Iran’s Ballistic Missiles and the Folly of Appeasement When regime-backed Houthi rebels fired on a base housing U.S. soldiers, Team Biden deflected. By Michael Doran and Can Kasapoğlu
The news that Iran’s contribution to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine will soon include ballistic missiles as well as kamikaze drones has alerted the world to the surprising advances the Islamic Republic has made in disruptive weapons technologies. To the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, these technologies are as important as its nuclear-weapons program.
One man who understands this better than most is Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, who retired in April as commander of U.S. Central Command, the military command responsible for the Middle East. Gen. McKenzie recently warned about the impact of Iran’s advances in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones. “Over the past five to seven years, Iranian capabilities . . . have risen to such a degree that now they possess what I would call effective ‘overmatch’ against their neighbors,” he said on Oct. 6 at Policy Exchange, a London think tank. “Overmatch,” he continued, “is a military term that means you have the ability to attack, and the defender won’t be able to mount a successful defense.”
The Iranians essentially have established a balance of power that favors offensive action by Iran. Lopsided defense economics partially explain this: America and its allies spend more money—tens or hundreds of times more—to intercept Iranian missiles and drones than it costs Iran to build and launch those weapons.
More important, when combined in a large strike package, some of Iran’s missiles and drones will inevitably break through America’s defensive shield guarding its allies and military bases in the Middle East. The IRGC combines ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones in strike packages. Each of these systems have different flight characteristics, radar signatures and homing angles. When launched simultaneously they tax the sensors of missile-defense systems. Even the most sophisticated systems operating at peak performance can’t prevent at least some of Iran’s weapons, when launched in significant quantities, from hitting their targets.
Consider the attacks that Iran’s Houthi proxy conducted against the United Arab Emirates in January. The Emirati defenses, based on state-of-the-art American technology, performed successfully, but three people died. In missile defense, a 90% interception rate is a feat of technical wizardry. Yet if a few missiles break through, “success” starts exacting a higher cost than America’s allies can pay. If one of Iran’s missiles were to slip through the defensive net and strike Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world, a successful defense would look like a catastrophic failure.
If there is an ironclad rule in military science, it is this: Solely defensive weapons can’t reverse an offense-dominant regime. A shield alone can’t fend off a powerful sword. A shield is most effective when wielded together with a sword. The logic of classical deterrence suggests that America’s allies should conduct offensive countermeasures against Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must be persuaded that his acts of aggression will be met with punishment that is severe, swift and certain.
America’s Gulf allies can’t take offensive countermeasures against Iran on their own. Those countries are too small and vulnerable to match the IRGC should it decide to escalate. Iran now has one of the largest and most diverse missile arsenals in the world, with enough raw firepower to pound the major cities of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to rubble.
Only the U.S. has the power to persuade Mr. Khamenei that his aggressions will result in unbearable pain for him. But the Biden administration has systematically taught him the opposite, that it much prefers to cover up acts of Iranian aggression rather than to punish them.
The strike package that the Houthis launched at the U.A.E. included ballistic missiles that targeted Al Dhafra Air Base, which houses the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing of the U.S. Air Force. Few people are even aware that Iran, through its proxy, launched a ballistic-missile attack on some 2,000 Americans this year.
As expected, the Biden administration didn’t respond to these attacks. Intent on returning to the Iran nuclear deal, the administration deflected attention from the provocation. National security adviser Jake Sullivan released a statement that defined the raid as a Houthi terrorist attack on civilians, erasing Iran’s role and the American target.
President Biden’s restraint has taught Mr. Khamenei that he possesses “overmatch” not only against America’s allies but against America itself. If the Americans won’t even defend themselves from Iranian attacks, is it any wonder that their allies are hedging toward China and Russia?
The protests on the streets of Iran demonstrate the weakness and vulnerability of the regime, yet it continues to run circles around the U.S. Washington has forgotten the most elementary lessons of classic deterrence.
Mr. Doran is director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. Mr. Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson.
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