Barack Obama’s chickens are coming home to roost in Asia. During his ongoing trip to America’s most important allies in the region, he has been buffeted by ill-concealed anxieties at every stop that, these days, it is better to be an enemy of the United States than its friend.
That is a formula for having more enemies, and fewer friends.
According to the Wall Street Journal, in the run-up to Mr. Obama’s visit to the Western Pacific, U.S. military planners were busy drawing up “muscular” contingency plans in the event Communist China or North Korea engage in further “provocations.”
Of course, what is worrying our allies is not simply the prospect of more provocations. It’s the steadily growing capacity of such hostile powers to act on their stated intentions to threaten America’s friends, their sovereign territories and vital interests.
The examples of U.S. responses the Journal says are under consideration involve various, mostly symbolic gestures. These include B-2 flights in the region, more port calls by naval forces and intensified exercises with allied forces. Among the other options that have, evidently, not yet been approved by the Commander-in-Chief are intensified surveillance near China and the transiting of carrier battle groups through the Strait of Taiwan.
Welcome as such gestures would be to nations in the Western Pacific who have been promised an American “pivot” to the region, but seen little evidence of it, they still fall far short of what is required to deter the increasing ability of China and its proxy, North Korea, to exercise hegemony over their neighbors. Even the laudable conclusion of an agreement with the Philippines (just in time for President Obama’s visit to the country) will allow renewed use of bases there by U.S. forces, but not a permanent presence.
Which brings us to the heart of the matter. Unless and until the Obama administration reverses course on the wrecking operation it has conducted against the American military over the past five years, the United States will be hard pressed to present a serious deterrent to Chinese aggression, both in its own right and via its North Korean cut-out.
Absent the wherewithal and resolve to maintain in-theater the sort of power-projection assets that would constitute a serious impediment in the future to the sorts of things Beijing and Pyongyang have engaged in of late – including declarations of sovereignty, seizures of territory, threatening actions at sea and ballistic missile tests – we must expect more of the same. And worse.