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ISRAEL PALESTINE AND THE SAMSON OPTION

Posted By Ruth King on November 1st, 2009

ISRAEL, “PALESTINE,” AND THE SAMSON OPTION
1 November 2009

lberes@purdue.edu

“For By Wise Counsel, Thou Shalt Make Thy War”

Proverbs 24, 6

Still following his “Road Map,” President Barack Obama now seeks to create a twenty-third Arab state. Known, of course, as “Palestine,” this state would be carved from the living body of Israel, and would become an immediate and open enemy of the United States. In the end, the birth of Palestine could even enlarge regional and worldwide risks of both nuclear war and nuclear terrorism.

What should be Israel’s operational and doctrinal response to the U.S. supported Palestinian state? In part, Israel will need to clarify and possibly codify significant elements of its still-ambiguous nuclear strategy. One such element concerns the “Samson Option.”

At first glance, a Palestinian state would have no direct bearing on Israel’s nuclear posture. Yet, although non-nuclear itself, Palestine could still seriously impair Israel’s capacity to wage certain essential forms of conventional war. This, in turn, could heighten the Jewish State’s incentive to rely on unconventional weapons in perilous circumstances.

Confronting a new Arab state that could act collaboratively with other already-existing Arab states, Israel would feel itself compelled to bring elements of its long-secret nuclear strategy (the “bomb in the basement”) out into the light of day. Palestine, whether or not it would actively seek collaboration, could also be used militarily against Israel by other regional enemies.

Israel’s nuclear strategy, however ambiguous, is oriented toward deterrence. The “Samson Option” refers to a presumed policy that is based upon an implicit threat of massive nuclear retaliation for specific enemy aggressions. This policy could be invoked credibly only where such aggressions would threaten Israel’s national existence.

The main point of the Samson Option would not be to communicate the availability of a graduated Israeli nuclear deterrent. Rather, it would intend to signal the unstated promise of a counter city (“counter value” in military parlance) reprisal. The Samson Option is therefore unlikely to deter any aggressions short of nuclear and/or certain biological first strike attacks upon the Jewish State.

Samson would say this to all potential attackers: “We (Israel) may have to “die,” but (this time) we won’t die alone.” The Samson Option could serve Israel better as an adjunct to deterrence and certain preemption options than as a core nuclear strategy. The Samson Option should never be confused with Israel’s main security objective, which is to seek deterrence at much lower levels of possible conflict.

To strengthen Israeli nuclear deterrence, visible preparations for a Samson Option could help to convince enemy states that aggression would not be gainful. This is especially true if Israeli Samson preparations were coupled with some level of nuclear disclosure (i.e., ending Israel’s posture of nuclear ambiguity); if Israel’s Samson weapons appeared sufficiently invulnerable to enemy first strikes; and if these weapons were plainly “counter value” in mission function.

Samson could also support Israeli nuclear deterrence by demonstrating an Israeli willingness to take existential risks. Earlier, Moshe Dayan had understood this: “Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.”

In our topsy-turvy and often counter-intuitive nuclear world, it can sometimes be rational to pretend irrationality. The precise nuclear deterrence benefits of pretended irrationality would depend in part upon prior enemy state awareness of Israel’s counter value targeting posture. The Project Daniel Group, in its then-confidential report to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, recommended exactly such a posture more than six years ago.

To strengthen essential strategies of preemption, preparations for a Samson Option could convince Israel’s own leadership that defensive first strikes would be cost-effective. These leaders would expect that any Israeli preemptive strikes, known under international law as “anticipatory self-defense,” could be launched with reduced expectations of unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This expectation would depend upon previous Israeli decisions on nuclear disclosure; on Israeli perceptions of the effects of such disclosure on enemy retaliatory intentions; on Israeli judgments about enemy perceptions of Samson weapons vulnerability; and on presumed enemy awareness of Samson’s counter value force posture.

As with Samson enhancements of Israeli nuclear deterrence, last-resort nuclear preparations could enhance Israel’s preemption options by displaying a bold national willingness to take existential risks.

But pretended irrationality can be a double-edged sword. Brandished too “irrationally,” Israeli preparations for a Samson Option could possibly encourage enemy preemptions.

Left to themselves, neither deterred nor preempted, certain Arab/Islamic enemies of Israel, especially after the creation of a Palestinian state, could bring the Jewish State face-to-face with the palpable torments of Dante’s Inferno, “Into the eternal darkness, into fire, into ice.” Israeli strategic planners and political leaders, therefore, must now begin to acknowledge an obligation to dramatically strengthen their country’s nuclear security posture, and to ensure that any failure of nuclear deterrence will not then spark nuclear war or nuclear terror.

One way to meet this vital obligation, especially after President Obama’s continuing support for Palestine, would be to focus more productively on the Samson Option. Indeed, to ignore or reject this option altogether could ultimately imperil not only Israel, but also the United States.

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LOUIS RENÉ BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and articles dealing with Israeli security matters. He was Chair of Project Daniel, and recently published “Facing Iran’s Ongoing Nuclearization: A Retrospective on Project Daniel,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 22, No. 3., Fall 2009, pp. 491-514.

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