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FOREIGN POLICY

The Iran Deal Isn’t Worth Saving The idea of ‘decertifying’ the agreement but staying in it is too cute by half. Trump should cut cleanly. John Bolton

‘Cut, and cut cleanly,” Sen. Paul Laxalt advised Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, urging the Philippine president to resign and flee Manila because of widespread civil unrest. The Nevada Republican, Ronald Reagan’s best friend in Congress, knew what his president wanted, and he made the point with customary Western directness.

President Trump could profitably follow Mr. Laxalt’s advice today regarding Barack Obama’s 2015 deal with Iran. The ayatollahs are using Mr. Obama’s handiwork to legitimize their terrorist state, facilitate (and conceal) their continuing nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, and acquire valuable resources from gullible negotiating partners.

Mr. Trump’s real decision is whether to fulfill his campaign promise to extricate America from this strategic debacle. Last week at the United Nations General Assembly, he lacerated the deal as an “embarrassment,” “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”

Fearing the worst, however, the deal’s acolytes are actively obscuring this central issue, arguing that it is too arduous and too complex to withdraw cleanly. They have seized instead on a statutory requirement that every 90 days the president must certify, among other things, that adhering to the agreement is in America’s national-security interest. They argue the president should stay in the deal but not make the next certification, due in October.

This morganatic strategy is a poorly concealed ploy to block withdrawal, limp through Mr. Trump’s presidency, and resurrect the deal later. Paradoxically, supporters are not now asserting that the deal is beneficial. Instead, they concede its innumerable faults but argue that it can be made tougher, more verifiable and more strictly enforced. Or, if you want more, it can be extended, kicked to Congress, or deferred during the North Korea crisis. Whatever.

As Richard Nixon said during Watergate: “I want you to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up, or anything else if it’ll save it—save the plan.”

Mr. Trump should not be deceived. The issue is not certification. The issue is whether we will protect U.S. interests and shatter the illusion that Mr. Obama’s deal is achieving its stated goals, or instead timidly hope for the best while trading with the enemy, as the Europeans are doing. It is too cute by half to employ pettifoggery to evade this reality. CONTINUE AT SITE

Prepare for the Worst With North Korea By Matthew R. Costlow

Failure is an option, especially when it comes to U.S. policy towards North Korea. Decades of diplomatic efforts have failed to de-nuclearize and pacify Kim Jong Un’s regime while parallel efforts to deter small-scale conventional and large-scale cyber-attacks have also failed.

Despite these failures, however, U.S. policy-makers appear to still be enamored with the idea of getting up, dusting themselves off, and going for one more spin on the North Korean nuclear merry-go-round: provocation, emergency U.N. Security Council meeting, a new round of sanctions, failure of diplomatic talks, provocation, ad infinitum.

There are ways to break this cycle and achieve some form of success, options which the Trump administration appears to be considering.

However, while the Trump administration hopes for success in these endeavors, it should not forget to prepare for failure. Previous failures in U.S. and allied diplomacy and deterrence have led to dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in damages. Future failures could lead to the death of millions and damages measured in trillions of dollars.

Paradoxically, preparing for failure, in either diplomacy or deterrence, is the greatest way to increase the probability of success. If Kim Jong Un believes the United States can mitigate or significantly contain the consequences of a failure of diplomacy or deterrence, he may be less likely to initiate a provocation in the first place.

So what does preparing for failure look like in U.S. policy?

To begin, U.S. and allied policy-makers must examine why deterrence has failed, or nearly failed, in the past. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Cuban leaders Fidel Castro and Che Guevara both lobbied for the use of Soviet nuclear weapons against the United States to advance the cause of the “socialist camp.” The Cuban leaders were rational in their own atypical non-Western way but were willing, even eager, to die for their cause. Kim Jong Un may not be all that different. His provocations may look crazy to the Western mind, but coldly rational to him.

The difficulty of deterrence is that it does not work in the same way universally, considering the diverse set of cultural values that each foreign leader holds. Demonstrating this reality in an academic setting, researchers in comparative psychology recently showed East Asians and Westerners the same picture for a short period of time and then asked the subjects what they remembered about the picture. The two groups, who saw the exact same picture, gave very different answers, in part, due to their cultural values which compelled them to focus on some things in the picture and not others.

This same dynamic recently manifest itself on the Korean peninsula. A few weeks ago, the U.S. military made the decision to withhold U.S. bombers from bilateral exercises with the South Koreans to signal North Korea its willingness to de-escalate the situation. Days later North Korea tested its largest-yield nuclear weapon ever. In the words of General Vincent K. Brooks, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea: “Apparently the changes in the exercise did not matter.” Both sides saw the same picture but gave different answers.

In fact, there is very good evidence that North Korean leaders hold dramatically different cultural values than the United States, namely, their elevation and devout protection of their leader’s “honor.” U.S. leaders regularly accept offenses to their honor as the price of politics. However, East Asian cultures in general, and North Korea, in particular, hold honor in much higher regard and are willing to go to greater lengths to defend it. This has major implications for the failure of deterrence and diplomacy.

Yes, the U.S. Navy Can Shoot Down North Korean ICBMs Its Aegis ballistic-missile defense system is already capable and can be more so with certain upgrades. By Henry F. Cooper

North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and its means to deliver them, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach America. We clearly need the best ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems possible.

Even with this urgent need, some think we still have time, because they think that North Korea still must develop greater accuracy and the means to reenter the atmosphere before it can threaten us.

In the Wall Street Journal, I recently observed that North Korea could detonate nuclear weapons above the atmosphere to produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and shut down the electric power grid indefinitely. Following such a burst over America, millions could die from starvation, disease, and societal collapse.

Guess what? North Korea recently highlighted its interest in a high-altitude “super powerful EMP attack” as a “strategic goal.” As in 2012 and 2016, it could launch a satellite to approach us from our mostly undefended south, this time with a nuke on board.

We need to enhance our limited ground-based BMD system in Alaska and California. Aegis BMD ships deployed around the world can augment that homeland-defense capability. But a false narrative is being spread in numerous articles: that these ships cannot shoot down ICBMs, except possibly in their terminal phase as they approach their targets.

That myth is a legacy of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which made it illegal to defend the American people against ballistic missiles. The United States bet on the doctrine of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD, which promised that we would destroy the Soviet Union if it attacked us.

It was my privilege to serve as President Ronald Reagan’s chief defense and space negotiator, defending his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) while learning all about the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” as the Soviets and the U.S. liberal elite described it. Then as President George H. W. Bush’s SDI director, I advocated a “global protection against limited strikes” mission, including a new role for theater-missile-defense (TMD) systems to protect our overseas troops, friends, and allies.

The ABM Treaty permitted TMD systems. So I advised Admiral Frank Kelso, the chief of Naval operations, to ensure that Aegis BMD efforts were limited to building a TMD capability; otherwise, MAD acolytes, who were committed to the ABM Treaty, would kill it in the cradle.

Fortunately, that strategy to secure the political viability of Aegis BMD worked — but perhaps too well. Many mistakenly think that Aegis BMD can do no more than provide TMD capability. Even after President George W. Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, little was done to make Aegis BMD all that we thought it could be in the early 1990s.

Nonetheless, in early 2008, when a threatening satellite was shortly to reenter Earth’s atmosphere, President Bush chose Aegis BMD to shoot it down before its toxic fuel could threaten folks on the ground. In a heroic concerted effort, dubbed the “Burnt Frost” mission, the Navy succeeded in destroying the satellite, an uncooperative target traveling faster than an ICBM.

Trump Should Buck the Consensus on the Kurds The administration shouldn’t be bullied into betraying them. By Jonathan S. Tobin

We all know President Donald Trump isn’t a fan of the foreign-policy establishment, either in Washington or at the United Nations. To the contrary, he delights in confounding the experts and defying the international consensus on a variety of issues. Yet on one key matter, Trump seems to be adhering to the conventional wisdom. When it comes to independence for Kurdistan, Trump has been listening to the so-called wise men both inside and outside the government and has been clear that his administration opposes the referendum held there yesterday.

But in this case he should buck the consensus. He ought to signal that the United States will not go along with efforts to suppress the Kurds’ bid for freedom. Doing so would be not only the right thing to do for America’s sole reliable ally in the fight against ISIS, but also good strategy. Giving the Kurds a leg up toward their goal would provide Trump with something he has been looking for: leverage against Iran.

Trump put the world on notice last week, in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, that he was not prepared to follow the lead of America’s European allies on Iran. He made a strong case that the nuclear deal his predecessor struck with Tehran had been ineffective in achieving its goal of ending the threat of an Iranian weapon. Just as important, he pointed out that the pact had both enriched and emboldened Iran.

There is good reason to believe that the Iranians are already pushing the envelope on compliance with the agreement, which legitimized their nuclear program — and whose provisions will start to sunset within a decade, essentially allowing Iran to build a weapon with international approval. The deal also has encouraged Iran’s leaders to believe that the country’s illegal missile tests, continued status as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism (a designation that Obama’s State Department reaffirmed after the deal went into effect), and successful military adventure in Syria will go unchallenged by the West. With the help of the Russians, the Iranians have enabled the barbarous Assad regime to prevail in Syria’s civil war. That has given them what is, in effect, a land bridge to the Mediterranean stretching from an Iraq run by their Shiite allies to Lebanon, where their Hezbollah auxiliaries dominate.

Trump has struggled in vain to balance his desire to finish the campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq with his recognition of the danger that a triumphant Iran poses to the West and to Sunni Arab states eager to cooperate with the U.S. This question has exposed a terrible contradiction in his foreign policy: His desire to restrain Iran has collided with his hopes for better relations with Russia, which acts as Tehran’s ally in Syria.

Unfortunately, his urge to finish off ISIS has blinded him to the rights of the group that has done more than any other in the region to carry on that fight: the Kurds. While the Assad-Iran-Russia coalition in Syria has paid lip service to the war on ISIS, it has largely ignored the Islamic State in practice, concentrating instead on eliminating Assad’s other domestic foes. The Kurdish Peshmerga, the military force raised by Iraqi Kurdistan, has been the only reliable land force in the campaign against ISIS. Without the Kurds, U.S. efforts to rout ISIS would have continued to fail. And yet the same Western governments that have cheered the Kurds’ efforts are unprepared to countenance their desire for a state of their own.

Trump Should Reject Fatally Flawed International Institutions Why the U.S. needs to opt out. Bruce Thornton

Donald Trump campaigned and was elected as an agent of radical change. He promised to roll back the policies on big government at home and transnational cooperation abroad that both parties have endorsed for years. His campaign rhetoric about the “useless UN” and the “unfair” Paris Climate Accords suggested he understood that such organizations and treaties fleece Americans while handing over national sovereignty to other countries eager to gain leverage over us.

But Trump’s recent comments about renegotiating the Paris agreement and reforming the UN imply an acceptance of the assumptions on which both are built: that multilateral cooperation is better able to serve the interests and security of the United States. If this is so, then Trump is buying into the flaws of those assumptions that need to be utterly discredited in order to enact meaningful change.

Trump’s rejection of the Paris Climate agreement was correct not just because it is a bad deal for our economy. Nor is withdrawal called for because, like previous meetings–– in Berlin, Geneva, Kyoto, Buenos Aires, Bonn, The Hague, Marrakech, New Delhi, Milan, Montreal, Nairobi, Bali, Poznan, Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, Doha, Warsaw, Lima, and now Paris––the results of these international gabfests have done nothing to reduce CO2 and mitigate the alleged apocalyptic consequences of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. But they’ve done plenty to enrich some countries at the expense of others, while profiting the “green energy” industries and hustlers like Al Gore.

So even if one believes in anthropogenic global warming, the Paris accord is a bad deal. The US would commit to a 30% reduction in carbon emissions, at the cost of an overall average of 400,000 fewer jobs, 200,000 fewer manufacturing jobs, a $20,000 loss in income for a family of four, an aggregate GDP loss of over $2.5 trillion, and increases in household electricity spending between 13% and 20%. And for what would the average American pay? According to the Heritage Foundation,

Using the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change developed by researchers at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, even if all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States were effectively eliminated, there would be less than two-tenths of a degree Celsius reduction in global temperatures. In fact, the entire industrialized world could cut carbon emissions down to zero, and the climate impact would still be less than four-tenths of a degree Celsius in terms of averted warming by the year 2100.

Worse yet, history teaches us that such an agreement is made to be broken, or sacrificed to national interests, or manipulated to benefit cronyism and rent-seeking. So while the US has reduced emissions by 12.2% since their peak in 2007, and 2.5% between 2014 and 2015, the EU, despite spending $1.2 trillion supporting green energy, saw an almost one percent increase in emissions over that same period. Nor have the US reductions been caused by government policies and regulations. The development of hydraulic fracturing extraction techniques––banned in the EU and hindered by Obama’s environmental policies–– has increased the amount of cleaner natural gas available to replace coal as an energy source.

Thus the US––in the teeth of Democrat-supporting environmental and green energy lobbies, and Obama’s multiple regulations targeting energy production–– has seen the market more effectively reduce emissions; while the EU has regulated and subsidized into existence electricity costs that are 2.5 times more expensive than in America. At the same time, an economic and geopolitical rival like China, responsible for 28% of total emissions in 2015, will continue to increase its emissions until 2030, when it promises to start reducing them.

Deterrence Games With Kim Jong Un – He’s got us where he wants us, and the one thing we can do about it Congress won’t pay for. by Jed Babbin

After its nineteenth missile test of the year (so far), the last being a second shot over Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido, and its sixth nuclear weapon test detonation, North Korea is claiming to be near completion of its nuclear forces. The last nuclear test, the North Koreans claim, was of a hydrogen bomb which may be within their capability to manufacture.https://spectator.org/deterrence-games-with-kim-jong-un/

America’s responses have, so far, ranged from harsh words and a new round of ineffective UN economic sanctions to a new nickname — “Rocket Man” — that President Trump hung on Kim Jong Un on Saturday while speaking with South Korean President Moon Jae-In. We were informed by the president, as usual, on Twitter.

Angry words aimed at Kim’s regime aren’t enough to assuage our allies’ fears. Twice this year, senior Japanese officials have sought and received assurances from people such as Defense Secretary James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that Japan is under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” i.e., that we would defend Japan, if necessary with nuclear weapons, were it attacked by North Korea.

A delegation of South Korean politicians visited Washington last week to lobby for the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to their nation. They weren’t successful because President Moon (who wasn’t part of the delegation) is opposed to the idea.

As reported by Fox News on Saturday, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is quoted in state-run media saying that North Korea is going “full speed and straight” to the goal of “completing its nuclear force” and is “nearly” there. In the FNC report Kim goes on to say that his regime’s aim is to “establish the equilibrium of real force with the U.S.” so the U.S. would “dare not talk about the military option.”

It’s a bad idea to take dictators at their word, but it’s equally bad — and usually worse — to try to psychoanalyze them to figure out what they mean. Kim’s actions are vastly more important. In their context, his comments about establishing an “equilibrium of real force” so that we wouldn’t dare attempt the “military option” are somewhat revealing.

Kim is trying to establish a deterrent force sufficient in range and lethality to prevent us from doing several things. One, as his words indicate, is to kill him and however many of the members of his regime necessary to precipitate regime change. He also wants to continue to threaten the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with his increasingly capable nuclear arsenal. From his standpoint, Kim is succeeding far more than he may have expected to.

Turning the Screws on North Korea New sanctions and a turn by China may finally isolate the Kim regime.

American officials have been wrong for years predicting breakthroughs in the North Korea nuclear crisis, but this week could prove to be different. The combination of Kim Jong Un’s growing belligerence, new U.S. financial sanctions, and a Chinese turn on North Korea trade might be a turning point that finally isolates the Kim regime.

The new U.S. sanctions that President Trump announced Thursday will finally cut off the regime from the U.S. dollar, the currency it has continued to rely on for trade. Any institution that does business with Pyongyang will lose access to the U.S. financial system. Meanwhile, Chinese regulators told China’s banks on Monday to stop handling North Korea trade, and many of them had already frozen North Korean accounts.

These mark a significant ramp up in pressure on the North. Americans might think that such sanctions were already in place since the regime first tested a nuclear weapon 11 years ago. Barack Obama once called North Korea “the most heavily sanctioned, the most cut-off nation on Earth.” And the U.S. foreign policy establishment, right and left, has claimed that sanctions were tried and failed to change Pyongyang’s behavior.

Yet until last year United Nations and U.S. sanctions on North Korea were far less stringent than those imposed on Iran before 2015. Only in March 2016 did the U.N. begin to restrict the country’s commercial trade, and only in November did the U.S. sever North Korean banks from its financial system. This June the U.S. finally blacklisted a Chinese bank along with companies and individuals that helped the North obtain forbidden materials for its nuclear and missile programs.

Those were important steps, but on Thursday the gloves really came off. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin told a press briefing, “Foreign financial institutions are now on notice that, going forward, they can choose to do business with the United States or with North Korea, but not both.” The punishments to be meted out are similar to those reserved for financiers of terrorism under the Patriot Act. One Administration official claimed that Thursday’s executive order goes further than sanctions on any other country.

So far the U.S. has declined to sanction large Chinese banks, so will it do that now? It may not have to. Since the U.S. fired its warning shot by sanctioning the Bank of Dandong in June, Chinese banks have frozen or closed North Korean accounts. That has reduced trade flows across the Chinese border by 75%, according to a Kyodo report. Fuel prices began to rise in Pyongyang even before new United Nations sanctions this month capped trade in petroleum.

Trump’s Big North Korea Decision By Lawrence J. Haas

President Donald Trump’s dismissive comments about the new United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea, contrasting sharply with the boasts of his State Department, reflect the harsh reality that a sanctions-driven approach to reversing Pyongyang’s nuclear progress seems increasingly problematic.

That means that Washington is nearing a sobering decision: whether to “contain” a nuclear-armed North Korea or take military action to cripple its nuclear capacity – with all the conflict, bloodshed and chaos that military action could trigger on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

The Security Council’s unanimous Sept. 11 vote for more sanctions was “just another small step, not a big deal,” Trump said the next day, adding that he doesn’t know whether it will have “any impact.” His comments came as State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert called the Security Council’s vote “significant” because it triggers “the strongest set” of U.N. sanctions ever imposed on Pyongyang.

Notwithstanding State Department bullishness, Trump has the better argument for two reasons: First, Washington was forced to water down its sanctions proposal to secure Chinese and Russian support and, second, Beijing and Moscow continue to facilitate Pyongyang’s success in evading sanctions to begin with.

Assistant Treasury Secretary Marshall S. Billingslea told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week that the new sanctions will cut off “over 55 percent of refined petroleum products” to North Korea, ban “all joint ventures” with that nation, and restrict Pyongyang’s ability to secure revenue from overseas workers.

Fine. But Washington had sought a much stronger set of sanctions that would have included a total oil embargo. To secure Chinese and Russian backing, however, it settled for a cap on oil imports.

Trump’s Successful U.N. Speech It had both striking rhetoric and a sound argument. By Elliott Abrams

In his speech to the United Nations, President Trump very successfully met the political and intellectual challenge he faced. He reminded the delegates that the United Nations was never meant to be a gigantic bureaucracy that would steadily become a world government. Rather, he said, it is an association of sovereign states whose strength depends “on the independent strength of its members.” Its success, he argued, depends on their success at governing well as “strong, sovereign, and independent nations.”

Trump cleverly turned patriotism — love of one’s own country, and what he called the necessary basis for sacrifice and “all that is best in the human spirit” — into the basis for international cooperation to solve problems that nations must face together. “The true question,” he said, is “are we still patriots?” If we are, we can work together for “a future of dignity and peace for the people of this wonderful Earth.” This was a useful, principled, and accurate reminder that the nation-state (a term he used) remains the key to world politics, and that successful nation-states will be the key to addressing the world’s challenges.

The speech added to this line of thinking several Trumpian touches that must be applauded — and others that served at least to wake up his audience. He said, for example, that “the problem in Venezuela is not that socialism has been poorly implemented, but that socialism has been faithfully implemented.” That has to count as one of the nicest lines ever delivered in that General Assembly chamber. He noted that “major portions of the world are in conflict, and some in fact are going to hell.” One assumes he added the latter phrase to the written text — and it was pure Trump. He carefully distinguished between the vicious and corrupt regime in Iran, “whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos,” and “the good people of Iran,” adding that “Iran’s people are what their leaders fear the most” after only “the vast military power of the United States.” On North Korea, he delivered the line that may be the most quoted: He said of Kim Jong-un that “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission” and told the delegates that if Kim attacks the United States, “we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”

What did Trump not talk about? The Israeli–Palestinian conflict. At times that problem was the central item in President Obama’s speeches to the U.N., so its absence in Trump’s first address to the General Assembly was very striking. He wants to get a deal done, as he reiterated when meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, but he realizes that the conflict is not central to world politics or even to stability and peace in the Middle East. So it had no place in this text.

Trump’s criticism of the United Nations was clear, hitting everything from the hypocrisy of allowing tyrannical regimes to serve as members of the Human Rights Council to its bloated bureaucracy, but every criticism was combined with a call for improvement and a pledge of cooperation. He held out the picture of a better U.N. able to confront and solve many of the world’s problems.

Why Trump’s UN Speech Was a Triumph By Roger Kimball

Donald Trump on Tuesday confirmed yet again why he is the most robust president since Ronald Reagan. Following up on his brilliant speeches before a joint session of Congress in February, his speech about combating Islamic terrorism before Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia, and his splendid defense of Western civilizational values in Warsaw a few months ago, Trump addressed the United Nations and articulated for the 150 delegates at that ostentatiously corrupt institution the signal lesson of successful international relations: that freedom within nations, and comity among them, is best served not by the effacement or attenuation of national sovereignty but its frank and manly embrace.https://amgreatness.com/2017/09/19/trumps-un-speech-triumph/

“Sovereignty,” indeed, was the master word of Trump’s address. The word and its cognates occur 21 times in the 4,300-word talk, centrally in conjunction with the core Trumpian ideal of “principled realism.”

“We are guided,” Trump explained, “by outcomes, not ideology. We have a policy of principled realism, rooted in shared goals, interests, and values.”

The United Nations has in recent decades become a poster child for bureaucratic despond: corrupt, wasteful, and inefficient. It has also evolved into a megaphone for anti-American, left-wing sentiment, often hiding behind utopian world-government rhetoric.

This development, Trump reminded his listeners, is a blunt betrayal of the noble aspirations that formed the United Nations in the aftermath of World War II. Trump quoted Harry Truman, who stressed that the success of the United Nations depended on the “independent strength of its members.” The United Nations was not created to subvert national sovereignty but to help guarantee it.

One of the most refreshing things about Trump’s address—it is characteristic of his speeches—was his frankness. At the U.N., this had a positive as well as a critical side. On the positive side, I found it a breath of fresh air to hear an American president celebrate the achievements of America.

“The United States of America,” Trump said, “has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world, and the greatest defenders of sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.” This is the simple truth, but I do not recall hearing such sentiments from the White House in recent years.

On the critical side, Trump was equally forthright. He affirmed his intention to battle threats to sovereignty from “the Ukraine to the South China Sea.” He roundly castigated the handful of “depraved” rogue regimes that not only terrorize their own people but threaten world peace. They violate, he noted, every principle upon which the U.N. was founded. In one the speech’s two most memorable moments, he called out the deplorable regime of Kim Jong-un in North Korea. The patience of the United States, Trump noted, is great, but it is not infinite.

If North Korea persists in its policy of nuclear blackmail, Trump explained, the United States “will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” He continued: “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.” I could almost hear tongues clucking at the New York Times and the Washington Post, as much for the contemptuous nickname as for the threat of military force. But I liked it, just as I liked his robust calling-a-spade-a-spade moment with respect to the criminal regime of Iran, one of the world’s most ostentatious enablers of terrorism.

But Trump’s comments about North Korea and Iran were not only a declaration of resolve. They were also a challenge to the United Nations, the forum in which rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea ought to be brought to heel. The United States would step up to the plate by itself if necessary. But, Trump said, it would be better if the United Nations address the outliers. “If the righteous many do not confront the wicked few,” Trump said in another memorable line, “then evil will triumph.”