“Yes, our democracy suffers from excessive secrecy. But given how parlous the world has become, and how many of our most precious secrets are now publicly available for our enemies to ponder and act upon, it is possible that excessive openness is an even greater problem.”….
The U.S. government is the most open in the history of the world—but it still keeps far too many things secret.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a democratic society to find exactly the right equilibrium between protecting national security and fostering openness. There will be problems no matter how the balance is struck. In “Democracy in the Dark,” Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., chief counsel of the Brennan Center at NYU Law School, argues that we have arrived at a point of ominous disequilibrium—that America has a secrecy problem.
Mr. Schwarz has no difficulty showing that secrecy has long been abused by our government to cover up embarrassment and wrongdoing. He explores J. Edgar Hoover’s depredations at the FBI, Richard Nixon’s antics during Watergate and the many intelligence abuses uncovered by the Church Committee (for which Mr. Schwarz served as chief counsel) in 1975 and 1976. Routine information, he notes, is too often classified as “secret” although it would convey little of value to our adversaries and yet a great deal of value to the American public.
Some government secrets are “worthy of protection,” Mr. Schwarz acknowledges, even if others are not. His project is to outline “possible guidelines with which we can distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate secrets.” He draws from various episodes across American history to make his argument.
One such episode is President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima even after officials learned how devastating the bomb’s effects would be. Secrecy in this instance, Mr. Schwarz maintains, was a bad thing: It allowed officials “to avoid outside pressure to revisit their decision, challenge their preconceptions, or take account of changing facts.” As a result, they went in the wrong direction and annihilated a densely populated city. The United States, Mr. Schwarz argues, “would have been on higher moral ground if it had started with a predominantly military target, coupled with a demand for prompt surrender, and only escalated if the demand were not accepted.” Thanks to secrecy, however, there was remarkably little “analysis, give and take, discussion or debate” about a step of enormous consequence.