Testing, testing, testing
The horror of 298 innocents, oblivious to the warfare 33,000 feet below them, blown out of the sky by criminally negligent fanatics supported by Russian Vladimir Putin, forebodes greater catastrophes.
The incident is a part of a worldwide scene wherein Pres. Barack Hussein Obamas strategy of withdrawal from what he — and a large part of the apolitical war-weary American people sees as overreaching worldwide projection of U.S. power.
But Obamas clumsy retreat has led to a continuing welter of probes by opponents and even allies — of Pax Americana. Whatever the merit of arguments about a declining U.S., its power and influence on the rest of the contemporary world remains enormous. Obamas withdrawal creates an international and regional power vacuum, setting up the kind of ambiguities that throughout history has led to misperceptions, and, often, major wars.
The classic example, often cited if by simplistic interpretation of a very complex episode, is Dean Achesons speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. In what was considered a seminal statement, the secretary of state did not include the KoreanPeninsula in a statement of the all-important United States “defense perimeter”. Its omission was widely interpreted as a signal that Washington would not defend South Korea, a product of the division of the Peninsular at the 38th parallel at the end of a 50-year-Japanese Occupation on Tokyos World War II surrender.
With concentration on the postwar Soviet takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, the U.S. had absent-mindedly occupied the Peninsular with only a vague understanding of its potential threat to highly industrialized if decimated Japan. Into that vacuum, the Soviet Unions Josef Stalin, riding the full thrust of the developing Cold War, instigated his puppets, the well disciplined army led by Kim Il Sung, a former Soviet officer, to attack the South with the intention of reunifying the country as another Moscow satellite. The U.S. responded, if lamely in the beginning, but in force, and initially was victorious in threatening a complete reversal of the two superpowers goals.
But Mao Tse-tung, frightened by the prospect of a reunited Korea, an American ally on Communist Chinas most important northeastern land frontier, hurled tens of thousands of former surrendered Nationalist troops as cannon fodder into the combat. Pres. Harry Truman, engaged on other European and Middle Eastern fronts, denied Gen. Douglas Macarthur his all-out strategy for a military victory even were it to bring on possible direct and perhaps nuclear conflict with Beijing, and the war ended in stalemate. The Forgotten War cost five million lives including almost 40,000 U.S. soldiers — devastated the Peninsular, and left a festering international problem.
Today, looking around the world, there are too many places where just such complex unsolved geopolitical nodules present the same sort of potential.