THE PHONY “COST CONTROL” BILL OF GOODS
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The ‘Cost Control’ Bill of Goods
How Peter Orszag and the White House sold a health-care illusion.ObamaCare’s core promise—better quality care for everyone at lower costs—is being exposed as an illusion as it degenerates into the raw exercise of political power. Naturally, the White House and its media booster club are working furiously to prop up this fiasco, especially on cost control.
As Obama budget director Peter Orszag put it at a revealing media breakfast earlier this month, the Senate bill does everything the experts recommend to “get at the underlying drivers of health-care costs.” While he admitted that “we don’t know enough” to produce results right away, the key is to encourage “continuous improvement” through pilot programs and demonstration projects. Cost containment will actually take “years to decades,” Mr. Orszag conceded.
The torch was then passed to Ron Brownstein of the Atlantic Monthly, David Leonhardt of the New York Times and editorial writers for the New England Journal of Medicine, among others. Last week the New Yorker ran a 5,000-word apologia from Atul Gawande, who likewise owned up to the fact that there is “no master plan for dealing with the problem of soaring medical costs,” only “a battery of small scale experiments.” Keep in mind, this is an argument in favor of ObamaCare.
They might have piped up earlier: What they’re finally admitting is that all the grandiose talk about “bending the curve” used for months to sell ObamaCare really comes down to their hope that bureaucratic improvisation will make a difference over the long term. Yet the liabilities of the greatest social spending program in American history will be added to the budget almost immediately, and what happens if Mr. Orszag’s technocratic revolution doesn’t work as promised? Or rather, when it doesn’t?
Forgotten in ObamaCare’s march-to-the-sea campaign is that during the transition and early on, the White House was divided on whether to pursue health reform at all. Opponents included Larry Summers, worried about the economy and deficits, and David Axelrod, worried about the politics. Another faction led by Tom Daschle preached from the conventional social-equity church of liberalism.
Mr. Orszag proposed another option, citing academic research observing that as much as 30% of health spending is “waste” that doesn’t affect outcomes. He argued the country could save $700 billion a year without harming quality—more than enough to pay for universal coverage.
Thus cost control migrated from Orszag theory to free political lunch. Mr. Gawande wrote an influential New Yorker essay on the topic in June, and the theme shaped both the case for a new entitlement and especially the appeal to potential opponents in business.
But then Congressional Budget Office director Douglas Elmendorf testified in July that “the curve is being raised,” given that ObamaCare lacks “the sort of fundamental changes” necessary to tamp down costs. Meanwhile, it became clear that Mr. Orszag’s favored research was always more nuanced and qualified than his pose of papal infallibility. One of his main gurus, Jonathan Skinner, mused recently that “the key lesson” from a new study challenging some of his findings “is how little we know about the science of health-care delivery.”
Well, sure. A field as dynamic and innovative as U.S. medicine, in which costs are largely driven by new technologies and better ways of caring for patients, is rife with complexities and uncertainties. But no one bothered to strike that note of caution when Washington was hopped up on a cost-control gambit that was too painless to be true.
The new cost-control apologists concede that there isn’t any actual plan for controlling costs: Throw enough speculative policies against the wall, they say, and some breakthrough will stick. Yet Mr. Orszag’s no-less-confident predecessors spent decades trying to pull down Medicare spending with little to no success. Technocracy rarely if ever works as intended. Mr. Gawande points to the case study of U.S. farm policy, and if politically sacrosanct agriculture subsidies and rural price-supports are the best to hope for, then what’s the worst?
More relevant examples include Medicare’s “relative value” payment scale, which was designed in 1985 by the Harvard economist William Hsiao to encourage more primary care. That’s this year’s rallying cry too. “Diagnosis-related groups” were introduced into Medicare in 1983 to alleviate hospital cost growth, and what a monumental success that turned out to be. With only brief periods of relatively slower growth, nominal Medicare spending has risen on average at an annual rate of 9.6% since 1980. Over the same period total Medicare spending has grown 13-fold, climbing from 1.2% of the economy to 3.2% today.
Congress lacks the stomach for serious cost control in any case. One policy Mr. Orszag favors—Medicare penalties for hospitals that re-admit certain patients—is limited to only three conditions in the Senate bill, and the penalties are trivial.
Another—a putatively independent commission that is supposed to enforce cost cutting—is barred from going after costs incurred by doctors and hospitals, which leaves out more than half of Medicare spending. Earlier this year Mr. Orszag got into a heated debate with Henry Waxman over such a commission at a dinner party hosted by Connecticut Rep. Rosa DeLauro, precisely because the House baron enjoys the political power that flows from controlling health spending.
Even if Mr. Orszag’s Princeton and Yale Ph.D.s really do cook up some hope-and-a-prayer savings plan, it will invariably offend one constituency or another and Congress will block it. Thereupon the political class will do what it always does when costs run over: Tighten price controls across the board, before moving on to denying patient access to costly treatments that will be defined as “wasteful.” That is, ration care.
“Basically everything that has been put forward in health policy discussions for a decade is in this bill,” Mr. Orszag said on a conference call shortly before Thanksgiving. He then asked critics pointedly: “What specifically else would you do?”
Hmmm. One liberal sage noted in a 2007 paper that “four decades of empirical research” have shown that insulating people through third-party insurance coverage “from the full cost of health care has been responsible for anywhere from 10% to 50% of the large increase in health expenditures.” Ultimately, he concluded, increasing cost-sharing would give individuals a direct stake in more prudent purchasing, as opposed to today’s invisible health dollars that vanish as more expensive premiums, foregone wages and higher taxes.
Those are the words of Jason Furman, now the White House deputy economic director who seems to have been put into witness protection. Every serious health economist in the country recommends reforming the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance, perhaps by converting it to a deduction or credit. Cost control will never stick unless it is extricated from politics and transferred to individuals to make their own trade-offs.
Such reforms were ruled out by union opposition, so the Senate gestures at them with a 40% excise tax on high-cost insurance plans, on the theory that two wrongs will make a right. But this untargeted tax will simply raise the cost of coverage for all workers in a given pool—it’s too clever by 40%—while doing nothing to stem the distortions from first-dollar, third-party insurance.
No doubt there are efficiencies to be had in health care, and maybe Mr. Orszag has even identified some of them. But all of his bright ideas could be taken for a whirl without adding trillions of new liabilities to the federal balance sheet. And the bad faith of the White House and its acolytes is breathtaking.
The White House hawked a permanent entitlement expansion on flimsy and speculative theories that its own partisans now admit—albeit when it is nearly too late—aren’t more substantive than the triumph of hope over experience, while simultaneously writing off the one policy that has been effective in the real world. The cost control mantra of ObamaCare was always a political bill of goods, and its result will be the opposite of its claims: poorer quality care at higher costs.
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A24
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