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With expanding competitors and severe domestic challenges, the time has come for Saudi Arabia to publicly engage Israel in order to confront shared opponents and protect mutual interests.
Iran and Turkey
Given its ancient history, large population, and leadership amongst the Shiite community that accounts for roughly two-thirds of Gulf-bordering states (including over 10% in Saudi Arabia), Iran sees itself as the area’s rightful leader[i]. While it has pursued nuclear capability and can potentially cutoff the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s main regional power projection is through its support of fellow Shiites[ii]. After Saddam Hussein served as the principal Arab bulwark against it, Iran has since 2003 steadily consolidated its sway over Shiite-majority Iraq and is developing through it an uninterrupted gateway to the Mediterranean. Iran’s Shiite ally Assad has emerged victorious in Syria and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah outmatches Lebanon’s army and has more political power than ever[iii]. Iranian support for Yemeni Shiites (who make up at least one-third of the population) exacerbates the impoverished country’s civil war and exposes the narrow shipping lanes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait heading into the Suez Canal[iv]. The Saudis have the world’s third-largest defense budget but have failed to thwart these Iranian inroads made with far less means at their disposal[v].
Iran has strong ties with China, Russia, and India, and Saudi Arabia cannot depend on a concerted Sunni effort against its aggression. Egypt pulled out of the so-called Arab NATO in April, its defense budget no longer ranks even within the global top fifty, and it is preoccupied with feeding, employing, and quenching the thirst of its one hundred million people – a daunting task perhaps obstructed more by domestic Sunni extremism and Ethiopia’s newly-constructed dam on the Nile than it is by Iran[vi]. Energy-starved Turkey relies on imports from Iran, the two conduct twice as much trade as Turkey does with Saudi Arabia, and they are united in subduing Kurdish ambitions[vii]. Though Jordanian King Abdullah is credited with coining the term “Shia Crescent” when warning of Iran as early as 2004, his country’s $40-billion GDP provides limited military capability[viii].
Pakistan is the second-largest Sunni state and a recipient of considerable Saudi aid but its major concern is India[ix]. With Saudi Arabia having seven-times their population and nineteen-times their landmass, the four smaller Gulf States are hesitant to coordinate militarily with it as they fear lurking Saudi domination under the guise of containing Iran[x]. The UAE stands firm against it politically but remains Iran’s second-largest trading partner, tiny Bahrain’s Sunni government supports the Saudis but has its Shiite majority to contend with, and both Oman and Kuwait maintain cordial relations with Iran[xi]. After years of dissension over Al Jazeera, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar lost its relations with Saudi Arabia in 2017 and renewed them with Iran[xii].