While the world is focused on the horrendous terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic State group and on the international campaign being waged against the organization in Iraq and Syria, the IDF is maintaining two intensive sectors opposite the group, in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
The majority of operations in both sectors is clandestine and is held as part of the IDF’s doctrine of the “campaign between the wars,” a title that encompasses a host of covert and low-intensity military and intelligence efforts to prevent enemy states and terrorist organizations from becoming stronger and thwart their offensive activity. Arab media reports about drone strikes in Sinai or the elimination of terrorist operatives on the Golan Heights usually receive only a casual mention, if that, in the Israeli and international media. The reason for that is simple: Barring a terrorist attack, there’s only minor media interest.
Keeping things on the down low involves intensive operational and intelligence activity seeking to ensure that Israel does not find itself in Islamic State’s crosshairs. The reason that the IDF has, until now, preferred to spare the public the details of its operations in these two sectors is two-pronged: the natural clandestine nature of things and the desire to keep a low profile vis-a-vis ISIS.
While the balance of power in the two sectors is clear to all, Israel has no interest in seeing ISIS operatives in Sinai or the Golan Heights train their sights on its territory. The fact that Wilayat Sinai, Islamic State’s proxy in the south, and the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, an ISIS-affiliate group based in the Syrian Golan Heights, are engaged in internal wars rather than fighting us, is very convenient for Israel.
This week, the IDF gave Israel Hayom an exclusive glimpse into the intensive, nightly counterterrorism operation against ISIS on the northern border, which aims to foil threats and ensure that the civil war raging in Syria and the parallel battles taking place in Sinai do not spill over into Israel.
No-man’s-land no more
The security fence in the southern part of the Golan Heights does not overlap with the border. For operational and topographical reasons, the IDF chose to place it in dominant areas across the ridgeline rather than adhering to the border itself. As a result, small “no-man’s-land” enclaves were formed between the border and the security fence. These enclaves — stretching up to 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) deep in some areas and merely dozens of meters in others — are separated from Israel by the security fence, but nothing separates them from enemy territory.
In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah used one of those enclaves, which the IDF refrains from operating in so not to risk breaching Lebanese territory, to abduct IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, triggering the Second Lebanon War. As part of the war’s lessons, the IDF decided to no longer leave the enclaves be, and then-GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizenkot ordered intensive activity in all of them, up to the very last inch.
The rationale was political — preserving Israel’s sovereignty over the entire territory; operational — removing the threat; and also psychological — shifting the balance of power back in the IDF’s favor by again positioning it as the party taking operational initiative.