https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/15871/afghanistan-shady-peace
There are several fundamental problems with the “deal” touted by the administration as a ticket to peace in a land torn by war since the 1970s. To start with, it is not at all certain that the cast of characters that negotiated the “deal” actually do represent the Taliban…. Like the Mafia in Italy, it included a large number of “families” who came together… to set up an “Islamic emirate….” Today, we could identify a dozen groups of different sizes claiming the brand…. The only thing that unites the cartel members is a common dream to recapture Kabul and restore the “emirate” that allowed them to rule their patches of territory as they pleased.
The “deal” itself is a model of dangerous naiveté. It aims at exchanging something tangible and easily verifiable, that is to say the withdrawal of American troops, against something intangible and not easily verifiable in the form of a promise to prevent terrorist acts against American interests. More importantly, there is no mechanism for making the Taliban dealmakers pay for failure to honor it.
Any peace deal should be aimed at finding a place for them within the new Afghanistan, not the other way around, that is to say reshaping this new Afghanistan the way the mullahs want. They should disarm, accept the constitutional frame and seek a share of power through the ballot box.
Next, despite zigzags, the new Afghanistan, though cumbersome, corrupt and chaotic is stumbling forward on the right path; it is far better, or less bad, than anything the Taliban could or would offer…. The US won the war and the Taliban lost. The only way to peace, since the start of history, has been for those who lost to submit to the will of those who won.
Even before he entered the White House, Donald Trump insisted that, as president, he would avoid the policies that led to some of his predecessor Barack Obama’s glaring foreign policy failures. And, yet, he now seems set to pursue one of those failed policies with gusto by embarking on what could lead to a premature disengagement from Afghanistan.