Forty years ago, Saigon fell to communist North Vietnam. Images of terrified South Vietnamese clambering to the roof of the U.S. embassy, and Vietnamese helicopter pilots ferrying them to ships and then pushing the helicopters overboard to make room for more refugees are still heart-wrenching.
Vietnam represented a change in the American security dynamic for the protection of friends and the defeat of adversaries, but the application of useful policy lessons is hard to find.
WWII and the Korean War had required the United States to leave substantial parts of its military in place either to consolidate victory or prevent the erosion of an armistice. In the case of Vietnam, however, the U.S. armed and trained the South Vietnamese military (ARVN) and then left it to the field. The policy was called “Vietnamization.” The question should have been asked, “What is the staying power of an army when its enemy consists of its brothers and cousins — that is to say, when it is fighting a civil war — in the absence of U.S. support on the ground?” And, the corollary, “Particularly when its brothers and cousins are supported by outside powers?”