what observers called the “Hindu rate of growth” of about 3.5% a year—sluggish for a developing country. Starting in 1991, a spate of reforms under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his finance minister—future Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—set India on a different course, and India’s growth rate accelerated dramatically. India grew faster than China during several years in the past decade. But India must do better to narrow that $10 trillion gap. There were signs even before the pandemic that India’s economic progress was slowing. Without a strong push by Mr. Modi and his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, India’s growth could stabilize at a rate that would keep Indian incomes rising but leave the country falling ever further behind China.
That wouldn’t be good for the U.S. and Asia, or good enough for the hundreds of millions of poor Indians whose elevation from poverty would be hastened by faster growth. But Indian society is complex and difficult to govern. Reforms that challenge powerful constituencies aren’t easily imposed.
Not since the early Cold War, when promoting economic recovery in Europe and Japan was a critical element in the effort to contain the Soviet Union, has the economic performance of a foreign country mattered this much to the U.S. Helping democratic India lift its long-term growth rate enough to narrow the gap with China should be one of America’s top foreign-policy goals.
Achieving it will require working with Indian officials and experts to find regulatory changes and forms of American assistance that could smooth the path of reform. It will mean working to avoid the kind of environmental devastation that followed China’s industrialization. Those who rightly urge a “whole of government” approach to countering China should think hard about what such an approach to India’s development would look like—and which allies to enlist in the effort to make a more peaceful, prosperous and securely democratic world.
America won its most important Cold War victories by helping democracies become rich in ways that advanced its own security and prosperity. It’s high time to revive that approach, and India is the place to start.
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