U.S. Mistakes Fed Putin’s Ukraine Temptation At the rate he’s going, Biden will be making concessions to Russia for the rest of his term. By Ric Grenell and Andrew L. Peek
America’s current crisis with Russia over Ukraine is a logical outcome of the Biden administration’s failed European policy and misguided focus on consensus. This standoff, which may culminate in January with concessions to Moscow, is the product of five basic problems.
First and most glaring, the administration has treated diplomacy with Western Europe as an end in itself. America’s current fetish for agreement with Berlin and Paris, rather than transactional diplomacy, means that on issue after issue the Germans and French can insist on their own policy views in exchange for consensus. For countries that don’t view Russia’s military buildup with sufficient alarm, consensus means words rather than action. The European Union has failed to draft sanctions on Russia even as the crisis enters its third month. The Germans are reportedly blocking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from selling lethal aid to Ukraine. And Germany was insistent on completing Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will effectively isolate Ukraine.
Moscow can be sure that the U.S. won’t act on its own militarily to help Ukraine, because the Biden administration has promised it won’t. Credible uncertainty about the likelihood of U.S. action would have been a genuine deterrent to Moscow’s escalation of this crisis. If Ukraine is a vital American interest, Washington must leave the Russians guessing whether America will commit its own forces, especially since European diplomacy has borne so little fruit.
Second, American deterrence has collapsed in the wake of the Afghanistan fiasco, which demoralized our friends and energized our adversaries. There is no reason Russia should believe that Mr. Biden’s administration credibly threatens military action. Afghanistan cheapened every promise the U.S. has made, including those to NATO and the European states in Russia’s shadow.
Third, America treats its relationship with Russia as a series of one-off issues that can be cherry-picked. Acceding to cooperation when Russia wants to engage diplomatically (on strategic arms control, for example), the U.S. has less leverage on the issues in which Russia has a comparative advantage and wants to use force, such as Ukraine.
Fourth, the U.S. has failed to set priorities. Washington has been unusually active, following the EU’s example, in criticizing Poland and other Eastern European states for perceived backsliding on democracy. Poland’s migration policy isn’t a crisis of democracy, and neither is its draft law prohibiting foreign companies from using shell companies to work around restrictions capping their ownership of media outlets. Picking fights with politically different states (here, the more conservative ones) makes it easier for Mr. Putin to divide frontline states from the West and render them more vulnerable. This is especially acute when Russian-backed forces are pressuring these countries with such hybrid threats as forced migration.
Fifth, America has failed to show strategic patience with Turkey. President Trump took political flak for his effort to keep the positive bilateral relationship with Ankara while paying for the Obama administration’s reckless bilateral policies. Mr. Biden was equally reckless with anti-Turkish rhetoric on the campaign trail. After his inauguration, he delayed a call and meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan until it became a diplomatic problem. Mr. Erdogan can be a rough, ugly customer, but Turkey is also a historic balancer of Russia. Turkish-backed forces are confronting Russian-backed forces in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus. Turkey will continue to assert its interests aggressively, usually in contravention of Russia’s, unless the U.S. gives it a reason to prioritize other issues. Strategic patience with Turkey, including addressing disagreements privately, is of the utmost importance.
It is possible to achieve with Russia the things that Mr. Biden wants: stability, a working relationship with NATO and cooperation abroad. Mr. Trump had a more stable relationship with Russia while pursuing objectively tougher policies than Mr. Biden or Mr. Obama. But Mr. Biden’s idealization of EU-style consensus, his administration’s inability to prioritize, and America’s discredited threat of deterrence ensure that Mr. Biden will be making concessions until he leaves office—especially if disaster strikes.
Mr. Grenell served as U.S. ambassador to Germany (2018-20) and acting director of national intelligence (2020). Mr. Peek was senior director for European affairs at the National Security Council (2019-20).
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