RUTHFULLY YOURS

https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/paul-krugman-michael-lind

How a trash-talking neoliberal economist harmed America by vilifying strategic trade and industrial policy

Strategic trade and national industrial policy are back. Growing U.S. military and economic competition with China, along with the COVID-19 pandemic, have revealed the dependence of the United States on manufacturing supply chains in China and other foreign sources. The neoliberal consensus in favor of indiscriminate trade liberalization and against government support for strategic industries is evaporating: The Biden administration, in a more nuanced way, has continued many of Donald Trump’s nationalist economic policies, including some tariffs and programs to promote reshoring. In an era of extreme polarization, there is a high degree of bipartisan support for measures like the CHIPS for America Act, which seeks to reduce U.S. reliance for semiconductors on a few Asian sources like the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics.

The last time these issues were at the center of public debate was during the 1980s and early 1990s. At that time, both the industrial revival of Japan and West Germany after the devastation of World War II and the increasing offshoring of production to low-wage countries by U.S. corporations were challenging America’s manufacturing sector and its workers.

Then as now, America’s university-based economics profession was dominated by the otherworldly neoclassical school, which, having purged the empirical and realistic institutional school of economics after 1945, specializes in using mathematics to model unrealistic assumptions. Even so, a generation ago the debate over whether the U.S. should adopt a strategic trade and industrial policy—favoring some industries over others and including selective protectionism or export promotion—was causing a few bold academic economists to rethink the discipline’s creed that free trade is always and everywhere good for everyone.

One was a promising young economist named Paul Krugman. In a 1987 paper for The Journal of Economic Perspectives, “Is Free Trade Passe?” Krugman noted:

If there were an Economist’s Creed, it would surely contain the affirmations “I understand the Principle of Comparative Advantage” and “I advocate Free Trade.” … Yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy … because of the changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade itself. … There is still a case for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful target in the practical world of politics, but it can never again be asserted as the policy that economic theory tells us is always right.

Only a few years later, however, Krugman had become one of the most vehement critics of scholars, public servants, and journalists who questioned free trade, doing his best to destroy their reputations in the eyes of the trans-Atlantic media and business and academic establishments. He and other intellectual vigilantes like Martin Wolf of the Financial Times and the economist Jagdish Bhagwati who policed the borders of acceptable discourse about trade in general and offshoring to China in particular were all too successful. It might have happened anyway, but Krugman’s prestige and skill as a polemicist helped persuade elite media outlets, think tanks, government agencies, and business institutions that they could ignore the experts from varied backgrounds who were raising alarms about the consequences that offshoring U.S. manufacturing would have for supply chain fragility, domestic jobs, and U.S. military power. By the time Krugman confessed that he and others had been wrong to minimize the problems involved in globalization for a quarter of a century, the damage to the United States had been done.

.https://thefederalist.com/2021/11/23/atlas-i-watched-the-nations-top-scientists-lie-about-covid-and-get-away-with-it/

This is an excerpt from the author’s new book, “A Plague Upon Our House,” which releases December 7 and is available now for preorder.

[CDC Director Robert] Redfield’s congressional testimony on September 23 immediately caught my attention. I watched in disbelief as Redfield told Congress that “more than 90 percent of the population”—more than three hundred million people in the US—remains susceptible to the illness.

The statement was based on incomplete and outdated data, as well as an apparent lack of understanding of the literature, and it struck me as one of the most erroneous and fear-inducing proclamations of any public health official to that moment. Approximately two hundred thousand Americans had already died from COVID; the last thing the public needed was an exaggeration of the future risks, implying to some that ten times that number could still die.

First of all, the numbers didn’t add up. At that point, confirmed cases in the US already totaled approximately seven million, and the CDC itself had estimated that approximately ten times the number of confirmed cases, a very conservative estimate, were likely to have had the infection. A Stanford seropositivity study back in April had shown that confirmed cases underestimated the total infections by a factor of approximately forty times. It made no sense that only 9 percent, or thirty million Americans, had been infected.

Second, the 9 percent calculation was blatantly wrong. That number came from antibody testing by the states. I looked at the CDC website myself, and sure enough, the data was based on antiquated testing from several states.

Some antibody totals were pulled from several months earlier, before many of those states had experienced a significant number of cases. It therefore grossly underestimated the number of cases that had already occurred. The data was simply not valid, but you needed to pay attention to the details.

More importantly, Redfield’s basic claim was fundamentally flawed. The conclusion that serum antibody testing revealed the entire population of those protected from COVID was counter to an entire body of published literature and contrary to fundamental knowledge of immunology, including other coronavirus infections.

It was well known that antibody tests showed one cross-section in time—they were transient—even though immune protection can last. From studies on SARS-2 and most other viruses, antibody levels change over a span of months. They typically appear in the first couple of weeks, peak in a few months, and then decrease over a span of several months.

The literature on COVID had already shown these patterns. A month before this press conference, a Nature Reviews Immunology study on COVID-19 explicitly stated, “The absence of specific antibodies in the serum does not necessarily mean an absence of immune memory,” and explained, “memory B-cells and T-cells may be maintained even if there are not measurable levels of serum antibodies.”

Japan’s study demonstrated this dramatically. In their study, antibody levels increased from 5.8 percent to 46.8 percent over the course of the summer. The most dramatic increase occurred in late June and early July, paralleling the rise in daily confirmed cases within Tokyo, which peaked on August 4.