PROMOTING APPEASEMENT OF IRAN
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.5238/pub_detail.asp
Exclusive: Brzezinski and CFR Promote Appeasement of Iran (Part Two of Two)
William R. Hawkins
Part One of this two-part essay looked at the essay by President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the January/February 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs. This well-known journal is the flagship publication of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). My focus was on Brzezinki’s controversial views of what should be U.S. policy towards Iran and Israel. His views have been reflected in a November Contingency Planning Memorandum published by the CFR. The author of the memo is Steven Simon, currently a CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, who had previously occupied a CFR chair endowed by Hasib J. Sabbagh, a wealthy Palestinian opponent of Israel. Part Two looks at the arguments offered by Simon for blocking the use of force by Israel against the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Simon wrote his memo for the CFR’s Center for Preventive Action Contingency Roundtable Series, which is described as a “monthly meeting series [that] seeks to organize focused discussions on plausible short to medium term contingencies that could seriously threaten U.S. interests. The goal of the meeting series is not only to raise awareness of U.S. government officials and the expert community to potential crises but also to generate practical policy options to lessen the likelihood of the contingency and to reduce the negative consequences should it occur.†In the case of an Israeli attack on Iran, the “threats†to U.S. interests posed by Simon (and Brzezinski) are minor, even spurious.
Simon acknowledges that “Israel is capable of carrying out these attacks unilaterally†against nuclear facilities at Isfahan, Natanz, Arak and Qom. Using aerial refueling, Israeli strike fighters “have the range to reach the target set, deliver their payloads in the face of Iranian air defenses, and return to their bases….the munitions necessary to penetrate the targets are currently in Israel’s inventory in sufficient numbers†and “these munitions could be expected to damage the targets severely.â€
Simon also notes that “the 1981 Osirak attack [on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program] won two crucial decades during which Operation Desert Storm effectively disarmed Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom finally decapitated it.†He argues that “In the case of Osirak, the Carter and Reagan administrations’ unwillingness or incapacity to intervene left Israel feeling cornered and compelled to act unilaterally. One lesson to be learned from this is that Israel is more likely to use force if it perceives Washington to be disengaged.†The sub-contracting of six years of futile negotiations with Iran over its nuclear ambitions to the Europeans by President George W. Bush has now been followed by President Barack Obama’s desire to reduce tensions with Tehran. This is exactly the kind of dangerous environment that could prompt Israel to again exercise its right of self-defense and act unilaterally against a deadly enemy.
Simon only pretends to understand Israeli’s security imperative. The “preventive action†he wants the U.S. to take is aimed at Israel, not Iran, because he feels Israel presents the greater threat to American interests. His case does not hold up to examination.
First, Simon warns, “the United States would probably become embroiled militarily in any Iranian retaliation against Israel or other countries in the region†and “would stretch U.S. military capabilities at a particularly difficult time while potentially derailing domestic priorities.†If the U.S. cannot defend against Iran retaliation, then its posture is too weak to deter Iran in other contingencies as well, or to back successful diplomacy to end the Iranian weapons program. And if American capabilities are weak, they will only deteriorate further if placed behind “domestic priorities†in the allocation of national resources. Simon’s argument that American weakness should beget Israeli weakness only benefits Iran.
Second, Simon raises the issue of a spike in oil prices following an Israeli strike, but then knocks this down by citing a GAO study that concluded “the loss of Iranian oil for eighteen months would increase prices by only $6 to $11/bbl, assuming that the International Energy Agency coordinated release of reserves.†Simon advocates the U.S. encourage the Gulf States to increase oil output to offset reduced Iranian shipments.
His third argument is even weaker and rests on a complete misunderstanding of the division in the Muslim world between Arab Sunnis and Persian Shiites. Simon claims, “Since the United States would be viewed as having assisted Israel, U.S. efforts to foster better relations with the Muslim world would almost certainly suffer. The United States has an enduring strategic interest in fostering better relations with the Muslim world, which is distinct from the ruling elites on whom the United States depends for an array of regional objectives.†This is the old “Arab Street†argument that assumes a unified Islamic hatred of America.
In reality, the Bush administration made great progress in forging cooperation among the Arab states and with Israeli against their common Iranian enemy. During the summer of 2006, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan openly criticized Iran’s Hezbollah proxy for raiding into Israel. The Arab states gave Israel the diplomatic space it needed to mount military operations aimed at crippling Hezbollah.
In 2007, the U.S. offered $20 billion in military aid to Saudi Arabia and the other five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council; $30 billion in aid to Israel; and $13 billion to Egypt over the next decade. According to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the arms sale to the government of Hosni Mubarak would “strengthen Egypt’s ability to address shared strategic goals†with Israel and the other Sunni Arab states. Israel did not oppose the arms sales to the Arabs. And there was no negative reaction among the Arabs to Israeli’s strike against the nuclear facility in Syria that year which was linked to North Korean and Iranian programs.
In 2008, Egypt did nothing to interfere with Israel’s blockade of Gaza or with the targeted killing of Hamas activists and other Palestinian militants with ties to Iran. And during the offensive into Gaza, no Arab state lifted a finger against Israel. Currently, Egypt is stepping up its efforts to stop the smuggling of supplies into Gaza, in effect, helping to reinforce Israel’s blockade. Simon’s simplistic view of Middle East geopolitics is a generation obsolete.
Simon’s out-of-date views were evident in his fifth point, “progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian final status accord remains elusive, an Israeli strike, especially one that overflew Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would delay fruitful renewed negotiation indefinitely.†It is a major strategic mistake to place the Palestinian issue ahead of larger security concerns, especially those involving major state confrontations and nuclear proliferation. Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi cooperation in a strike against Iran would be a great step forward, advancing the vital U.S. interest of strengthen a regional coalition against Tehran’s expansionist ambitions.
It is only the fourth of Simon’s points that warrants serious consideration. Would an Israeli (or U.S.) strike unite a politically divided Iranian people? Would those who are protesting against the illegitimate rule of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rally to the national flag? Simon thinks so, but acknowledges “some argue that the popular anger aroused in Iran by a strike would be turned against a discredited clerical regime that seemed to invite foreign attack after its bloody postelection repression of nonviolent opposition.†History would indicate that losing a war is one of the most common ways that a regime loses its final credibility with the public, leading to revolution. Ask the ghost of Mussolini. And even if a regime can put down such uprisings, as Saddam Hussein did after losing the Gulf War in 1991, the country can hardly be said to be unified afterwards. The Iraqi people did, in fact, welcome U.S. military intervention as liberation from the madman Saddam.
Brzezinski in his Foreign Affairs essay argues against cutting off Iran’s importation of gasoline because it would hurt the middle class. Yet, what could better demonstrate to the most important popular elements in Tehran the rising costs to the country of the regime’s militant policies? Pulling back external pressure would give the regime breathing space to concentrate on suppressing domestic opposition. Sanctions should not be seen merely as bargaining chips, but as tools to weaken the regime so it may be driven from power by democratic forces.
Simon finally falls back on the argument that an Israeli strike would not be decisive in the long term. “Israeli officials are aware that no conceivable Israeli strike could completely eliminate the nuclear threat posed by Iran and that an attack might only intensify longer-term risks as Iran reconstituted covertly, advancing an argument long made by counterterrorism officials that any effort to counter Iran’s nuclear challenge is going to be like ‘mowing the lawn.’ Just as the grass will grow again, so will the nuclear program; Israel will just have to mow again.†That is, however, the nature of national security. Constant vigilance and effort is required, history never comes to an end. If Iran continues to pursue its aggressive ambitions in the region, with or without nuclear arms, it will have to be constantly confronted and thwarted.
Simon’s alternative program is purely defensive. The lawn would never get mowed, but be allowed to grow into a jungle. He advocates nothing more than continued negotiations while proclaiming that Iran’s nuclear program is unacceptable and no options are off the table. In other words, the status quo approach that is making Iran’s program acceptable to the Obama administration . Tehran knows virtually all options for meaningful counteraction are off the table, so sees no need to halt its efforts. Simon’s focus is on building up the defenses of Israel and the Arab states, and giving regional allies assurances that America will protect them from an Iran that is permitted to go nuclear.
But what kind of credibility would such assurances have coming from a U.S. administration that would contemplate using force against its closest ally in the region (Israel) to protect the coalition’s main enemy (Iran)? Simon’s program is a recipe for diplomatic as well as military failure. Simon’s presentation is so weak; one has to suspect American failure is his real objective. Not a surprising conclusion given his past writings and associations.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in international economic and national security issues. He is a former economics professor and Republican Congressional staff member.
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