When the asylum is on fire and management is arguing about regulating the volume of fire buckets, even the saddest inmate will grasp that making for the door is good idea. On June 23, in a plebiscite none but the brave or foolish would presume to predict, the UK will take the measure of its sanity.
The folly of the Euro has been discussed ad nauseam. For our purpose, let us just look at the outcomes: Far from harmonising, the most efficient economies, the newly reunified Germany to the fore, reaped the benefits while the least efficient economies, led by France, were left horribly exposed when the whole house of cards collapsed after the financial crisis of 2008. Trying to run a currency union by relying on monetary policy and adherence to the rules alone was always an ill-starred project. Interest rates that suited historically stable German deutschemarks were never suitable for Italy and their inflated Lire.
Where did this leave the EU? Paralysed. The Franco-German axis has tipped. It used to be Merkozy[1], now it’s just Merkel. Her CDU party hold the balance of power in the European Parliament[2]; she herself dominates the Council of Ministers, leaving just the Commission. Their own frustrations with the supposedly democratic arms of EU government were neatly summed up by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, back when he had to worry about such things, quipping, “We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it”[3]. While the Euro crisis unfolded it became increasingly clear that Angela Merkel was the de facto head of the EU and that the énarques had become little more than her EUnuchs while she cautiously adopted a Grand Wait & See policy.
The status quo, before the migrant crisis at least, suited Merkel very well. Like France pre-enlargement and the Euro, Germany benefits the most from the state of affairs. While the governance of Europe was French, the finances are quintessentially German. The new Members to the east have cultural and economic ties, smoothing their path into the German supply line. Historically however, Germany has never been powerful enough to completely dominate Europe and she is uncomfortable in the role now. The old German Question has resurfaced, namely: How does she deal with the lesser powers surrounding her? Fortunately, while a hundred years ago the question revolved around the military, nowadays it’s the economy[4]. Germans increasingly resent having to pay for the weaker Members who share the Euro and worry that they will club together to make them do so. They themselves see Germany’s trade and budget surpluses rise while theirs’ seem to fall in an inverse proportion and resent German economic growth at what they perceive as their expense[5].
The Euro crisis has brought up all the old European fault lines and the EU’s reaction to the migrant crisis has only deepened those divisions. After trying to ignore the crossings into Italy, the numbers choosing the much shorter route into Greece has led to extraordinary measures. While the Commission came up with a plan to distribute the refugees equally among Member States the Balkan nations, followed by the central European ones, put up fences with an alacrity that Donald Trump would envy. The EU’s passport free Schengen zone has effectively been ended[6] and while the Commission has tried its usual pan-European model that only answers the questions nobody else is asking, the Member States typically fell out over it. Merkel’s response was, against all European treaties, protocols and conventions, to invite a million into her country with no concern as to how they would get there. In doing so she has alienated her central and eastern allies.
The Brexit Countdown: Part I
The rights and wrongs of the migrant crisis will not concern us here. The British model of helping refugees closer to their homes seems eminently sensible if one is furthest away and has a moat to hide behind. The EU has fewer options and little experience in implementing them. The effects have been added political unrest amongst the citizenry and threats to social order unseen in the EU’s, but not Europe’s history. Merkel’s policy, while undoubtedly heartfelt, has undermined her authority and led to a rise in support for ultra-nationalist and xenophobic parties. Her recent Turkish deal and the backlash over the prosecution of the German comedian Jan Böhmermann, who dared exercise his right to free speech by insulting the Turkish president, has diminished her further.
The Empire Strikes Back
Merkel’s loss is the Commission’s gain. The Five Presidents’ Report[7] plots out the short, medium and long-term future of the EU. Progress must be made “towards a genuine Economic Union” – building on that “successful and stable” currency; “towards a Financial Union” which “increases risk-sharing with the private sector” – does anyone remember Moral Hazard? “towards a Fiscal Union” that somehow will deliver “fiscal sustainability” and “fiscal stabilisation” – or in other words, “harmonised” (high) tax rates; “finally, towards a Political Union” that will give the proceeding Unions “legitimacy” – which in the UK is known as the ‘Cart Before the Horse Strategy’. It promises to do all this by creating several new layers of bureaucracy with undoubtedly untold numbers of committees to help form new “Authorities” within Member States to help them towards “harmonised policies”. These Authorities would then form various “Boards” which would then work with the other EU institutions to achieve “convergence and further pooling of decision making on national budgets”. It also looks at “significant policy areas” such as “digital and capital markets” which as yet the EU has not stuck its beak into. The idea of a “Euro area treasury” is also floated. Buried at the back in Annex 3 (on the last page, where else) it has the almost obligatory catch-all that not withstanding the above the Commission reserves the right to ignore all the new levels of bureaucracy and Boards which represent Member States, so long as it can explain itself. To whose satisfaction it must justify its actions is unclear. What the report, and the whole Euro elite for that matter, seemed to have missed in building their harmonious ‘United States of Europe’ is that the United States of America works because traditionally there is variety between the states; if you don’t like the tax or regulatory regime in New York you can move to Texas…