RUTHFULLY YOURS

China’s military has an interesting way of greeting U.S. officials. In 2011 the People’s Liberation Army unveiled its first stealth fighter—a crude knock-off of an F-22 called the J-20—during a visit by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. This week a Chinese fighter made an “unsafe intercept” of a U.S. reconnaissance plane while John Kerry and Jack Lew were in Beijing for the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Call it the diplomacy of recklessness.

Tuesday’s midair intercept of the U.S. Air Force RC-135 over the East China Sea is the second such incident in less than a month, after two Chinese jets came within 50 feet of a U.S. Navy EP-3 flying over the South China Sea. Far from apologizing for the incidents—or denying them—the Chinese foreign ministry accused the U.S. of provoking them by flying “in China’s relevant airspace.” On both occasions the U.S. planes were flying in international airspace. CONTINUE AT SITE

With every new speech in English, Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, becomes more comfortable with the language. Yet his audience at a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on Wednesday would have been grateful for their printed copies of his address—not merely because the text would have been helpful when Mr. Modi did trip up, but also as a keepsake: The speech offered the clearest Indian promise to date of a 21st-century alliance with the U.S.

India and the U.S. have been performing a mating dance since the early days of George W. Bush’s second term. Bruised by Iraq, he found a salve of sorts in India. By the end of his presidency, Mr. Bush had concluded a nuclear deal with India that was the historic turning point in a relationship between the two countries that had hitherto been cordial at its best and bristling at its worst. (The nadir came in 1971, when Bangladesh, aided by India, broke away from Pakistan, to President Nixon’s great consternation.) The vastly improved relations with India counted as one of the few Bush foreign-policy successes beyond dispute.

President Obama had things other than India on his mind in his first term. But in his second term, Mr. Obama made up for his neglect of the land Bush had won over, courting New Delhi so ardently that U.S.-India relations will also count as that rarity in the Obama presidency, an indisputable foreign-policy achievement.

The nationalist Mr. Modi and the cosmopolitan Mr. Obama aren’t natural soul mates. Neither were the folksy Mr. Bush and the mousy Manmohan Singh, Mr. Modi’s predecessor. So the coming together of India and the U.S. isn’t the product of passing brotherly love, or chemistry that might dissipate once new leaders come along. There have been tectonic changes in the world that have caused India to rethink its foreign, defense and economic policies. Foremost among them is the irruption onto the world’s stage of China—mercantilist, bellicose, sea-grabbing and covetous of ever-greater portions of global heft. India cannot cope with China without America. CONTINUE AT SITE

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi paid his second visit to the White House in two years on June 8. President Barak Obama was greatly pleased by Modi’s stated willingness to proceed with ratification of the Paris agreement to limit greenhouse gases, and this was the theme duly emphasized in the Western media coverage of their meeting.

To Modi, however, global warming was a peripheral issue. He is a foreign-policy realist who looks upon Obama’s climate-change obsession with quiet bemusement, while pretending to share his concern in order to obtain concessions on other issues. He is far more interested in the long-term geopolitical challenges facing India from the Islamic world to her west and from the Chinese colossus to her north. Pakistan is perceived—quite rightly—as a threat and a source of chronic regional instability, and its deep state (as embodied in the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) as irredeemably jihad-friendly. China’s explosive economic growth over the past quarter-century, followed less spectacularly by India’s since the mid-1990’s, has not prompted the two Asian giants to resolve their border disputes and other feuds of long standing.

In order to meet various actual or potential threats, Modi wants to further develop and assert India’s status as a regional power; but to that end he needs closer relations with Washington on a number of fronts. His strategy vis-à-vis the United States is threefold. First of all, Modi wants to turn India into a major global manufacturing workshop—that is the theme of his Make in India campaign—and he sees the involvement of U.S.-based corporations as essential to its success. His second goal is to encourage the United States to terminate its policy of tolerating Pakistan’s duplicity in the fight against Islamic terrorism—as manifested in its schizophrenic attitude to the Taliban in Afghanistan—and to encourage the U.S. to look upon India as the only reliable and rational partner in the Subcontinent. Finally, Modi wants to diversify India’s arms supplies—most of which still come from Russia—but does not want to become (or to be seen as becoming) too close to the United States in the grand-strategic scheme of things.

All of Modi’s strategic themes and objectives broadly correspond to America’s interests in Asia. India occupies pivotal position in the Indian Ocean, the second most critical maritime highway in the world. Under Modi the Hindu nationalist, the government in Delhi may be more inclined to base its long-term strategy on the development of a community of geopolitical interests with the leading thalassocratic power in the world—the United States—than any of its predecessors since independence. America wants to contain China’s ambition to break through the bars of the First Island Chain in the Far East and Southeast Asia, while India would be loath to see Burma (“Myanmar”) provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean by road, rail and pipeline.

Since Rouhani replaced Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president, all that has changed is U.S. policy towards Iran and the administration’s willingness to lie to the American people about it.

President Barack Obama personally guaranteed the peaceful nature of both Khamenei and Rouhani, saying: “Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has said that Iran would never develop a nuclear weapon.” To date, no such fatwa has been seen by anyone. Rouhani seems to have been lying.

The Iranians also keep threatening to “walk away from the nuclear ‘deal,'” even though there is no deal to walk away from as Iran has not signed anything yet.

Within the leaders of Iran’s regime, those who fail to live up to the Supreme Leader’s expectations are impeached or killed.

Ever since Hassan Rouhani became president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Americans have been told that a fundamental change had occurred, that the latest Iranian election had been a once-in-a-lifetime event, and that Iran’s formerly adversarial regime had been transformed into a moderate one.

In Iran, however, what has changed is precisely nothing. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is as powerful and dangerous as ever. Iranian support for terrorists has increased. And Iran’s genocidal rhetoric regarding Israel (“the malignant Zionist tumor”) and America (the great Satan) has not softened.

Since Rouhani replaced Ahmadinejad, all that has changed is U.S. policy towards Iran and the administration’s willingness to lie to the American people about it.

Bret Stephens at the Wall Street Journal really, really doesn’t like Donald Trump.

In an interview with CNN’s serial plagiarist Fareed Zakaria, Stephens said it is his goal to “make sure he [Trump] is the biggest loser in presidential history” and that “[i]t’s important that Donald Trump and what he represents – this kind of ethnic quote ‘conservatism’ or populism – be so decisively rebuked that the Republican party, the Republican voters learn their lesson that they cannot nominate a man so manifestly unqualified to be president in any way, shape, or form.”

In his latest piece, Stephens attempts to convince his readers that conservatives have some form of derangement syndrome over Mexico, and that, in fact, “Americans are blessed to have Mexico as our neighbor.” Given his background, we might expect Stephens to be less than objective toward Mexico. Stephens was raised in the centerpiece of Mexican corruption itself, Mexico City, where his father was a senior executive in a chemical company.

Stephens claims that “Mexico is a functioning democracy whose voters tend to favor pro-business conservatives, not a North American version of Libya, exporting jihad and boat people to its neighbors.”

Well, I suspect that a geography lesson is in order for the WSJ’s boy wonder. Mexico has a long and largely undefended land border with the country into which its illegal emigrants want to immigrate. So why would they pile onto boats? Perhaps if the Rio Grande were the width of the Mediterranean, naval transportation would be necessary, but until that biblical flood arrives, Mexicans can just walk across the border, or have a light, refreshing swim. Let’s call the Mexican illegals “land people” instead.

As for jihad, another teachable moment is required. Mexicans aren’t Muslims, but they do export an equally threatening revolutionary philosophy called the “La Raza” movement – one that a certain judge presiding over the Trump University class action lawsuit is potentially implicated in, giving a textbook example of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

Only a direct and unequivocal US commitment can truly reassure Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that their recent grim histories of invasion, occupation and oppression will not be repeated. Obama has proven himself unequal to the task. Will the next president be any better?
Next month, my wife and leave on a trip to Europe. First, we will visit Lithuania, my wife’s home country, for two weeks to catch up with her family and old friends. This is my second visit to Lithuania, and I hope to gain further insights to the hopes and fears of the local people, ranging from 90-year-olds, who lived under both Nazi and Soviet occupation, to young adults, born after independence.

For Lithuania, along with Latvia and Estonia, geopolitical vulnerability is a permanent fact of life. Historical experience has taught harsh lessons. The enforced incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union back in 1940, notwithstanding their declared neutrality, has impelled them to choose a side.

As soon as accession to NATO was offered, they jumped at the chance to shore up their security. After all, Article 5 of this mutual defence pact reads:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

But does anybody seriously believe that either Germany or France, or for that matter, any other European country would have either the capacity or willingness to come to the aid of the Baltic States, if a resurgent Russia decided to put the treaty to the test? Consider the historical record. The Baltic states have long been expendable pawns. Remember Germany’s seizure of Klaipeda (Memel) from neutral Lithuania in March, 1939, and the secret clauses of the Ribbentrop/Molotov Pact of August, 1939, which doomed the Baltic States to Soviet occupation.

Lest we imagine that the denial of freedom and independence for the Baltic states was merely a totalitarian exercise, we read in, The President, The Pope and The Prime Minister, by Quadrant Editor John O’Sullivan, that independence for the Baltic States was very nearly thwarted, not merely by the still existent Soviet Union but also by Jacques Delors, chairman of the European Commission, Francois Mitterand of France, Helmut Kohl of Germany and the Bush Administration. Only Margaret Thatcher’s heroic intervention at the Rome summit of the European Community in October, 1990, saved the day for Baltic freedom. Remember, this was after the fall of the Berlin wall. As O’Sullivan records on pages 322-323 :

The United States was already applying pressure on the Baltic states against independence. Secretary of State James Baker had told the Lithuanians in May 1990 that they should “freeze” their declaration of independence – and the United States continued to exert such public and private pressure throughout that summer. At Rome, European Commission chairman Jacques Delors further proposed that the EC issue a declaration in favour of preserving the existing external borders of the USSR. That would have meant formal European approval for imprisoning the Baltics indefinitely, and would have damaged their morale, which was already depressed by the lack of Western support.

To the casual observer, the drama playing out on the streets of France looks to be following a well-rehearsed script. It features protests and strikes, illegal blockades and burning tires, riot police, torched cars and tear gas. You will know the final act has come when the French government, as in 1995 or 2006, eventually backs down—in this case, over a labor law that would decentralize collective bargaining and undermine France’s rigid 35-hour workweek.

The current stand-off between Paris and its hard-line unions is unusual in one crucial respect. Its protagonists are all from the left. At stake isn’t just a piece of legislation, but control of the Socialist Party and the electoral future of the French left.

At center stage are two figures: Manuel Valls, the reformist Socialist prime minister, and Philippe Martinez, the leader of General Confederation of Labor, or CGT, France’s biggest and most militant union. Both men are in their 50s, of Spanish origin and, incidentally, supporters of the FC Barcelona soccer team. But the similarities stop there.

Not a graduate of France’s elite schools, Mr. Valls has spent more time than most thinking hard about modern social democracy, well before he got his current job. He has called his party passéiste (“outdated”), once campaigned to drop the word “socialist” from its name, and entered politics to support Michel Rocard, a moderate former prime minister, for whom he later worked.

Yet Mr. Valls’s market-friendly version of progressive politics, known as the deuxième gauche (“second left”), has long struggled to impose its ideas on the mainstream left. When he ran in the Socialist presidential primary in 2011, he secured less than 6% of the vote.

Across the burning tires stands Mr. Martinez, a one-time technician at Renault and former member of the French Communist Party, who sports a Mexican moustache and a permanent scowl. He took over the CGT a year ago and so still has a reputation to forge.

Mr. Martinez has taken class warfare to the barricades with bravado and with cause. He faces declining overall membership for unions—less than 3% of French workers belong to the CGT—as well as competition for members and political clout from more moderate unions that back Mr. Valls’s labor law.

The French have a historic sympathy for defiant figures of resistance. The CGT’s red and yellow flag, its megaphone politics and the images of burning braziers on the picket line form part of a romantic, muscular iconography of postwar struggle. Yet the prime minister is betting that the union’s hard-line tactics in reality represent the death throes of a worn-out movement, rather than genuine vigor or popular expression.

It was interesting to hear Mr. Valls, who invited a small group of foreign correspondents to his office last week, treat this conflict as a test case for socialism in power. Either he holds steady and proves that his politics can carry the day, or the left is condemned to obduracy and obsolescence. CONTINUE AT SITE

ISTANBUL—A car bomb targeting a police bus in central Istanbul on Tuesday killed 11 people and injured dozens, including civilians, officials said, in the latest in a string of attacks as Turkey fights Kurdish insurgents and Islamic State militants.

The blast hit at around 8:40 a.m. in the city’s Vezneciler district, not far from Istanbul University and the tourist landmarks of the historic center.

Istanbul Governor Vasip Sahin said a bomb in a car was detonated remotely as the police bus drove by. The explosion killed seven police officers and four civilians, and at least 36 people were wounded, he said.

Ambulances and police swarmed the scene. The impact of the blast left the police vehicle toppled over on its side, laying near the charred husk of a car. Several storefronts and a dormitory at the university had their windows shattered.

There were no immediate claims of responsibility, but the state run Anadolu news agency reported that Istanbul police had detained four people for questioning. CONTINUE AT SITE

Huh? Moshe Ya’alon’s nickname is “Bogey” should be short for bogus. He was justly sacked for failing to respect the position of the party he supposedly represented. Typical of Israel’s fractious politics, this is more of a tempest in a teapot than an earthquake…”Bogey” is more a chameleon than a hawk and his poor administration of the IDF was roundly criticized by all parties…..and, most egregious, he defended a member of the IDF who compared Israelis to Nazis…..rsk

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent decision to fire his widely respected defense minister, Moshe Ya’alon, and replace him with right-wing populist firebrand Avigdor Lieberman has triggered a political earthquake in Israel. Mr. Netanyahu now may face his most serious political challenge since taking office in 2009. His move also raises fundamental questions about the governance and character of the Jewish state.

Leading figures long associated with Mr. Netanyahu’s Likud Party have criticized his decision. Benny Begin, a Likud legislator, characterized it in a TV interview in Israel as “delusional.” Moshe Arens, a former defense minister, wrote in the Haaretz newspaper that “Choosing between an excellent defense minister serving in a narrow coalition . . . and obtaining a few more coalition votes should have been easy. But Benjamin Netanyahu made the wrong choice.”

Just months ago, a Likud press release had this to say about Mr. Lieberman: “He is a man who has never led even a single soldier to battle and never had to take a single operational decision in his life. He isn’t even qualified to be a television talking head on military issues.”

Mr. Ya’alon has resigned from the Likud Party and from the Knesset. But his withdrawal from politics is only temporary. In a letter to potential supporters, he writes: “I regard this period as a ‘time-out’ after which I intend to return and run for Israel’s national leadership.”

If he does, other well-known figures, such as former Likud Interior Minister Gideon Sa’ar and former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, are likely to join him. A recent poll conducted for the Jerusalem Post found that a new party headed by Mr. Ya’alon would win as many seats in the Knesset as Mr. Netanyahu’s Likud. Parties that have been unwilling to enter the prime minister’s right-leaning government would be more inclined to join forces with Mr. Ya’alon to form a centrist coalition.

Moshe Ya’alon is no one’s idea of a dove. But his tough line is based on security, not ideology. “I’m not a supporter of ‘greater Israel,’ ” he has said. “I supported the Oslo Accords. I was willing to give up territory in return for peace. But the Palestinians are not partners for that kind of deal—at least not in the foreseeable future.” This argument suggests that Mr. Ya’alon would be open to the security-based proposals just unveiled by Commanders for Israel’s Security, a coalition of former members of the IDF, Shin Bet (the Israel Security Agency), Mossad and police forces. These proposals—including completing the West Bank security barrier, instituting strict border control along this barrier, and freezing settlement building—are designed to enhance Israel’s security while preserving the conditions for future negotiations for a two-state solution.CONTINUE AT SITE

The rift in the European Union between the older, mostly Western European, members and the newer ones from Eastern Europe has become increasingly clear lately over the refusal of most Eastern European countries to receive migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.

The European Commission has proposed reforms to EU asylum rules that would see financial penalties imposed on members refusing to take in what it deems a sufficient number of asylum seekers, amounting to $290,000 for every migrant. The penalties, if passed, are particularly aimed at the newest EU countries, such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, since these are countries who have closed their borders to migrants or are in the process of doing so.

Disagreement over how to respond to the migrant crisis in Europe, however, is not the only issue dividing the Eastern European members of the EU from Western European ones. Israel is another such contentious issue.

Several Eastern European countries, while having pasts rife with virulent anti-Semitism and atrocious records of behavior toward Jews during the Second World War, differ greatly in their policies toward Israel compared to their Western European counterparts. That does not mean that everything they do is in favor of Israel, far from it. The entire EU, including those Eastern European countries, voted in favor of the latest U.N. resolution to slander Israel, when they voted that Israel was the world’s only health violator. There must be some diplomats sitting around with very bad tastes in their mouths.

Nevertheless, Eastern European countries today represent the only part of Europe that, out of national interest or a genuine sense of solidarity, stands with Israel in one form or another. This is already saying much on a continent where, for example, Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders only recently declared that calls to boycott, divest and sanction Israel are considered by the Netherlands to be “freedom of speech” and therefore legal. (It would appear that there are some serious cognitive issues in the Dutch government: What happens when the calls actually lead to real action, such as municipalities refusing to do business with Israel or refusing to buy Israeli goods and services? Would that be legal, too, according to the foreign minister? As discussed previously in this column, a Spanish court recently declared such municipal boycotts of Israel to be in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, the same convention that Koenders invokes in his condoning of BDS as “free speech.”)