Tokyo Flexes Its Talons Suga was hawkish on China, but the soft-power U.S.-Japan alliance needs work. Walter Russell Mead
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-flexes-its-talons-11618871351?mod=opinion_featst_pos3
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s visit to the White House is being hailed in both countries as a major success. On the American side, officials rejoiced that Mr. Suga aligned Japan with U.S. talking points in Asia. As the prime minister said at a joint press conference, America and Japan both “oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South China seas and intimidation of others in the region.” References to the Taiwan Straits and the situation in Xinjiang added to the impression that Tokyo is becoming more forthright in supporting a tougher U.S. line.
On the Japanese side, there was also much to be happy about. President Biden chose Mr. Suga for his first Oval Office meeting with a foreign leader, an unmistakable sign of the priority the Biden administration attaches to the relationship. Better still, American officials didn’t press the prime minister for a list of specific commitments that might have been difficult to sell at home—or that would ignite a firestorm in the volatile relationship between Beijing and Tokyo.
Mr. Suga hedged comments on Taiwan and Xinjiang carefully. On Taiwan, he said at the joint press conference that the summit “reaffirmed” the U.S.-Japan consensus. On Xinjiang he said that he had “explained Japan’s position and initiatives” to the president. Neither the press conference nor the joint statement Messrs. Biden and Suga issued after their discussion used the word “genocide.”
While Washington and Tokyo broadly agree about the risks of China’s behavior, Japan still prefers to stay a few steps behind America. Geography, economics and history all connect Japan to China. While officials in Tokyo fully understand that China’s growing military might and territorial assertiveness require a robust Japanese response, neither the country’s business community nor the public wants to be too confrontational with a neighboring superpower. On military and human rights issues alike, the Japanese consensus is shifting, but Tokyo’s postwar tradition of cautious diplomacy won’t change overnight.
And then there is the American question. The oscillations in U.S. policy under both President Obama and President Trump left Japan with a severe case of whiplash. Mr. Obama’s flaccid response to China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea horrified Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government. Mr. Obama made the Trans-Pacific Partnership the centerpiece of his Asia policy, but Mr. Trump campaigned against it before rejecting the deal in office.
Tokyo cannot be 100% sure where the Biden administration’s China policy is going. While Mr. Suga was in Washington, John Kerry was in China pushing for a grand bargain on climate. The Biden administration’s rhetoric on issues ranging from Taiwan to Xinjiang is hawkish, but Mr. Biden has proposed a small cut to the defense budget, adjusted for inflation. Under the circumstances, Mr. Suga’s most prudent course was to avoid offending anyone in Washington without unduly shocking China—and this is what he seems to have accomplished.
The alliance with Japan is the single most important international relationship America has. Without Japan’s economic weight, technological capabilities and geographical position, the U.S. cannot build an effective coalition to balance China. But without strong and stable American support, Japan can’t last as an independent great power in China’s front yard.
These facts drive the U.S. and Japan together, but alliances between democracies cannot live by realpolitik alone. Mr. Suga spoke in Washington about the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law that the two countries share. So far, so good. But the soft power of the alliance—the human contacts, the mutual understanding between societies, the sense of common destiny—is significantly weaker than the bonds that tie America to other allies like the U.K. and Israel.
In the 2018-19 school year, fewer than 9,000 U.S. students were studying in Japan. In 2019 only about 7,000 U.S. students registered to take the Japanese-Language Proficiency Test—of hundreds of thousands of registrants world-wide. Compared with Japan, China sent about twice as many students per capita to study in the U.S. pre-Covid. Among students from 29 Asian countries tested for English-language proficiency, Japanese students ranked 27th, ahead of only Laos and Tajikistan.
Few American academics, think tankers and journalists have a deep knowledge of Japan. There are only a rare few U.S. citizens like Japan Society President Joshua Walker —who grew up in Japan the child of missionaries, and has both private sector and government experience in America.
For the foreseeable future, the U.S.-Japan alliance is likely to remain the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Building the social and cultural ties that can support that relationship is an urgent task for both countries.
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