THANKS TO THE “HEARTS AND MINDS” STRATEGY THE TALIBAN IS ASCENDANT…EVEN KARZAI SAYS IT…..RSK

Afghan Staying Power

The President needs to speak up for his war strategy

Some six months into the 2007 Iraqi surge, skeptics from both parties and the media pack lambasted the Bush Administration for a spike in American casualties and the absence of quick results. Six months into the Afghan surge, the Obama Administration is taking similar flak. President Obama, who opposed the Iraqi surge before it paid dividends, might now—at least privately—sympathize with George W. Bush.

Wars don’t follow political calendars or 24-hour news cycles. A commitment to a hard, at times unpopular, fight is the mark of Presidential leadership. Though the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are different, and the Administration can only hope this surge turns out as well as the one in Iraq, the political and strategic lessons from 2007 apply as well to the war in Afghanistan.

Judging by the events of the past week, the American electorate might conclude that we’re on the wrong track in Afghanistan. Nearly two dozen U.S. and NATO soldiers were killed in various attacks, continuing the upward trend in casualties.

The U.S.-led military coalition announced a delay of several months in a long-promised campaign in Afghanistan’s second-largest city, Kandahar, a hothouse of the Taliban, government corruption and narcotics trafficking. The delay follows the mixed results of the Marine push into Marja, which isn’t free of the Taliban months after that hallmark offensive began.

On the political front, the U.S. was caught by surprise last week when President Hamid Karzai forced out his interior minister and intelligence chief. Hanif Atmar and Amrullah Saleh, respectively, were close allies of Washington and respected by the NATO brass on the ground.

No good rationale has been offered for their removal—except that Mr. Karzai wanted to purge his cabinet of ministers backed by Washington. Citing Mr. Saleh and unnamed officials, the New York Times reported over the weekend that the Afghan leader has lost confidence in America’s commitment to win the war, and is seeking to strike his own deals with the Taliban and their Pakistani patrons.

Whatever the truth of this Kabul palace intrigue, the Administration hasn’t helped its own cause with Mr. Karzai. For the first year of the Obama Presidency, the White House went out of its way to undermine the Afghan President, feeding his sense of paranoia. Mr. Karzai’s character and political flaws are obvious, and as the joke goes, his sovereign writ may not extend far beyond the city limits of Kabul. But Mr. Karzai is the elected Afghan President, and Washington must find a way to work with him. The Administration has recognized this belatedly, and last month it hosted Mr. Karzai and his ministers in Washington for a prominent summit.

The larger strategic problem is President Obama’s decision last year to announce a pullout date for U.S. forces starting next summer. Yes, he hedged the deadline as the start of a troop draw-down and left himself other outs. But in the region the deadline was taken as a signal that America lacks staying power. The Taliban have adopted a strategy to run out the clock. Having to think to a day when American won’t be here, Pakistani intelligence and some Afghans are talking about reaching an accommodation with the Taliban.

Mr. Obama can help undo some of this damage if he will walk back from the deadline in terms clear enough for the Taliban and America’s allies in Kabul and Islamabad to understand. And while he’s on the subject, the President could again explain to the American people why he ordered 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and what’s at stake in a conflict that he once called the central front in the war against terror. His habit has been to give a big speech and then drop the subject, which in turn leads to waning domestic support. This is how to lose a war.

Mr. Obama’s surge is an attempt to push back the Taliban and give the Afghans space to build a functioning state, while bringing the fight to al Qaeda and its allies in the border regions of nearby Pakistan. Were America’s commitment to flag, Islamists would claim a notable victory. Our own security would suffer greatly for it.

After their success in Iraq, General David Petraeus, the head of Central Command, and his commander on the ground, General Stanley McChrystal, deserve the time and political cover for their Afghan counterinsurgency strategy to bear fruit. Ensuring that our soldiers have both is a test of Mr. Obama’s own staying power.