https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/israel-zionism/2025/01/whats-wrong-with-the-postmodern-military/
The October 7 attack from Gaza was not supposed to have been possible. Israelis were continuously assured by the security establishment and political leaders that Hamas was “deterred,” that Israel has an ample, sophisticated defense mechanism, and that its intelligence capabilities were second to none. And so, Israelis had to endure two shocks on that Simchat Torah morning: the large-scale surprise attack itself, which the IDF failed to avert, and the barbaric atrocities committed by Hamas terrorists and Gazan civilians.
Then came a third shock, which might surprise those who rely on English-language news from Israel’s advocates abroad, its political leaders, or the IDF’s own spokespeople: the Israeli high command required weeks to formulate plans and prepare for an operation in Gaza. Even worse, within weeks of the ground operation’s commencement, it became evident that the initial strategy was flawed, poorly planned, and exposed a staggering number of failures in preparation, training, force buildup, equipment, munitions, and execution. Although Israeli society has sprung into action to help deal with logistical problems, it became clear that the IDF was in a dire condition. To this day, a year and three months after the attack, despite numerous tactical successes and an enormous national investment in the war, both Hamas and Hizballah have managed to avoid total defeat, and despite the accomplishments of Israel’s soldiers the IDF has failed to secure total victory.
It goes without saying that Israel has an exceptional national army. Its soldiers’ fighting spirit is second to none, their bravery and commitment are likely unparalleled in the West today. But tactics and bravery alone are not enough. The strategic capabilities of the high command are essential to give shape and direction to successful military campaigns. Therefore, my aim in this essay is to examine what I believe to be the most critical aspect of the reality revealed on and after October 7: the military doctrines and national-security mindset that have led to the decades-long deterioration of the IDF’s capabilities.
To do so, I will briefly turn to the U.S. and outline two successive transformations in Western military thinking. Admittedly, this depiction will be painted in very broad strokes, but despite exceptions and counterexamples, the trend it highlights—the marginalization of classical military and operational art—is very real and increasingly troubling. I will then shift focus to Israel to examine how it has navigated these two transformative waves of strategic thinking.
How the Cold War Upended Military Thought
From the beginning of recorded history until the Second World War, national-security doctrines relied on the operational capabilities of a strong, well-trained fighting force led by a professional high command. Generals were entrusted with the responsibility of winning wars, and warfare was regarded as a specialized art and vocation. Those who excelled in defeating enemy forces rose through the ranks to become military leaders.
Military professionalism was cultivated through two key endeavors. The first was experience, gained in active combat during wartime and through rigorous training during peacetime. The second was military studies. Most great strategists were ardent students of war. They identified something constant in war, an essence that transcended time, which helped would-be generals sharpen their intellectual and vocational abilities, adopt new technologies, develop new tactics and strategies, and adapt to changing threats. Thus, military history and theory were regarded as fundamental pillars of their expertise.
