Obama shows the fallacy of always leaving force as a last resort. Months after leaving the Pentagon nearly nine years ago, I wrote in NR (“Before They Go Nuclear . . . ”) that the Bush administration’s Europe-led sanctions strategy would lead to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Why? Because of the implicit understanding among the U.S. and its European partners that force was off the table as long as further sanctions could be imposed.
Obama shows the fallacy of always leaving force as a last resort. Months after leaving the Pentagon nearly nine years ago, I wrote in NR (“Before They Go Nuclear . . . ”) that the Bush administration’s Europe-led sanctions strategy would lead to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Why? Because of the implicit understanding among the U.S. and its European partners that force was off the table as long as further sanctions could be imposed.
The Obama administration has always insisted that force is on the table “if diplomacy fails.” But it has also insisted that strikes would only slow the Iranian program down. That’s of a piece with the rest of the administration’s approach, which appears to reject any notion of “coercive diplomacy.” The president is a faithful believer that diplomacy depends on dialogue and mutual understanding, and that “pressure” is provocative and therefore undermines diplomacy.