~I commented recently on Tucker that I preferred the Internet of a decade ago to the increasingly totalitarian social-media cartel of today: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter. Glenn Reynolds, the Instapundit, feels the same way:
I think that the old blogosphere was superior to “social media” like Twitter and Facebook for a number of reasons. First, as a loosely-coupled system, instead of the tightly-coupled systems built by retweets and shares, it was less prone to cascading failure in the form of waves of hysteria. Second, because there was no central point of control, there was no way to ban people. And you didn’t need one, since bloggers had only the audience that deliberately chose to visit their blogs.
The Internet of the post-9/11 years already seems like a lost Golden Age. Twitter in particular seems to have no purpose other than cascading “waves of hysteria”. I mentioned on air both Facebook’s viral snuff videos, and the suicide of a Canadian porn actress after a Tweetstorm of homophobia accusations from LGBTQWERTY types who subsequently gloated over her passing. “Social media” plays a role in more deaths than, say, America’s supposedly all-powerful “white supremacist” movement. But, unlike the latter, nobody seems bothered about the former.
~This week’s Spectator contains a piece with the following headline:
Do the Americans know who they’re fighting in Afghanistan — or why?
What follows doesn’t really ask that question – in part because we all know what the answer is. One of President Trump’s great contributions to the public discourse is that he sees people as winners (him) or losers (Crooked Hillary. Sad!), and that he would prefer America to be in the former category. That’s why his decision to string along with existing Afghan policy is so unTrumpian: If there is any US strategy left in the Hindu Kush, it’s to lose so slowly no one back home notices.
Jason Burke’s Speccie piece is a review of a new book by Steve Coll called Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret War in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2016. As old Islamabad hands will know, “Directorate S” is the secret unit dealing with Afghan affairs in Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), which itself celebrates its seventieth birthday this year. The ISI was set up by Sir Robert Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the fledgling Pakistani Army, and like so many bright ideas of well-intentioned men in that part of the world it jumped the tracks fairly spectacularly. But the very fact that a book about “America’s longest war” is named after a malign Pakistani black-ops racket tells you something about the tenuous grasp Washington has of the situation. In his review, Mr Burke writes of Afghanistan before the US intervention:
Bagram had been captured by the Taliban, who then exercised nominal control over 80 per cent of Afghanistan.