https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18000/russia-ukraine
In July, Putin published a 5,000-word article — “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” — in which he wrote that he was convinced that the “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.”
“The Russian regime’s foremost interest is its own hold on power. All policy, internal and external, stems from this overriding goal.” — Edward Lucas, Ben Hodges and Carsten Schmiedl, Center for European Policy Analysis.
“The Russian Federation…has two main options: to escalate the armed conflict in the Donbas in order to achieve a rapid breakthrough, or to intensify long-term pressure, i.e. to play for Kyiv’s gradual exhaustion. The choice of strategy depends on the Russian perception of the situation, the attitude of Ukraine itself, and the behavior of key Western actors.” — Marek Menkiszak, Center for Eastern Studies.
The first important factor here is Moscow’s likely perception of the relative weakness of the US. The Kremlin’s initial fear of ‘retribution’ from the new Joe Biden administration for its interference in the 2016 presidential election seems to have given way to the belief that Washington is focused on domestic problems and the challenge from China, so it is seeking to improve relations with the Russian Federation. — Marek Menkiszak.
“Do not make the mistake of handing an essential part of Europe’s future to a country that is demonstratively not the EU’s friend. Time will not be kind to such decision or to those who made it.” — Olexander Scherba, Ukrainian diplomat, Jamestown Foundation.
“Russia has a clear aim: to weaken Ukraine so much that it will be relatively easy to control the country’s politics. Moscow can achieve this by forcing Kyiv to implement the Minsk agreement on its terms — which would establish a de facto Russian veto on Ukrainian domestic affairs — and by starting…anti-government revolts. Alternatively, Moscow could pressure Washington to ‘deliver’ Ukraine by signing security guarantees that favored Russia. These guarantees would prohibit Ukraine from not only joining NATO but also engaging in any form of cooperation with the West that would strengthen its resilience. This would eventually force Ukraine back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.” — Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations.
“If Russia’s coercive strategy works well, there is no guarantee that it will stop with Ukraine.” — Gustav Gressel.
“Many European leaders do not seem to grasp the seriousness of the situation…. Ukraine has a gun to its head, but the German government only seems worried about the survival of its pipeline…. This is just the kind of poor judgement that enables Russian military aggression.” — Gustav Gressel.
A massive build-up of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border is fueling speculation of an imminent invasion. Western leaders have warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against military action, but, especially after the catastrophic American withdrawal from Afghanistan, they appear divided and weak and may be unable to stop him.
A Russian invasion of Ukraine, if successful, would expand Moscow’s sphere of influence along its western border and pave the way for Eastern Europe and the Baltics to come under Russian domination once again.
